Malaysia still in pursuit of full independence

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Still in pursuit of full independence

Global Trends By MARTIN KHOR

Fifty-four years after Merdeka, Malaysia, like other developing countries, is still fighting for full independence in a globalised world which has grown more complex and crisis-laden.

THE Merdeka season is a good time to ponder over what independence means to Malaysia and the other developing countries that are still battling to overcome the disadvantages that the colonial era brought.
The problems of governance in a developing country, 54 years after independence, are still as complex or even more so when compared with the immediate post-colonial days.

In that first phase of independence, the developing countries were preoccupied with domestic battles – how to install domestic political processes and how to chart new economic strategies to get out of the shadow of colonial influence.

Most countries tried to shake loose from the control of foreign-owned mining and plantation companies, banks and retailers, by boosting their domestic public and private enterprises.

However, they were over-dependent on a few export commodities for a long time.

In the social sphere, there was the monumental battle to provide jobs, build up housing, schools and health systems, besides reducing poverty.

Today, many developing countries like Malaysia have succeeded, to a significant extent, to break the foreign-ownership grip on the economy and to diversify from commodities to resource-based processing, boosting manufacturing and property development.



While some countries remain poor and dependent on foreign aid, other middle-income countries have broken through into the development sphere.

Indeed, countries like Malaysia are now worried about being stuck in the “middle-income trap”.

They are no longer so competitive in the labour-intensive industries like textiles and electronics assembly because lower-wage countries have entered the scene, yet they find it difficult to break through into higher value-added sectors and activities, in order to upgrade their economic status.

While the colonial grip on their economies has loosened, the middle developing countries are now caught in the complex web of global inter-dependence, in which they have become significant players but are still not able to call the shots, nor equitably participate in decision-making.

The dependence of immediate post-colonialism is now replaced with the inter-dependence that comes with globalisation. In good times, the country soars with the world economy.

But in bad times, the domestic economy is at the mercy of rapidly falling exports and foreign-capital outflows, as the 1998-99 Asian crisis and the 2008-09 “global great recession” showed.

With the United States and Europe caught in a deflationary situation, the next few years will be another great challenge.

Will the middle developing countries sink with the major players, or break free to chart their own course?
The answer will probably be in between.

But “decoupling” from the crisis in the rich countries can properly be achieved only if there are vision and action plans, including national economic restructuring and greater regional collaboration.

Intense inter-dependence is also evident in the physical world, where the environment worldwide is collapsing because the pursuit for economic growth did not take into account resource depletion and pollution.

The science of climate change and the recent radiation from damaged nuclear plants both reveal that emissions in one part of the world affect health and life in other parts.

Global solutions are thus necessary, but negotiations to find them are bogged down by basic issues of North-South equity and the need for balance between the imperative for environmental protection and the immediate needs for development.

International negotiations are also stuck in the area of economics.

The World Trade Organisation’s Doha talks have stalled because of the unreasonable demands made by major developed countries on the big developing countries.

Despite the G20 Summits, the world is further away today from global solutions to the financial crisis than in 2008-09 when concerted actions were agreed upon to stimulate a recovery.

It appears that the US, Europe and Japan, all former colonial countries, are now afraid that their mastery over the global economy is being challenged by China, India and some other developing countries – Asean included.

The middle developing countries like Malaysia are no longer one-sidedly dependent on their former colonial masters.

But in the web of an inter-dependent and globalised world, they are still in the mode of responding to initiatives and policies of the major developed countries, or to the unfolding situation.

They do not yet have the power or confidence to initiate and coordinate their policies and take the initiative to put forward solutions to global problems.

But they now have the growing capacity to do

Fifty-four years after Merdeka, the world is still an imbalanced one, and our country is building more stepping stones towards full independence.

It must join other developing countries to get a full voice and a fair share in the benefits of the global economy.

In this complex globalised economy, the developing countries’ battle for independence continues.

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Capital controls: From heresy to orthodoxy

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THINK ASIAN By ANDREW SHENG

 Principles for formulating capital control policies must take local conditions into account.

ON Sept 1, 2011, it would be 13 years to the day when Malaysia first introduced capital controls to stem the effects of the Asian financial crisis on the domestic economy. In 1998, it was heresy to introduce capital controls on capital flows, since it was the International Monetary Fund (IMF) orthodoxy to liberalise the capital account.

