Appreciating Asean

 

Regional togetherness: Asean’s first summits were irregular and distantly spaced. Now two summits are held regularly every year. — Bernama

Asean is a realities-grounded institution with certain strengths, which are hidden only to those who fail to appreciate them.

AS regional summits go, Asean’s has been growing by leaps and bounds. Not that this positive attribute is universally acknowledged, as is typical with Asean attributes.

Asean’s first summits were irregular and distantly spaced, and at one point even 12 years apart. Now two summits are held regularly every year, either together or spaced apart by months, with related Asean-led meetings in series.

Between summits, several hundred meetings of Asean officials are held each year to implement, oversee, and calibrate policies. The numerous meetings have prompted a misperception that Asean is merely a talkshop. 

Asean’s irregular summits proved that Asean leaders meet only when needed, as circumstances require, and not for the sake of meeting. Asean has never prioritised form over function, or ceremony over substance.

Asean is popular and successful for the common familiarity and shared comfort level leaders feel when they meet. These come only with frequent meetings forming a seamless web of mutual and reciprocal goodwill.

Critics cite the failure of the 2012 Asean Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Cambodia to issue a joint communiqué at its conclusion as a sign of weakness and inefficacy. But it takes decisiveness to opt not to issue a statement rather than produce a bland and meaningless one just for the sake of doing so.

Formal meetings are judged by how or whether they serve their purpose while in session, not by the feel good diplomatic summaries issued afterwards. As a process, Asean proceedings have seldom if ever been “full glasses”, but the uninitiated would see the “glasses” only as half-empty.

Asean’s core purpose has always been the quality of membership relations. How others see it is up to them, but this is no more than a concern for Asean’s public relations department if there is one.

Laos’ Asean chairmanship this year and its hosting of the 44th and 45th Summit over the week have predictably been scrutinised critically. A typical complaint is the seeming absence of any definitive resolution on the Myanmar impasse or the South China Sea disputes.

No annual summit is like a task force producing fail-safe solutions for outstanding issues. A small and underdeveloped Laos is already doing its best tackling the mammoth logistical and financial demands of hosting a series of international conferences at the highest official levels.

Any other country chairing Asean this year would face the same challenges. Asean makes no judgment about the economic status of members while helping less endowed members fulfil their financial obligations.

Asean is better at avoiding upheavals like Myanmar’s or war-torn Cambodia’s before its 1999 membership, than in conclusively resolving conflict that has occurred. It’s still not perfect, of course.

Asean’s record still compares favourably with the European Union’s, which failed to prevent the Kosovo and Ukraine wars. Nato (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) as a military alliance may mitigate these conflicts but has instead instigated and amplified the Ukraine war.

The EU and Asean were once described as the world’s most successful regional organisations, in that order, but that was before Brexit, when Britain exited the EU in 2020. No Asean country has sought to leave despite some challenges, while several countries not eligible to join have nonetheless tried.

The next and final member of Asean is Timor-Leste, the former Portuguese territory and Indo-nesian province of East Timor. It is the only sovereign nation in South-East Asia still to join Asean.

Others, from Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea to Mongolia and Turkey, have reportedly sought Asean membership, but were never seriously considered. Timor-Leste is different not least because it is in South-East Asia, although its Asean journey has been long and challenging.

In 2006 Timor-Leste submitted a “soft application” to join, and the following year Asean signalled a “willingness in principle” to consider it. Most Asean member states endorsed its application, but not all.

Meanwhile Dili worked hard to fulfil membership requirements by acceding to Asean norms and conventions, including the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia. It even introduced Asean Studies in schools, unlike most Asean countries.

Dili formally applied to join Asean in 2011, and Asean responded in 2022 with an “agreement in principle” to admit it. Membership remains a work in progress, with the Laos Summit during the week a part of that journey.

The state of the South China Sea’s multiple disputes has also been taken as a measure of Asean’s competence. Any catastrophe resulting from the disputes would be of concern to Asean as it would be to anyone else.

However, the disputes are between individual sovereign nations as neighbours and involves less than half the Asean membership. Asean is quietly confident that they can be resolved or are resolvable with time, provided there is no ulterior motive or foreign agenda at play.

Asean understands that the region has managed challenges before and wants that to continue. Anything less will not be Asean, nor will the region be sovereign.

Bunn Nagara is director and senior fellow at the BRI Caucus for Asia-Pacific, and an honorary fellow at the Perak Academy. The views expressed here are solely his own.

