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Apple products have gained huge popularity in China over recent years. Iphones and ipads are the "must-have" accessory, particularly in urban areas while the company’s stores are often overflowing with customers trying out the latest gadgets.
But there’s now a scandal brewing over Apple’s warranty and repair policy, and concern that Chinese consumers are being given a rough ride.
In a recent interview, Apple CEO Tim Cook said China will soon become Apple’s biggest market.
For Apple, business must stay business
Apple Inc has been having a hard time in China since China Central Television (CCTV) revealed on March 15 that the technology giant allegedly applies a different service policy to Chinese consumers than in other countries and regions. A wave of onslaught has surged in Chinese State media in the past few days, with Chinese authorities ordering the company to change its policies or face punishment according to Chinese regulations.
However, many Chinese fans have shown their loyalty toward Apple, allying with some foreign media outlets in saying that this is a "well-coordinated" campaign led by the Chinese government to pinch the US company. It is also said that Apple is merely the victim of China's vengeance against the US government's treatment of Chinese telecom giants. China's Huawei and ZTE have long been restricted in the US markets under security and other accusations.
The drama began as a typical business incident, as CCTV did not only point its finger at Apple in its March 15 exposé. It is no good for either side that the issue is gradually turning political.
Generally speaking, CCTV's annual showcase program on World Consumer Rights Day has played a positive role in digging out business scandals. It is also the reason why the program has remained influential among Chinese viewers for a long time.
Had Apple been more sincere in its response to the criticism, the result could have been different. The statement Apple made right after the CCTV exposé was very different with that of other multinational companies who were also reported to have consumer rights issues. With the sheer weight of the company behind it, Apple's detached tone could easily be seen as proof of arrogance.
Apple has won respect from Chinese consumers with its perseverance in developing leading technologies and styles. But the company is not impeccable. Like its continuing stride in exploring for technological breakthroughs, the company also needs to keep working hard to raise its service quality.
Apple should not follow the media speculation and consider itself the target of political persecution. As for its fans in China, if they do love this brand, they should let the truth emerge instead of joining the speculations.
If the issue developed into a head-on confrontation between Apple and the Chinese authorities, the US company will never be a winner, nor will China necessarily do well. Of course, Apple will suffer the most, as its products are already facing increasing competition in China.
It will be wise for Apple not to entangle itself into political debates. For Apple, it is still a matter of business. - Global Times
Why call US tech giant rotten Apple?
State broadcaster Central China Television (CCTV) took the first bite. The People's Daily followed, and now others like Guangming Daily and The Global Times have joined the fray.
China's state media has been piling the pressure on Apple since the American tech giant was criticised during CCTV's annual show on March 15 to mark World Consumer Day.
This week alone, the People's Daily has run articles four days in a row to lash out at Apple for allegedly discriminating against its customers in China.
"Why is it that Apple is so incredibly brazen and arrogant in China when it doesn't dare to be so in the United States and other countries?" asked a commentator in the People's Daily, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party. It also likened Apple to a wolf pretending to be innocent.
Many observers are wondering about the real reasons behind the coordinated media attacks.
Could China be retaliating against the difficulties faced by its tech behemoth Huawei in the US? Or is it Apple's lack of advertisements in the state media?
"I wish I knew," Bill Bishop, a Beijing-based analyst and founder of The Sinocism China Newsletter, told The Straits Times.
There are some who say there is nothing more to it than Apple behaving badly.
"When it comes to China, a market with great potential, Apple has taken advantage of its fans' crazy enthusiasm by using incredulous sales tactics," wrote blogger Shu Shusi, a frequent commentator on consumer issues.
Not only are iPhones released later and sold at a higher price in China than elsewhere, their after- sales service is bad too, he added.
Apple might also have violated Chinese regulations, noted others. CCTV on Wednesday said consumers had complained that Apple offered only a one-year warranty for its MacBook Air in China, when the country's rules mandate a two-year warranty for the main laptop parts.
Then there is the sense that Apple needed to be taught a lesson for not being contrite enough.
"Errant companies" featured on CCTV's 315 Evening Gala, like Chinese net firm Netease, had been quick to apologise and make peace. But Apple insisted that its China customers enjoy the highest service standards.