From the perspective of history, one tends to forget that in 1945, when the IMF was first established, the consensus opinion among bankers and academics alike was for hot money to be controlled. Indeed, the intellectual father of the IMF, John Maynard Keynes, remarked that “what used to be heresy is now endorsed as orthodoxy.”

In the old days, courtesy to living persons and the statute of limitations would allow history to be written only after 60 years when official archives are opened to the public.

Today, we live in an age of unfettered information, when oral and documented history can be published rapidly, from authorised biographies issued shortly after a leader leaves office to unauthorised leakages from Wikileaks.

The publication of a new book by Datuk Wong Sulong, former group chief editor of The Star, called Notes to the Prime Minister: the Untold Story of How Malaysia Beat the Currency Speculators, only two months after the IMF announced in April 2011 new thinking on capital inflows, is a remarkable achievement.

Sixty-six years after the IMF was formed, capital controls have moved full circle from orthodoxy to heresy and back again to (qualified) orthodoxy.

The book comprises 45 Notes written by Tan Sri Nor Mohamed Yakcop, Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, between Oct 3, 1997 and Aug 21, 1998 to then Prime Minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad.
In short, they were the key briefs that helped Dr Mahathir make up his mind on the key economic policies to help combat the Asian financial crisis.



Book offers deep insights

For both historians and practicing policymakers, this new book offers deep insights into the serendipity and the practice of successful policy decision-making. There is an element of serendipity, because Dr Mahathir recalled that he spotted Nor Mohamed walking down a street in Kuala Lumpur just before he left for Buenos Aires in September 1997 via Hong Kong, where he attended the World Bank Annual Meetings and clashed publicly with George Soros on currency trading.

On Sept 29, 1997, he summoned Nor Mohamed to meet him in Buenos Aires, because he needed someone who understood currency trading. It is a tribute to a politician trained as a doctor that he was willing to spend repeated sessions with an experienced currency trader to understand the intricacies of modern financial markets.

Reading the 45 Notes in historical sequence, one gets a far better appreciation of how the decision to impose capital controls was arrived at. The Notes not only have historical value, but also current-day applicability, as they explain not only offshore currency, the psychology of fear and greed that drive markets, but also market manipulation in thinly traded emerging market currencies.

The major problem of the proponents of the Washington Consensus in 1997 was that most of them were macro-economists who had little understanding or experience of how the markets actually worked. Free markets became a dogma and objective in their own right, rather than the means to an end for better livelihood for all.

The Notes also revealed that in complex decisions under uncertainty, it was vital to understand clearly the key parameters for action. Note 7 clearly pointed out that Malaysia was different from other countries under currency attack because it did not have large short-term external debt. Note 11, dated Oct 21, 1997, spelt out the factors that determined exchange rates, with a particularly illuminating explanation of market manipulation.

Market manipulation was seen as due to concerted effort by hedge funds, using large gearing and available tools and then triggering the element of fear among the long-term investors who have legitimate currency risk.

In other words, if the wolves can trigger the herd to move, then the fundamentals can move. The perception of fear changes the whole game.

Effect of CLOB

Note 39 dated July 9, 1998 is an important study of the effect on Malaysia of the central limit order book (CLOB) for trading of Malaysian shares in Singapore. The Note identified that the CLOB was a convenient way for capital outflows.

Hence, one of the most effective ways for exchange control was to impose the condition that Malaysian shares could only be traded on a Malaysian exchange, which came on Aug 31, 1998, with exchange controls imposed on the following day.

In Dr Mahathir's words, “during the financial crisis, we faced two parallel situations; the ringgit was falling rapidly and Malaysian shares were also falling rapidly. So we had to put an end to both.”
Image via Wikipedi
The IMF has come out with six key principles for formulating capital control policies.

The first is that there is no “one-size-fits-all” policy mix. The second is that capital controls should fit long-term structural reforms. Third, capital controls are only one tool and not a substitute for the right macro policies. Fourth, capital controls can be used on a case-by-case basis, in appropriate circumstances. Fifth, the medicine should treat the ailment, and finally, the policy must consider its effect on other market participants.

It is hard to argue against these common sense “motherhood” principles. The trick in real life policy-making is how to apply them to local conditions.

On of the features of the current Chinese capital controls is that China also has a large amount of Chinese shares listed outside capital controls, such as Chinese shares listed in Hong Kong, Singapore and New York.

This is a book that is a must read for all emerging market policymakers interested in liberalising their capital accounts and for IMF experts to ponder emerging market experience.

I recommend that this new book be translated into Chinese, so that Chinese policymakers interested in internationalising the renminbi can look at the Malaysian experience.