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China's 'moment' at ASEAN Summit a wake-up call for US sincerity

Western media have appeared to function under a consistent principle – whenever international affairs are at play, they are framed as a stage for major power rivalry. Unsurprisingly, the just-concluded ASEAN Summit was once again interpreted through the lens of US-China competition. This time, however, what was revealed was not US' diplomatic advantage, but rather its increasingly visible diplomatic predicament.

Understanding BRICS

 

Western institutions like Goldman Sachs expect BRICS to dominate the world economy by 2050, but still cannot understand how it works despite its strengths.

FOUR countries, each with considerable growth promise, were exploring greater trade and investment prospects at the turn of the century.

They were already among the world’s top 10 countries by way of geographical spread, population size, and national economic strength in GDP, in both nominal and purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. They were also working well together.

Brazil, Russia, India, and China then came together in 2009, and Goldman Sachs nicknamed them by the acronym “BRIC”. South Africa joined the following year to make it “BRICS”.

Almost immediately, Western scepticism worked overtime. It ranged from how a grouping with no discernible identity could achieve anything, to how long such an association with no conceivable purpose could possibly last. The sceptics did not seem to notice that the five countries happened to form a quarter of the Group of 20 (G20). Serious observers had known that the G20 was steadily surpassing the Western-led Group of 7 (G7) countries in global significance.

The International Monetary Fund had initially identified the G7 as the world’s leading economies. Yet just the five BRICS countries had exceeded the G7 in terms of GDP in PPP – with the promise of more.

Clearly, BRICS represented a shift in the global economy’s tectonic

plates. A new planetary alignment in economic power was underway, but this could not be understood through old ways of thinking.

Within the typically narrow Western perspective, an alliance could hold only by targeting significant others outside the group – or had clear affinities among members in seeking to target others.

Evidently, BRICS did not fit this notion of an intergovernmental grouping to work. BRICS was not about targeting anyone, but about developing members’ potential for building a more equitable global order together.

Obviously, those intent on keeping the Global South permanently down will be alarmed by BRICS’ development. However, such neocolonial attitudes are now the ones fading out.

BRICS is about the Global South spreading its wings, in solidarity with transnational partners and megatrends moving in that direction.

To emerging regions in the developing world this is identity and purpose enough, even if it is a blur to former colonial powers.

Typically, many in the West cannot fathom how BRICS can

nd appeal to any “friendly” or nonaligned country. They assume that countries come together only as an “alliance”, which in turn must work to rival or oppose others in zero-sum fashion.

They tend to forget that BRICS began as a small community of emerging economies exploring greater trade and investment opportunities. Economic development is crucial to countries of the Global South because colonialism had robbed them of it.

Among the Global North’s misperceptions is that BRICS is a rival to the G7. That is a mistake in terms of BRICS’ identity and purpose.

Rivalry is another party’s definitive challenge to the point of rendering one redundant or irrelevant, and then usurping one’s purpose through displacement.

To that end, the G20 should be paired with the G7 and BRICS with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The G20 and G7 are competing entities much like BRICS and the OECD, not BRICS and the G7.

Each group has agency, yet only represents emerging or receding megatrends. Countering “unfavourable” megatrends is an enormous or impossible task that requires addressing their historic undercurrents, not the organisations themselves.

The fact that the G20 includes major BRICS countries shows that the G7 as its Western component, in ceding some influence, is facing the global shift towards multipolarity. This reality should be acknowledged and managed intelligently.

Most countries see no contradiction between joining BRICS and continuing healthy relationships with Western powers for mutual benefit. Of course, such relationships have to be based on equality and mutual respect between sovereign nations, not any kind of neocolonial or patron-client arrangement.

Indonesia reportedly considered joining BRICS, only to shelve the idea in prioritising OECD membership. Malaysia has applied to join BRICS, with an intention to join the OECD as well.

India as an important partner of the West is a leading member of BRICS. Vietnam is another Western partner considering BRICS membership.

US ally Thailand has applied for membership, while Laos and even its former “protectorate” master France have indicated interest in BRICS. Another Nato (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) member Turkey showed interest in 2018 and applied for membership this year.

Naturally, nonaligned Malaysia seeks better economic opportunities with BRICS. After joining the Us-led Indo-pacific Economic Framework and the Trans-pacific Partnership (now Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-pacific Partnership) once led by the US to exclude China, for Malaysia to snub BRICS would be to tilt against its main trading partner.