Some wonder whether the attacks are just a case of tit-for-tat.
A US Congressional report last October accused Huawei of being a security threat.
"Just as the US attacked Huawei, China is taking it out on Apple in revenge," claimed "Blank Neo" on his Sina Weibo microblog.
Another possible explanation could be Beijing's unease with the wide usage of iPhones in China.
"There is a serious official desire for an indigenous mobile operating system," noted Bishop.
Also, the iPhone's operating system may be seen as a foreign security threat as it is a closed one and not easily monitored. The Android operating system, in contrast, is open and thus less of a threat, say observers.
The attacks could be a way of attracting eyeballs, suggested a consumer rights advocate.
"Apple has a huge customer base in China. Its news value is high," Wang Hai said.
What can Apple do to stop the rash of attacks?
Said Bishop: "I expect Apple to have to change its policies, express public contrition, and then this particular storm will blow over.
"They may also need to buy some ads on CCTV, as (search engine) Baidu and many other Chinese firms who have been on the receiving end did."
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Sunday, 31 March 2013
Saturday, 30 March 2013
BRICS change the world: doing development differently
A prospective new financial architecture promises to reform and improve development finance for the world.
FIVE countries came together during the week to grab international headlines over how they might, as a group, change the world: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Brics).
And they would do so in the most tried-and-tested way imaginable: financially, as a single economic entity. As a bloc Brics may effect change on a global scale, but the grouping would still do so in the traditional way of flexing economic muscle.
The annual Brics summit held during the week in Durban, South Africa, focused on what that muscle can do – challenge the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the way development finance is conducted, as well as the Western dominance that has prevailed in both Bretton Woods institutions.
Those institutions were never meant to be that way, of course, as a reading of their founding texts would show. But any initial magnanimity soon gave way to self-interest: US and European dominance of the World Bank and the IMF respectively was to be a Western “consensus” imposed on the world like a global neo-colonial regime.
Interestingly, the original Bric as both a term and a grouping originated not in any of the initial four countries or the developing world, but in the US itself.
None other than Goldman Sachs’ Asset Management Chairman Jim O’Neill coined the term in 2001 for those countries he believed would outpace the US in total GDP by 2020.
At the turn of the century Brazil, Russia, India and China were merely regarded by some as emerging economies developing under their own steam.
After O’Neill’s coinage they held their first summit in 2009 and invited South Africa to join them a year later, and Brics was born.
Since then, Brics as both concept and entity has had vigorous growth and a vibrant youth. It compares favourably with the IMF and the World Bank, both pushing 70 years and weighed down by limiting conditionalities and outmoded economic ideology.
Both institutions typically adopt a cold, mechanistic approach to development that prioritises market interests over human needs. Their Western bias is also a throwback in a 21st-century world of shared global interests and aspirations, and a world in which Western economies themselves are in trouble.
In contrast, Brics as a bloc of emerging economies serves as a bridge between the developing Third World and the developed First World. It seeks to narrow that yawning chasm by focusing on reviving global growth and ensuring macroeconomic stability.
Those virtues that had once been the preserve of the West have become its elusive goals. The “developed” and the “emerging” (mostly, once “developing”) economies have traded places.
The new global bank that Brics wants to establish is expected to emphasise infrastructure development and trade. The first represents solid investment in development for the future, and the second works as an economic multiplier for further growth.
On paper, Brics countries account for almost half the world’s population and just over a quarter of world trade. But more important than these bare figures is how Brics economies have been driving global growth for years, as acknowledged by the World Bank itself.
The idea for a new global bank arose only last year. So how the measured progress at the Durban summit is perceived depends at least as much on the observer: is the glass half-full or half-empty?
Some of the most difficult decisions, such as financing modes, remain unresolved. Its primary purposes like the operation of funds in project financing and a contingency fund as crisis buffer will take more time to work out.
Pessimists may cite how the absence of agreement on even the quantum of fund contribution from each country bodes ill for Brics. Basing the contribution on economic capacity makes sense, but concerns were expressed over how that would inevitably make a hulking China dominant.
