SINCE last month, tensions over the disputed islands in the East China Sea, known as Diaoyu to China and Senkaku to Japan, have noticeably declined, largely as a result of conciliatory words and actions by Japanese political figures visiting China.
The first was by Yukio Hatoyama of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan, who was prime minister in 2009-2010 and who had advocated closer ties with China while in office. Hatoyama took issue with Japan's position of denying that there was a territorial dispute, saying "if you look at history, there is a dispute".
The former leader also visited a memorial in Nanjing honouring those who were killed in 1937 and apologised for "the crimes that Japanese soldiers committed during wartime".
Hatoyama's visit was widely publicised in the Chinese media, which published pictures of him and his wife at the Nanjing Massacre Memorial bowing in silent tribute to the dead.
The normally nationalistic Chinese newspaper Global Times declared editorially: "Hatoyama's words and deeds these days show that in spite of the tough environment, forces which are friendly to China have not disappeared."
Shortly after Hatoyama's departure from China, Natsuo Yamaguchi, leader of the New Komeito Party -- a coalition partner of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party -- arrived in China, carrying with him a letter from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for Xi Jinping, the new leader of the Communist Party of China.
Yamaguchi was received by Xi on Jan 25, and, aside from passing over the letter from the prime minister, he also suggested that the territorial dispute be shelved for now and to let future generations deal with the issue.
Xi no doubt knew that the Japanese politician was paraphrasing the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping who, while visiting Tokyo in 1978, famously said, "Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all."
Alas, no solution is yet in sight and the best policy is to put the dispute back on the shelf.
Yamaguchi also suggested a summit meeting between Abe and Xi, and the Chinese leader responded that he would consider it seriously if there was a "proper environment".
Xi also said that China wanted to promote a "strategic relationship of mutual benefit" with Japan.
Soon, a third influential Japanese political figure arrived, another former prime minister, Tomiichi Murayama, whose visit, like the other two, contributed to the establishment of an improved environment.
It was Murayama who, while in power, issued an apology on historical issues that was widely hailed in Asia.
The visits by these three Japanese figures have contributed to a lowering of tensions, making it possible to envisage a thaw in China-Japan relations.
What is significant is that these three men were all invited by Beijing, which of course had a good idea of what they were likely to say and do. That is to say, without denigrating their contributions to the lessening of the impasse, the improved atmosphere of the last few weeks was largely the result of initiatives taken by China.
Japan, too, clearly wants to keep tensions low. Abe has now made it clear that he endorses the Murayama's statement, although there is still some talk of making a new statement "suitable to the 21st century". But there is unlikely to be any backtracking.
It is imperative at this stage that both Japan and China recognise the delicate political environment in the other's country. Each should rein in its own aggressive nationalistic forces.
It is also necessary for each side not to say or do anything that may be humiliating or embarrassing to the other side. Threatening to fire "warning shots", for example, is not helpful.
A lot of damage has been done to China-Japan relations. It will take time for the relationship to heal.
When Abe became prime minister for the first time in 2006, he went to China on his first overseas visit to mend relations damaged during the premiership of Junichiro Koizumi, who insisted on visiting the Yasukuni Shrine each year.
This led to a dramatic improvement in relations, with Premier Wen Jiabao making an "ice-melting" visit to Japan in 2007, followed by a presidential visit by Hu Jintao the following year.
Another China-Japan summit will be indispensable if ties are to be rebuilt.
This, however, cannot take place until the necessary groundwork has been laid. Both sides will have to work hard at this. And flexibility should be the watchword.
The row over the disputed islets, known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China, are seen in this file handout photograph taken on a marine surveillance plane B-3837 on December 13, 2012, and provided by the State Oceanic Administration of People's Republic of China. A long-simmering row over the East China Sea islands, has noticeably declined, largely as a result of conciliatory words and actions by Japanese political figures visiting China. Reuters pic
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Wednesday, 6 February 2013
Would the 3 Japanese wise men invited by China help ties with Japan?
The Philippines broken ranks with Asean
HIGH STAKES: In its zeal to take on China's claims in the South China Sea, the Philippines has alienated itself
The official map of the Philippines labels the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea and includes Sabah.
By initiating an arbitral proceeding against China, the Philippines has upped the ante in the South China Sea. Manila says it is left with no choice but to take Beijing to arbitration after exhausting all remedies. However, many see Manila's action as a desperate act -- a publicity stunt to regain international prestige following the Scarborough Shoal fiasco in April last year.
Manila's request for an arbitral award opens up a can of worms, especially when its Regime of Islands claim (to the Kalayaan Islands and Scarborough Shoal) under its 2009 Baseline Law is contestable under international law.
