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Monday 21 September 2015

Structural issues including education are holding Malaysia back




KUALA LUMPUR: Malaysia is facing several long-term structural issues in its economy that needs to quickly adjust in accordance with the new realities of the global economy.

This was the conclusion of a panel discussion by representatives of three leading rating agencies – Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services (S&P), Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings – during Malaysia’s Economic Update 2015 forum on “Outside-In Perspective: Economic Outlook for Malaysia” held here.

The agencies said that while the fundamentals of the country, including the financials, were good, the country needed to address several issues that would hold it back in the long-term.

S&P’s associate director of sovereign and international public finance ratings Phua Yee Farn said that one of the issues that needed to be quickly addressed was the state of education in the country.

“As discussed earlier (in the forum) by Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department Datuk Seri Abdul Wahid Omar on the education system here, this is something that is very fundamental to improving the level of output and productivity.

“The affirmative action policy has been around for decades and we think that it will continue to be in place here. However, this will continue to cause the brain drain to other countries. The brilliant ones are paid very well and are choosing to go somewhere else,” Phua said.

He, however, also acknowledged that the Government had made some efforts to try and reverse this situation, adding, however, that it would “not be easy”.

“The education system has to go through some structural reforms before we can see the next leap to a real high-income economy,” Phua said.

Meanwhile, Fitch Ratings’ managing director and global head of sovereign and supranational ratings James McCormack said that being stuck in the “middle-income trap” was something that should be of concern to Malaysia.

“While we are all preoccupied with China and the growth picture there now, the reality is that there is a transformation going on there now from an investment-led, export-oriented economy to a consumption-led, domestic-demand economy.

“Asia, in general, has leveraged off the previous export growth model tremendously. Even if the growth rate may be lower in China, but (structurally) it is a different kind of growth that will be taking place there,” McCormack said.

“It is not one where the rest of Asia can simply feed intermediate products into an export machine that will eventually end up in Europe and the United States. China is already supplying more of these inputs domestically so that trade is actually slowly disappearing,” he added.

He noted that the economies that were more geared to the new consumption model in China were the ones that would benefit from this new economic model there.

“This, however, seems to be more evident in north Asia such as in Taiwan, Japan and South Korea than it is in South-East Asia. These countries in north Asia are heavily invested in China and have companies that are directly selling to Chinese consumers. This is an economic model that is less prevalent in South-East Asia,” he said.

“This is why I worry about Malaysia and South-East Asia being caught in this middle-income trap because the higher value-added products are in north Asia, while the lower end lies in the lower-income countries.

“Because the income levels are moving up here in Malaysia and this is where you get competition from both the top and bottom. this is what the middle income trap is about – getting squeezed in the middle,” he pointed out.

McCormack’s views were also shared by Moody’s vice-president/senior analyst of sovereign risk group Christian de Guzman, who added that Malaysia needed to attract more high-value investments.

By DANIEL KHOO The Star/Asia News Network

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China-US new type of major power relations: positive narratives needed to help turn negative tide

Illustration: Liu Rui/GT

New type of great power relations

Xi Jinping's upcoming visit to the US comes amid the two sides' pledge to push for a "new type of great power relations." Though tensions come part and parcel of ties between great powers, China and the US have vowed to navigate those dangerous waters through dialogue.

http://t.cn/RyJMfbB

China-US are on way to a new type of major power relations



Recently, worries have been heard in the Western academia and strategic circles on China's development direction, foreign policy changes and thus the possible deterioration of China-US relations.

Two catchy phrases are mostly used to describe the current situation, the "Thucydides's Trap" and "tipping point."

The "Thucydides's Trap," which means a rising power generates fear in an established power that it ultimately leads to a war between the two, is not persuasive to describe the possible prospect of nowadays China-US relations. On the one hand, it neglects significant changes of the external environment. In addition, the theory hardly explains the peaceful transition of power in history.

On the other hand, the "Thucydides's Trap" puts too much blame on the threat of the rising country, missing the possibility that the established country could be more comfortable in launching a preemptive war.

"Tipping point" is another phrase that has caused a round of discussion about China-US relations in both countries. David Lampton, a senior China scholar, delivered a speech in May, worrying that China-US relations were approaching "a tipping point." After that, some US politicians and scholars followed the suit and expressed worries about bilateral relations. Even in China, people began to write articles, discussing how to avoid a hot war with the US.

Paying too much attention on the two phrases will exaggerate the competitive sides of the two countries and are not helpful for China-US relations. It will lead people to imagine more difficulties and feel frustrated about the relations.

We should adopt positive narrative about China-US relations and concentrate more on cooperation rather than competition.

It is a good chance for the two countries to strengthen the positive and grand narrative about bilateral relations during the upcoming state visit paid by Chinese President Xi Jinping to the US. A new type of major power relationship in general is a useful guideline and positive narrative for the future development of bilateral ties.

Meanwhile, the two countries should inject more concrete contents into the idea by narrowing divergences and expanding cooperation. China-US relations are the most important and complex bilateral relations in the world. It is impossible for the two countries to shun competition, but strengthening bilateral cooperation still forms the major part of the relations.

China and the US need each other. Although some US scholars and politicians argued that the US government should change its grand strategy toward China, namely balancing China's rise, the fact is that the US needs China's cooperation on a bunch of issues ranging from bilateral issues to global governance such as climate change.

Xi's visit will provide a great opportunity to facilitate cooperation between the two countries. The communication between the two leaders will first of all enhance the strategic mutual trust and ensure the relations on the right track. Numerous highlights might pop up during Xi's visit.

On cyber security, the two may reach some fundamental consensus like promising not to attack each other's key infrastructure, regulating their own actions and forming basic norms.