A standard sum of US$10bil (RM31bil) from each country as seed capital was then considered, following a Russian proposal, but the final decision was left until later.
Optimists would say that far from weak indecision, this showed an openness about not wanting any country to dominate, with agreement on equality with a fair and manageable quantum for all.
However, realists may say that in such financial matters China would still eventually dominate. To that, it can be said that dominance by a single country was never a problem before, given the prominent US role and influence in the World Bank and the IMF.
At this point some may say it was precisely because of single-power dominance that had compromised the work of the Bretton Woods institutions. It might then be observed that a new global bank dominated by China would only balance the World Bank (and the IMF), which it would complement rather than replace.
Some observers may see crippling incompatibility in the different political systems within BRICS.
But such diversity need not be an obstacle, particularly when all countries now work within a global capitalist system.
President Vladimir Putin, often cited in Western circles as a modern incarnation of the Soviet bear, even insisted that a new global bank “must work on market principles only.” And “communist” China is not only a major and enthusiastic player in global markets, but – to former British foreign minister David Miliband – has even acted as a saviour of Western capitalism.
What worries fans of the IMF and World Bank is not how a new global bank as competitor will “steal their business,” but how it may force both to be more democratic and more sympathetic to the developing world. Who else but those currently dominating them in Washington and Brussels would object?
Japan as an emerging economy itself decades ago had its chance to forge a new alternative in international finance with the Asian Development Bank, but blew it.
The former coloniser in Asia seeking to make good in its post-war period, with US partnership, soon settled into establishment mode alongside its Bretton Woods equivalents. A new global bank established by BRICS will be a welcome addition to the existing financial institutions.
Its continental and political diversity would also make a slide into betraying its noble purpose more difficult.
Late last year, Brazil suggested that the proposed bank should be modelled on Asean’s Chiang Mai initiative.
This is a time for a sharing of experiences when each can learn from the rest, not of jealous exclusion and unfounded fears of rivalry.
In time, perhaps even the World Bank and the IMF can find it in themselves to accommodate and welcome new financial institutions operating on their “turf”.
At least that would help them return to their initial noble calling.
FIVE countries came together during the week to grab international headlines over how they might, as a group, change the world: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Brics).
And they would do so in the most tried-and-tested way imaginable: financially, as a single economic entity. As a bloc Brics may effect change on a global scale, but the grouping would still do so in the traditional way of flexing economic muscle.
The annual Brics summit held during the week in Durban, South Africa, focused on what that muscle can do – challenge the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the way development finance is conducted, as well as the Western dominance that has prevailed in both Bretton Woods institutions.
Those institutions were never meant to be that way, of course, as a reading of their founding texts would show. But any initial magnanimity soon gave way to self-interest: US and European dominance of the World Bank and the IMF respectively was to be a Western “consensus” imposed on the world like a global neo-colonial regime.
Interestingly, the original Bric as both a term and a grouping originated not in any of the initial four countries or the developing world, but in the US itself.
None other than Goldman Sachs’ Asset Management Chairman Jim O’Neill coined the term in 2001 for those countries he believed would outpace the US in total GDP by 2020.
At the turn of the century Brazil, Russia, India and China were merely regarded by some as emerging economies developing under their own steam.
After O’Neill’s coinage they held their first summit in 2009 and invited South Africa to join them a year later, and Brics was born.
Since then, Brics as both concept and entity has had vigorous growth and a vibrant youth. It compares favourably with the IMF and the World Bank, both pushing 70 years and weighed down by limiting conditionalities and outmoded economic ideology.
Both institutions typically adopt a cold, mechanistic approach to development that prioritises market interests over human needs. Their Western bias is also a throwback in a 21st-century world of shared global interests and aspirations, and a world in which Western economies themselves are in trouble.
In contrast, Brics as a bloc of emerging economies serves as a bridge between the developing Third World and the developed First World. It seeks to narrow that yawning chasm by focusing on reviving global growth and ensuring macroeconomic stability.
Those virtues that had once been the preserve of the West have become its elusive goals. The “developed” and the “emerging” (mostly, once “developing”) economies have traded places.
The new global bank that Brics wants to establish is expected to emphasise infrastructure development and trade. The first represents solid investment in development for the future, and the second works as an economic multiplier for further growth.