BRICS membership provides pluses that are cumulative with no trade-offs elsewhere. Even if only some Asean members join, it would benefit Asean as a whole through better global economic networking, without disadvantaging neighbouring countries that are not BRICS members.

BRICS offers expanded trade and investment opportunities in new, untapped markets and preferential trading arrangements among members. Greater use of local currencies also reduces transaction costs, minimises exchange rate volatility, and strengthens the value and status of local currencies.

Membership also means access to funds from BRICS’ New Development Bank, and exchange-traded funds invested in members’ emerging economies that are among the world’s fastest growing. The potential benefits explain BRICS’ popularity among dozens of countries worldwide regardless of culture, history or politics.

For Asean countries like Malaysia, membership of BRICS and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as the world’s biggest trading bloc can mean powerful new synergies for accelerated and sustained economic growth. Every country has the responsibility to its citizens of making the most of every available development opportunity.

For the developing world, BRICS provides a means for fasttracking the route to fully developed status. For all countries in the Global South and North, it also provides coordinated efforts for fulfilling such global public goods as UN Sustainable Development Goals.

By BUNN NAGARA Bunn Nagara is director and Senior Fellow of the BRI Caucus for Asiapacific, and Honorary Fellow of the Perak Academy. The views expressed here are solely his own.

China has a real world economy, not the fake economy bases on money ptiting kike America

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Engagement is vital

 

Chinese Coast Guard vessels fire water cannons towards a Philippine resupply vessel Unaizah May 4 on its way to a resupply mission at Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea in March. — Reuters

THE South China Sea is a bustling waterway with growing freight and naval passages, combining widespread commercial and military interests.

More than 80% of world trade exceeding US$5 trillion (RM21.67 trillion) in value traverses these much-contested waters each year, fusing high economics with heated geopolitics.

Not least, the South China Sea sees a convergence of intemperate conduct by some claimant countries alongside some hard-nosed commonsensical prudence. Most claimants to these waters including Malaysia opt for the latter approach.

Brunei, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam are the contending claimants to part or all of the Spratlys, a group of rocks, reefs, shoals and other maritime features in the South China Sea.

Indonesia and China have rival claims to the Natuna Islands at the southern end of the sea, on the cusp of the Natuna Sea. Indonesia has renamed the area the North Natuna Sea, but whether that helps solidify its stake is unclear.

Among Malaysia’s claims are Luconia Shoals, at the mid-point between Sarawak’s shore and the fullest extent of Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 200 nautical miles from shore.

On August 29, the Philippine Daily Inquirer newspaper reported that China had sent a diplomatic note to the Malaysian Embassy in Beijing protesting Malaysia’s oil exploration activities at Luconia Shoals.

Such official notes between governments are nothing new, but always confidential or classified. How it leaked for the Inquirer to expose it to the world should be investigated, and Malaysia is doing that.

Context can help explain the newspaper’s motivation. Among all the claimant parties, the Philippines backed by its US ally’s military forces is the most assertive in trying to face down China on the high seas.

Until the first half of this year, Vietnam seemed to be an informal partner of the Philippines in confronting China over its claims. Then after an abrupt change of President and a Deputy Prime Minister, Vietnam warmed to China again and the Philippines was left without an Asean partner.

Exploiting the release of China’s diplomatic note could provoke Malaysia, or some Malaysians, to seek a tougher line with Beijing.

The news report described China’s mild note to Malaysia as a “warning”, just when China and Malaysia are on the best of terms marking the 50th anniversary of their diplomatic relations this year.

Rival claims between China, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines are more conflated with one another than with Malaysia’s and Brunei’s limited claims further south. Philippine claims may be more troubling for Malaysia because of its on-off claims to Sabah and the implications on maritime territory off Borneo’s north coast.

On Dec 12, 2019, Malaysia filed its claim to an extended continental shelf with the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf off northern Sabah. Both China and the Philippines were upset, but Manila displayed far more drama.

Beijing sent a delegation to Kuala Lumpur to seek clarification. In an unofficial capacity, I explained that Malaysia’s act was consistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), which China and Malaysia had signed and ratified.

The delegation asked follow-up questions, took notes, and left without any complaint, argument or “warning”. The Philippines was particularly stung because Malaysia’s move undermined its claim to the entire Kalayaan Island Group between northern Sabah and southern Mindanao, and to Sabah itself, both of which Malaysia rejects.

The Marcos Jr government is not pressing Manila’s claim to Sabah, relegating it to a “private matter” among Sulu claimants. However, as long as their illegitimate claim to Sabah is not fully revoked and annulled, Philippine-Malaysia relations will remain constrained and their rival claims in the South China Sea will stay complicated.