On economic cooperation, as the top two economies in the world, the countries should express their willingness to lead the global economic development.

On climate change, the countries may carry on the momentum and release another joint announcement to accumulate more dynamism for the upcoming Paris Climate Conference.

In addition, Xi might share his experience of China's development path to disperse US misunderstandings about China's domestic policies and interact with the US public, offering a solid foundation of the bilateral relations.

By Sun Chenghao Source:Global Times

The author is an assistant research fellow at the Institute of American Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn

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Sunday 20 September 2015

Asian finance uncertain future

While Asians think long term, their institutional framework remains short term.


Global factory: A cargo ship waits to be loaded with shipping containers at a port in Qingdao, Shandong province. China’s emergence consolidated Asia’s key role as the global factory, supplying the rest of the world with all manner of consumer goods. – Reuters

ANYONE who thinks he can predict the future of Asian finance has to know first how the Asian real economy will be doing. Projections of the future, based on past data, are notoriously inaccurate. But there are general scenarios that we can paint about the mega trends in the global economy that will certainly shape what will happen to Asia.

Roughly every five years, the US National Intelligence Council (www.dni.gov/NIC_2030_project.html) has been publishing scenarios about the future, the latest being for 2030. There are no straight line projections into the future, but rather factors that we do have some knowledge about that will impact on future outcomes.

The key trends are well known, such as demographics, urbanisation, technology and social media, globalisation, climate change and growing risks through social conflict, including terrorism, civil disruption and regional wars. The main trend that makes life much more complicated is the fact that we have moved from a uni-polar world where the US dominant position has weakened relative to the other major players.

Not only are there new powers emerging, such as the BRICS countries, but also non-state players like Isis that can fight across borders without a national identity. This makes coordinated and consistent action much more difficult to manage, which is why there is little agreement at the level of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and other multilateral institutions.

The McKinsey Global Institute has tried to help corporate captains and policy-makers frame the uncertain future for the period 2015-2025 into basically four possible outcomes. The best scenario is a globally coordinated and distributed growth underpinned by broadening productivity increases.

Next are pockets of global growth with imbalances. Scenario three is low but stable global growth, with lots of muddling through. And the worst is continuing rolling regional crises with volatile and weak growth all round.

Stimulus packages

Most of what is likely to happen would depend on what is happening near term to stimulus packages like quantitative easing (QE) and the outlook for energy prices. Over the long term, the aging of advanced economies, rapid urbanisation (or labour migration) and technology and global connectivity will shape the final outcome.

The near-term outlook is much bleaker in the post-crisis adjustment period. Having shot the world full of steroids in terms of QE, the world’s central banks are moving in divergent paths. The Fed wants to withdraw, while the European Central Bank and Japan are still bent on using very loose monetary policy. But post-crisis, advanced country growth are roughly 2% below potential, and their demand for Asian imports are likely to remain weak.

Which is why Asian finance would depend on what happens in the next decade to the Asian global supply chain. Historians remember that the Japanese led the post-war revival of the Asian economies by being the first to supply the demand for consumer goods by the West.

After growth in Japan peaked in the 1980s, Japan invested heavily in the rest of East Asia to exploit cheap labour and increase its productive capacity. China’s emergence consolidated Asia’s key role as the global factory, supplying the rest of the world with all manner of consumer goods.

The success of the Asian global supply chain meant that Asia ran a current account surplus with the rest of the world, but mostly with the US. With rising incomes and savings, Asia became a net lender to the world, further stimulating global growth as domestic investments, an emerging middle class and demand took most of Asia to middle-income levels.

But such excessive savings were never properly intermediated within Asia. Instead, the excess savings were parked in New York and London, returning to Asia in the form of foreign direct or portfolio investments. Fundamentally, Asia did not upgrade its bank-dominated system of using short-term deposits to fund long-term investments.

Despite aging population, the level of long-term pension and insurance funds and therefore the institutionalisation of long-term savings remained small compared with the banking system.<

Low rate policies

Much of this has to do with a penchant for low interest rate policies, beginning with the Japanese attempts to reflate its economy with ultra-loose monetary policy. Excessively low interest rates meant that investments may not go to the best use of funds, while speculation in asset bubbles became more profitable than upgrading total factor productivity.

China’s stock market gyrations this year symbolise the contradictions within Asia’s financial system. On the one hand, the stock market should be the source of long-term equity much needed for giving the whole economy an equity cushion against overleveraged fragilities.

On the other, the stock market became a casino for retail punters with margin funding.

Which is why the Fed’s decision on raising interest rates has so much impact on the future of Asian finance, because New York and London remain an important intermediary for Asian excess savings.

Capital outflows back to New York and London occur precisely because as Asian excess savings unwind, interest rates will adjust upwards and Asian asset bubbles will accordingly also unwind.

The irony of Asian growth is that while Asians think long term, their institutional framework remains distinctly short term. Asian pension and insurance funds remain too small and lack the firepower and innovative imagination to be the market stabilisers that are needed for the long haul.

The Japanese pension system is the classic example of Asian institutional weakness. By putting the bulk of its savings in domestic government bonds, the system is trapped in terms of returns, since the large Japanese fiscal deficit and debt overhang (roughly twice GDP) can only be sustained by low interest rates. We then have the world’s largest net saver becoming the largest borrower, owing everything to oneself

Can the right hand of an aging person rescue its left hand? Over any demographic cycle, it is the young that will support the old, so one must invest in the young for the future to be bright.

The future of Asian finance is less a technical issue and more a mindset problem. Unless Asian policymakers start thinking more about long-term funding for its young (in thinking as well as action), it will continue to be subject to the whims of monetary policy decision in Washington DC.

Andrew Sheng writes on global issues from an Asian perspective.

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