On paper, Brics countries account for almost half the world’s population and just over a quarter of world trade. But more important than these bare figures is how Brics economies have been driving global growth for years, as acknowledged by the World Bank itself.
The idea for a new global bank arose only last year. So how the measured progress at the Durban summit is perceived depends at least as much on the observer: is the glass half-full or half-empty?
Some of the most difficult decisions, such as financing modes, remain unresolved. Its primary purposes like the operation of funds in project financing and a contingency fund as crisis buffer will take more time to work out.
Pessimists may cite how the absence of agreement on even the quantum of fund contribution from each country bodes ill for Brics. Basing the contribution on economic capacity makes sense, but concerns were expressed over how that would inevitably make a hulking China dominant.
A standard sum of US$10bil (RM31bil) from each country as seed capital was then considered, following a Russian proposal, but the final decision was left until later.
Optimists would say that far from weak indecision, this showed an openness about not wanting any country to dominate, with agreement on equality with a fair and manageable quantum for all.
However, realists may say that in such financial matters China would still eventually dominate. To that, it can be said that dominance by a single country was never a problem before, given the prominent US role and influence in the World Bank and the IMF.
At this point some may say it was precisely because of single-power dominance that had compromised the work of the Bretton Woods institutions. It might then be observed that a new global bank dominated by China would only balance the World Bank (and the IMF), which it would complement rather than replace.
Some observers may see crippling incompatibility in the different political systems within BRICS.
But such diversity need not be an obstacle, particularly when all countries now work within a global capitalist system.
President Vladimir Putin, often cited in Western circles as a modern incarnation of the Soviet bear, even insisted that a new global bank “must work on market principles only.” And “communist” China is not only a major and enthusiastic player in global markets, but – to former British foreign minister David Miliband – has even acted as a saviour of Western capitalism.
What worries fans of the IMF and World Bank is not how a new global bank as competitor will “steal their business,” but how it may force both to be more democratic and more sympathetic to the developing world. Who else but those currently dominating them in Washington and Brussels would object?
Japan as an emerging economy itself decades ago had its chance to forge a new alternative in international finance with the Asian Development Bank, but blew it.
The former coloniser in Asia seeking to make good in its post-war period, with US partnership, soon settled into establishment mode alongside its Bretton Woods equivalents. A new global bank established by BRICS will be a welcome addition to the existing financial institutions.
Its continental and political diversity would also make a slide into betraying its noble purpose more difficult.
Late last year, Brazil suggested that the proposed bank should be modelled on Asean’s Chiang Mai initiative.
This is a time for a sharing of experiences when each can learn from the rest, not of jealous exclusion and unfounded fears of rivalry.
In time, perhaps even the World Bank and the IMF can find it in themselves to accommodate and welcome new financial institutions operating on their “turf”.
At least that would help them return to their initial noble calling.
Behind the Headlines
By BUNN NAGARA
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By BUNN NAGARA
Related post:
President Xi: Russia ties ensure peace; foreign debut ...
Financial crises a result of governance failures
ROMAN emperor Julius Caesar was famously warned by a seer about the Ides of March, traditionally March 15.
On March 15 this year, banks in Cyprus were closed to allow politicians time to decide how to raise 5.8 billion euros so that the country could qualify for 10 billion euros in bailout funds from the rest of eurozone and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The solution suggested was to levy a tax on depositors, sparking a realisation that finally, the Europeans had decided to “bail-in” investors and depositors, rather than using public funds to “bail-out” everyone else.
The Cyprus crisis caused a stir in global financial markets, because it punctured expectations that the worst was over. Instead, it demonstrated another episode of muddling through.
Banks in Cyprus re-opened on Thursday with new capital controls on the amount depositors can take out. Larger depositors with over 100,000 euros would stand to lose up to 40% of their deposits. Of course, a significant portion of the deposits in Cyprus banks belong to Russians, who may suffer losses of 4 billion to 6 billion euros. For certain investors, this is the price of putting money in higher risk offshore financial centres. The price to Cyprus of operating as an offshore financial centre is likely to be a drop of GDP of more than 20% in the next couple of years.