Manila’s confrontational approach towards China is unlikely to gain traction from other Asean nations favouring pragmatism on at least five key issues.

First, the South China Sea disputes should see a conclusive resolution sooner or later, but preferably sooner rather than later.

Second, that resolution must be political and diplomatic, not military. There can be no military “solution” of any kind, so posturing on the high seas makes any resolution harder or impossible to achieve.

Third, naval brinkmanship begets naval brinkmanship. Residual goodwill, if any, disappears while the prospect of a peaceful settlement diminishes.

Fourth, avoiding force and confrontation in seeking a solution does not mean abandoning the search for solutions. Instead it reflects a thoughtful maturity enabling real solutions to be reached jointly, fully consistent with Asean’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that claimant parties already accept.

Fifth, talking to another claimant is to engage the other party in meaningful discussion. It does not imply accepting the other party’s rival claims unconditionally.

China’s nine-dash line in the South China Sea began as an 11-dash line of a 1947 official map by the Nationalist Government under Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang Party. It lost the 1949 civil war and escaped to Taiwan, whose 11-dash line today still claims virtually all the South China Sea.

In 1952 Vietnam negotiated with China to remove two of the 11 dashes close to its coast. Later Taiwan’s provocations resulted in Beijing declaring a 10th-dash line off the island’s east coast but not in the South China Sea.

China’s nine-dash line claim covers such features as banks, cays, reefs and shoals in the area but not the international waters between them. Two important lessons from these developments are clear.

One, peaceful negotiations can result in a revision of the precise scope of China’s maritime claims. The Taiwan Strait and Taiwan, which claims more of the South China Sea than China, are “more core” to Beijing than the legacy claims of lines whose exact coordinates Chinese cartographers themselves are uncertain about.

Two, confrontations are much more likely to worsen the situation. In the headlong rush into military posturing threatening a war with no winners, the choice of which is the better, saner approach is obvious enough.

 Bunn Nagara is BRI director and senior fellow as well as Perak Academy honorary fellow. The views expressed here are solely his own.

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Checkmated over Ukraine; Is Ukraine a metaverse nightmare?

 Cornered: Ukrainian armoured vehicles blocking a street in Kyiv as Russian troops stormed toward Ukraine’s capital on Saturday. – AP Nato's actions have made it's Western allies incapable of doing better for Ukraine than Ukraine can do its own relations with Russia