Incidentally, its new official map that has renamed the South China Sea as the West Philippines Sea has re-incorporated Sabah, which is sure to reopen old wounds.
People who live in glasshouses should not throw stones, as they will expose not only the throwers' hypocrisy but also vulnerability.
No one doubts that Manila is fed-up with Beijing's intransigence. Lately, the Philippines has mounted diplomatic and political offensives in the South China Sea in a hope to get the United States and the international community to sanction China. Unfortunately, following a rebuff by Washington, the offensive failed to undermine China, the Goliath who was close to former president Gloria Arroyo, now under house arrest.
As a domestic political agenda, Manila's unilateral legal proceeding is likely to be futile again. Its success record in international arbitration has been dismal. For example in 1927, the US, acting on behalf of Manila, failed to convince judge Max Huber that the island of Palmas belonged to the Philippines. The judge awarded the ownership of the island (now known as Miangas) to Indonesia, although the island is within the 1898 Treaty of Paris Limits.
In October 2001, the Philippines sought permission to intervene as a non- party in the case involving the sovereignty of Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan. the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected (14 to 1) the request.
China, the world's second largest economy and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, has said no to arbitration proceedings. Without its consent, it is unlikely for the tribunal to act; furthermore, the tribunal may lack jurisdiction to hear the case.
Manila has insinuated that Beijing can no longer hide behind its declarations under Article 298 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In 2006, China declared, "it does not accept any of the procedures provided in Section 2 of Part XV of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with respect of all categories of disputes...", including sovereignty issues.
Manila says this proceeding against China is not over sovereignty. Yet, the notification statement implies the contrary.
Manila wants the proposed tribunal to determine the legality of China's nine-dash line of 1948 and to determine the legal status of 10 features that China has occupied in the South China Sea (mainly in the Spratlys) as either "islands or rocks". These issues are jurisdictional in nature. The nine-dash line relates to jurisdictional and sovereignty issues.
The Philippines brings the case to the tribunal under UNCLOS. Those familiar with jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea are aware of the nine-dash line, published in 1948. This means the line has preceded UNCLOS by thirty-four years; UNCLOS came into force in 1996.
The only way for UNCLOS to have jurisdiction over the case is to give it a retrospective power, which arguably constitutes an abuse of rights and goes against the legal principle of good faith (Article 300 of UNCLOS).
The unfortunate omission of the applicable law under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute in the notification statement has significantly weakened Manila's position.
I also find it puzzling for Manila to ask the tribunal to "require China to bring its domestic legislation into conformity with its obligations under UNCLOS".
On the diplomatic front, Manila has garnered zero support from the claimant parties.
Their silence results possibly from disagreement with the manner the Philippines handled a vital matter in the light of Statement on Asean's Six Point Principles on the South China Sea of July 20 last year.
Moreover, Manila's objection in May 2009 to the Joint submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is still fresh in the minds of Hanoi and Kuala Lumpur.
Is Manila telling the world that it has broken ranks with Asean?
The way forward is not to break ranks but to mend fences with China.
by Dr BA Hamzah New Straits Times
Related posts/articles:
Philippines wants rearmed Japan to contain China
Tensions in South China Sea: US won’t take sides...
Manila and ASEAN: Upping the ante on the South China Sea
Overhyping the South China Sea
The official map of the Philippines labels the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea and includes Sabah.
By initiating an arbitral proceeding against China, the Philippines has upped the ante in the South China Sea. Manila says it is left with no choice but to take Beijing to arbitration after exhausting all remedies. However, many see Manila's action as a desperate act -- a publicity stunt to regain international prestige following the Scarborough Shoal fiasco in April last year.
Manila's request for an arbitral award opens up a can of worms, especially when its Regime of Islands claim (to the Kalayaan Islands and Scarborough Shoal) under its 2009 Baseline Law is contestable under international law.
Incidentally, its new official map that has renamed the South China Sea as the West Philippines Sea has re-incorporated Sabah, which is sure to reopen old wounds.
People who live in glasshouses should not throw stones, as they will expose not only the throwers' hypocrisy but also vulnerability.
No one doubts that Manila is fed-up with Beijing's intransigence. Lately, the Philippines has mounted diplomatic and political offensives in the South China Sea in a hope to get the United States and the international community to sanction China. Unfortunately, following a rebuff by Washington, the offensive failed to undermine China, the Goliath who was close to former president Gloria Arroyo, now under house arrest.
As a domestic political agenda, Manila's unilateral legal proceeding is likely to be futile again. Its success record in international arbitration has been dismal. For example in 1927, the US, acting on behalf of Manila, failed to convince judge Max Huber that the island of Palmas belonged to the Philippines. The judge awarded the ownership of the island (now known as Miangas) to Indonesia, although the island is within the 1898 Treaty of Paris Limits.