The Cyprus outcome is not unexpected. If European governments are to be loaded with heavy debt burdens as a result of the crisis, they will be bound to start “taxing” offshore financial centres, where rich Europeans had been avoiding tax for years. If the eurozone banking union is to have any credibility, they will have to start controlling banking centres which operate largely on tax and regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, having banking assets seven to eight times GDP is no longer considered viable, whether for Cyprus or Iceland.
At the heart of such troubles lies the issue of governance. Financial crises are more governance failures than anything else.
Last week, The End of History philosopher and political scientist Francis Fukuyama published an important blog commentary on “What is governance?” This is the much-awaited part of his promised series on political governance, beginning with his 2011 book The Origins of Political Order. In that book, he looked at the three components of a modern political order a strong and capable state, the rule of law and accountability of the state to its citizens. Since the 2011 book stopped at the French Revolution, most readers would be curious to see how he handled the rise of China, which has a different political system from the West.
Fukuyama's new definition of governance is “a government's ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not.” Notice that he has decided to remove any suggestion that democracy is automatically associated with good governance, appreciating that “an authoritarian regime can be well governed, just as a democracy can be mal-administered.”
Accordingly, he uses four approaches to evaluating the quality of governance: procedural measures, input measures, output measures and measures of bureaucratic autonomy. To put it into simple language governance should be measured according to how you govern (the processes); the efficiency of governance (how much tax or resources you need); the effectiveness (outcomes rather than objectives) and whether the bureaucracy is independent of politics or not (the autonomy question).
In dissecting governance into its different dimensions, Fukuyama has helped to clarify the methodology in thinking about the tradeoffs between the ability to have high discretion versus being bogged down by excessive rules, and high capacity to execute, versus low capacity to execute. Critics of that approach would argue that strong states with excessive discretion may not be sustainable. On the other hand, weak states with too many rules and no discretion may not be sustainable either.
Fukuyama is right to point out that the bureaucracy's interests may not be identical to those of the people. The bureaucracy is supposed to be agent of the people (the principal), but many bureaucracies serve their own interests, rather than the public to the extent that civil servants may be neither civil nor servants.
Indeed, the simplistic view that the state is deterministic versus the view of free market self-order misses the fundamental point that large bureaucracies also have self-order. Anyone familiar with working in large complex bureaucracies in China, India or the United States, with many layers of government, would recognise that it is not easy to implement policies from the centre. State or provincial governments have a mind of their own, with very different priorities from that of the centre.
Indeed, in the 21st century, many cities have become more effective instruments of state, and it is not surprising that effective mayors have become national leaders because they show a capacity to deliver close to the people.
The more interesting question about governance is: why are collective action traps so pervasive? In other words, it is understandable why ineffective and weak bureaucracies or political systems are unable to overcome gridlock in their systems, but it is common to see highly effective and capable bureaucracies also caught in gridlock.
These gridlocks are apparent in the resolution of the euro crisis, the stalemate in the Doha World Trade Organisation negotiations and the Durban climate change debates. In the first week of April, the Institute for New Economic Thinking, the Centre for International Governance Innovation and the Fung Global Institute will be hosting a major conference in Hong Kong on how creative and innovative thinking can open up new avenues of thinking on the solutions to global governance. As a respected member of the global economic community, Hong Kong should make its voice heard.
You can watch most of the podcasts on www.ineteconomics.org or www.fginstitute.org.
Related posts:
Euro zone economy shrinks, worst since 2009
US fiscal deficit position is cheating American Children
IMF aid to Europeans stirrings of resentment
Unemployment Fuels Debt Crisis
On March 15 this year, banks in Cyprus were closed to allow politicians time to decide how to raise 5.8 billion euros so that the country could qualify for 10 billion euros in bailout funds from the rest of eurozone and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The solution suggested was to levy a tax on depositors, sparking a realisation that finally, the Europeans had decided to “bail-in” investors and depositors, rather than using public funds to “bail-out” everyone else.
The Cyprus crisis caused a stir in global financial markets, because it punctured expectations that the worst was over. Instead, it demonstrated another episode of muddling through.