Tan Sri Andrew Sheng is author of the book, From Asian to Global Financial Crisis.

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China’s US$3.2 trillion headache

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ENTER THE DRAGON By YAO YANG

WHILE the downgrade of US government debt by Standard & Poor's shocked global financial markets, China has more reason to worry than most: the bulk of its US$3.2 trillion in official foreign reserves more than 60% is denominated in dollars, including US$1.1 trillion in US Treasury bonds.

So long as the US government does not default, whatever losses China may experience from the downgrade will be small. To be sure, the dollar's value will fall, imposing a balance sheet loss on the People's Bank of China (PBC, the central bank). But a falling dollar would make it cheaper for Chinese consumers and companies to buy American goods.

If prices are stable in the United States, as is the case now, the gains from buying American goods should exactly offset the PBC's balance sheet losses.

The downgrade could, moreover, force the US Treasury to raise the interest rate on new bonds, in which case China would stand to gain. But S&P's downgrade was a poor decision, taken at the wrong time. If America's debts had truly become less trustworthy, they would have been even more dubious before the agreement reached on Aug 2 by Congress and President Barack Obama to raise the government's debt ceiling.

That agreement allowed the world to hope that the US economy would embark on a more predictable path to recovery. The downgrade has undermined that hope. Some people even predict a double-dip recession. If that happens, the chance of an actual US default would be much higher than it is today.

Reason to worry: China’s US$3.2 trillion problem will become a 20-trillion-renminbi problem if China cannot reduce its current account surplus and fence off capital inflows. — AP

These new worries are raising alarm bells in China. Diversification away from dollar assets is the advice of the day. But this is no easy task, particularly in the short term. If the PBC started to buy non-dollar assets in large quantities, it would invariably need to convert some current dollar assets into another currency, which would inevitably drive up that currency's value, thus increasing the PBC's costs.

Another idea being discussed in Chinese policy circles is to allow the renminbi to appreciate against the dollar. Much of China's official foreign reserves have accumulated because the PBC seeks to control the renminbi's exchange rate, keeping its upward movement within a reasonable range and at a measured pace.

If it allowed the renminbi to appreciate faster, the PBC would not need to buy large quantities of foreign currencies.



International experience

But whether renminbi appreciation will work depends on reducing China's net capital inflows and current account surplus. International experience suggests that, in the short run, more capital flows into a country when its currency appreciates, and most empirical studies have shown that gradual appreciation has only a limited effect on countries' current account positions.

If appreciation does not reduce the current account surplus and capital inflows, then the renminbi's exchange rate is bound to face further upward pressure. That is why some people are advocating that China undertake a one-shot, big-bang appreciation large enough to defuse expectations of further strengthening and deter inflows of speculative “hot” money. Such a revaluation would also discourage exports and encourage imports, thereby reducing China's chronic trade surplus.

But such a move would be almost suicidal for China's economy. Between 2001 and 2008, export growth accounted for more than 40% of China's overall economic growth. That is, China's annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate would drop by four percentage points if its exports did not grow at all. In addition, a study by the China Centre for Economic Research has found that a 20% appreciation against the dollar would entail a 3% drop in employment more than 20 million jobs.

There is no short-term cure for China's US$3.2 trillion problem. The government must rely on longer-term measures to mitigate the problem, including internationalisation of the renminbi. Using the renminbi to settle China's international trade accounts would help China escape America's beggar-thy-neighbour policy of allowing the dollar's value to fall dramatically against trade rivals.

But China's US$3.2 trillion problem will become a 20-trillion-renminbi problem if China cannot reduce its current account surplus and fence off capital inflows. There is no escape from the need for domestic structural adjustment.

To achieve this, China must increase domestic consumption's share of GDP. This has already been written into the government's 12th Five-Year Plan. Unfortunately, given high inflation, structural adjustment has been postponed, with efforts to control credit expansion becoming the government's first priority. This enforced investment slowdown is itself increasing China's net savings, i.e., the current account surplus, while constraining the expansion of domestic consumption.

Real appreciation of the renminbi is inevitable so long as Chinese living standards are catching up with US levels. Indeed, the Chinese government cannot hold down inflation while maintaining a stable value for the renminbi. The PBC should target the renminbi's rate of real appreciation, rather than the inflation rate under a stable renminbi. And then the government needs to focus more attention on structural adjustment the only effective cure for China's US$3.2 trillion headache. - Project Syndicate

● Yao Yang is Director of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University.