In October 2001, the Philippines sought permission to intervene as a non- party in the case involving the sovereignty of Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan. the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected (14 to 1) the request.
China, the world's second largest economy and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, has said no to arbitration proceedings. Without its consent, it is unlikely for the tribunal to act; furthermore, the tribunal may lack jurisdiction to hear the case.
Manila has insinuated that Beijing can no longer hide behind its declarations under Article 298 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In 2006, China declared, "it does not accept any of the procedures provided in Section 2 of Part XV of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with respect of all categories of disputes...", including sovereignty issues.
Manila says this proceeding against China is not over sovereignty. Yet, the notification statement implies the contrary.
Manila wants the proposed tribunal to determine the legality of China's nine-dash line of 1948 and to determine the legal status of 10 features that China has occupied in the South China Sea (mainly in the Spratlys) as either "islands or rocks". These issues are jurisdictional in nature. The nine-dash line relates to jurisdictional and sovereignty issues.
The Philippines brings the case to the tribunal under UNCLOS. Those familiar with jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea are aware of the nine-dash line, published in 1948. This means the line has preceded UNCLOS by thirty-four years; UNCLOS came into force in 1996.
The only way for UNCLOS to have jurisdiction over the case is to give it a retrospective power, which arguably constitutes an abuse of rights and goes against the legal principle of good faith (Article 300 of UNCLOS).
The unfortunate omission of the applicable law under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute in the notification statement has significantly weakened Manila's position.
I also find it puzzling for Manila to ask the tribunal to "require China to bring its domestic legislation into conformity with its obligations under UNCLOS".
On the diplomatic front, Manila has garnered zero support from the claimant parties.
Their silence results possibly from disagreement with the manner the Philippines handled a vital matter in the light of Statement on Asean's Six Point Principles on the South China Sea of July 20 last year.
Moreover, Manila's objection in May 2009 to the Joint submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is still fresh in the minds of Hanoi and Kuala Lumpur.
Is Manila telling the world that it has broken ranks with Asean?
The way forward is not to break ranks but to mend fences with China.
by Dr BA Hamzah New Straits Times
Related posts/articles:
Philippines wants rearmed Japan to contain China
Tensions in South China Sea: US won’t take sides...
Manila and ASEAN: Upping the ante on the South China Sea
Overhyping the South China Sea
Tuesday, 5 February 2013
How much Any Pow be given in Chinese New Year?
A NETIZEN from Singapore has triggered a debate on the amount of ang pow one should give family members and friends, reported China Press.
The netizen said people should give between S$88 and S$288 (about RM211 to RM690) to their parents, and for their children they should give from S$50 (RM120) to S$188 (RM450).
The netizen suggested that they should give S$28 (RM67) to S$50 (RM120) to their nieces and nephews.
For children of a close friend, they could give ang pow worth between S$8 (RM19) and S$18 (RM46), it reported.
For other relatives and friends, they should give at least S$2 (RM4.80).
Some netizens said pegging a rate on ang pow went against the spirit of Chinese New Year as the gift of giving red packets should be from the heart.
However, some said the chart had given them an idea on the amount they should give to their family members and friends.
> Malaysian songbird Fish Leong said she planned to have a baby this year but urged the public not to pressure her, reported Sin Chew Daily.
“If there's good news, I will let you know,” she said, adding that she would celebrate Chinese New Year in Taiwan with her Taiwanese husband Tony Zhao's family.
Leong said she would come back to Malaysia to visit her family members only after Chinese New Year.
Leong married Zhao in 2010 and since then the media had been asking her about her plans to have a baby.
- The Star/Asia News network
The netizen said people should give between S$88 and S$288 (about RM211 to RM690) to their parents, and for their children they should give from S$50 (RM120) to S$188 (RM450).
The netizen suggested that they should give S$28 (RM67) to S$50 (RM120) to their nieces and nephews.
For children of a close friend, they could give ang pow worth between S$8 (RM19) and S$18 (RM46), it reported.
For other relatives and friends, they should give at least S$2 (RM4.80).
Some netizens said pegging a rate on ang pow went against the spirit of Chinese New Year as the gift of giving red packets should be from the heart.
However, some said the chart had given them an idea on the amount they should give to their family members and friends.
> Malaysian songbird Fish Leong said she planned to have a baby this year but urged the public not to pressure her, reported Sin Chew Daily.
“If there's good news, I will let you know,” she said, adding that she would celebrate Chinese New Year in Taiwan with her Taiwanese husband Tony Zhao's family.
Leong said she would come back to Malaysia to visit her family members only after Chinese New Year.
Leong married Zhao in 2010 and since then the media had been asking her about her plans to have a baby.
- The Star/Asia News network
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