Banks in Cyprus re-opened on Thursday with new capital controls on the amount depositors can take out. Larger depositors with over 100,000 euros would stand to lose up to 40% of their deposits. Of course, a significant portion of the deposits in Cyprus banks belong to Russians, who may suffer losses of 4 billion to 6 billion euros. For certain investors, this is the price of putting money in higher risk offshore financial centres. The price to Cyprus of operating as an offshore financial centre is likely to be a drop of GDP of more than 20% in the next couple of years.
The Cyprus outcome is not unexpected. If European governments are to be loaded with heavy debt burdens as a result of the crisis, they will be bound to start “taxing” offshore financial centres, where rich Europeans had been avoiding tax for years. If the eurozone banking union is to have any credibility, they will have to start controlling banking centres which operate largely on tax and regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, having banking assets seven to eight times GDP is no longer considered viable, whether for Cyprus or Iceland.
At the heart of such troubles lies the issue of governance. Financial crises are more governance failures than anything else.
Last week, The End of History philosopher and political scientist Francis Fukuyama published an important blog commentary on “What is governance?” This is the much-awaited part of his promised series on political governance, beginning with his 2011 book The Origins of Political Order. In that book, he looked at the three components of a modern political order a strong and capable state, the rule of law and accountability of the state to its citizens. Since the 2011 book stopped at the French Revolution, most readers would be curious to see how he handled the rise of China, which has a different political system from the West.
Fukuyama's new definition of governance is “a government's ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not.” Notice that he has decided to remove any suggestion that democracy is automatically associated with good governance, appreciating that “an authoritarian regime can be well governed, just as a democracy can be mal-administered.”
Accordingly, he uses four approaches to evaluating the quality of governance: procedural measures, input measures, output measures and measures of bureaucratic autonomy. To put it into simple language governance should be measured according to how you govern (the processes); the efficiency of governance (how much tax or resources you need); the effectiveness (outcomes rather than objectives) and whether the bureaucracy is independent of politics or not (the autonomy question).
In dissecting governance into its different dimensions, Fukuyama has helped to clarify the methodology in thinking about the tradeoffs between the ability to have high discretion versus being bogged down by excessive rules, and high capacity to execute, versus low capacity to execute. Critics of that approach would argue that strong states with excessive discretion may not be sustainable. On the other hand, weak states with too many rules and no discretion may not be sustainable either.
Fukuyama is right to point out that the bureaucracy's interests may not be identical to those of the people. The bureaucracy is supposed to be agent of the people (the principal), but many bureaucracies serve their own interests, rather than the public to the extent that civil servants may be neither civil nor servants.
Indeed, the simplistic view that the state is deterministic versus the view of free market self-order misses the fundamental point that large bureaucracies also have self-order. Anyone familiar with working in large complex bureaucracies in China, India or the United States, with many layers of government, would recognise that it is not easy to implement policies from the centre. State or provincial governments have a mind of their own, with very different priorities from that of the centre.
Indeed, in the 21st century, many cities have become more effective instruments of state, and it is not surprising that effective mayors have become national leaders because they show a capacity to deliver close to the people.
The more interesting question about governance is: why are collective action traps so pervasive? In other words, it is understandable why ineffective and weak bureaucracies or political systems are unable to overcome gridlock in their systems, but it is common to see highly effective and capable bureaucracies also caught in gridlock.
These gridlocks are apparent in the resolution of the euro crisis, the stalemate in the Doha World Trade Organisation negotiations and the Durban climate change debates. In the first week of April, the Institute for New Economic Thinking, the Centre for International Governance Innovation and the Fung Global Institute will be hosting a major conference in Hong Kong on how creative and innovative thinking can open up new avenues of thinking on the solutions to global governance. As a respected member of the global economic community, Hong Kong should make its voice heard.
You can watch most of the podcasts on www.ineteconomics.org or www.fginstitute.org.
THINK ASIAN By ANDREW SHENG
Tan Sri Andrew Sheng is president of the Fung Global Institute. Related posts:
Euro zone economy shrinks, worst since 2009
US fiscal deficit position is cheating American Children
IMF aid to Europeans stirrings of resentment
Unemployment Fuels Debt Crisis
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