WHEN the wilfully unstoppable force of Nato expansion hits the steadfastly immovable object of Russian national security, war erupts.
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By February 24 when Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, Moscow’s challenges became exposed and grew more acute.
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Russia cannot hold Ukraine in any sense as resentment to its incursion swells. There can be no assurance Russia can succeed in whatever it seeks to do to Kiev.
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As in all military interventions, moving in is always easier than pulling out – which must eventually happen. And then what?
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All disputes must conclude in negotiations, especially between neighbours, and it is now harder to negotiate. Meanwhile Russia is cast as the sole villain, so an invasion could not have been its preferred option.
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As a power play it is a tragedy of Shakespearean proportions and superpower dimensions. Ukraine and Nato may have top billing but the US and Russia are the key actors.
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The 1947 Dunkirk Treaty between Britain and France was a contingency agreement against German or Soviet aggression. This grew to include the Benelux countries and then the US and six others to become today’s North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
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By 1955 Nato expanded to include WWII foe Germany, leaving the Soviet Union out in the cold. Moscow then established its Warsaw Pact alliance in trying to achieve some balance.
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Since then, Moscow stayed in Nato’s sights on the other side of the fence. Nato’s first Secretary-General Hastings Ismay described its role as “keeping the US in, Germany down, and Russia out.”
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Nato is a Cold War device that was not dismantled after the Cold War but has instead grown. But the official rhetoric in the early 1990s was of consolidation with a few contemplating dissolution.
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As the Soviet Union was collapsing in 1991, Nato officials from the US, Britain, France and Germany repeatedly assured Moscow that Nato would not expand. Nato had become the most serious organised challenge to Russian national security.
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US Assistant Secretary of State Raymond Seitz said expansion of membership would not happen “either officially or unofficially.” His British counterpart added that expansion was “unacceptable”.
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German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher agreed and said so. Then Nato’s expansion happened.
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When Russia complained, Nato stalwarts said any agreement was only verbal and not written down, implying that what they said could not be trusted. Later Nato claimed there had not even been a verbal agreement.
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Earlier this month Germany’s Der Spiegel newspaper reported that Prof Joshua Shifrinson of Boston University had found a declassified document confirming that a pledge on Nato’s non-expansion had been made. Elsewhere it is reported that President Bill Clinton broke that pledge.
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In 1999, Nato expanded by including former Soviet bloc countries Poland, Hungary and Czechia. Russia seethed but could do little.
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In 2004, Nato expanded further by admitting former Soviet republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russia complained again but once more its security concerns were ignored.
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As Nato missiles aimed at Russia moved closer to its borders, Moscow protested but Nato said they were only there because of Iran. Russia was unconvinced.
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After Ukraine’s independence its government continued friendly relations with Russia. But the US engineered the 2004-05 Orange Revolution that toppled the government and replaced it with one closer to the West.
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France and Germany invaded Russia in the 19th and 20th centuries with each attack ending in disaster. Napoleon’s and Hitler’s forces nonetheless made damaging incursions into the Russian heartland and national psyche.
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Today France and Germany are among European nations careful in managing relations with Russia. However, a US-led Nato with less experience and less sensitivity to Russian security concerns has acted with less care.
`
Russia remains the world’s largest country by area rich in natural resources like oil and gas. It is not a threat to Europe or even Ukraine if agreements made can be honoured, but provoking it can produce a different result.
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Using Nato to challenge and undermine Russian interests will not end well for anyone. US interests are protected with the Atlantic Ocean as buffer, but European members of Nato share a continent with Russia and would have different priorities.
`
The UN wants Russian forces to withdraw from Ukraine and return to base almost as much as Russia wants Nato to withdraw from its eastward momentum and return to the 1997 Nato-Russia Founding Act. Although neither may happen soon, Moscow has no interest or expressed desire to occupy Ukraine so the former is more likely than the latter.
`
Ukraine for now is trapped in a vicious cycle of violence and disintegration beyond its control. It is a familiar plight of pawns caught between incompatible great powers.
`
Ukraine wants urgent negotiations with Russia while Russia wants Belarus to host talks on the Minsk accords for a ceasefire and phased measures towards a compromise. Even if talks are possible it will be an uphill task since Moscow and Kiev have different interpretations of the 2014-15 terms.
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Among Biden’s errors is targeting Putin personally as if another Russian leader would have acted differently. Even Boris Yeltsin would have done the same over Ukraine, while a nationalist like Vladimir Zhirinovsky would have acted tougher and earlier.
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For the West to dump the Nord Stream 2 deal supplying Europe with Russian gas punishes only Europe which now has to pay many times more for US supplies. On Feb 4 Russia signed a new US$117.5bil oil and gas deal to supply China instead.
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Western observers worry that China may learn unsavoury lessons from Russia’s actions in Ukraine to further its disputed claims in Asia. Any lessons would be more akin to Nato’s gradual encroachment on Russian territory.
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The apparent beneficiary from Ukraine’s crisis is China, being a distraction for the West which also increases Moscow’s dependence on Beijing. But China is also awkwardly positioned as it wants to maintain good ties with all parties.
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The only unqualified beneficiary of the crisis is China-Russia relations, which must count as another major strategic blunder for Nato and the West.
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Bunn Nagara is a political analyst and Honorary Research Fellow of the Perak Academy. The views expressed here are solely the writer’s own.

By Bunn Nagara, Author at ISIS

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Is Ukraine a metaverse nightmare?

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The Russian pipe-laying ship 'Akademik Tscherski' which is on deployment for the further construction of the Nord Stream 2 Baltic Sea pipeline, is moored at the port of Mukran on the island of Ruegen, Germany, on Sept. 8, 2020. The gas is still flowing from Russian even as bullets and missiles fly in Ukraine. But the war is raising huge questions about the energy ties between Europe and Russia. The conflict is helping keep oil and gas prices high due to fears of a possible reduction in supplies, and consumers will continue to face financial stress from that. 

 

The real-life cost of war: People walk at the border crossing between Poland and Ukraine, in Medyka, Poland, on February 24, 2022. Photo: Reuters

 Moving from a unipolar world to a multipolar world was always likely to be messy and risk-prone. But few saw how fast we moved from beating war drums to actual armed conflict between the Great Powers, the latest being in Ukraine. Are we on a march of folly to World War III, or have key players lost sight of reality?

`Lest we forget, World War I (1914-1918) and World War II (1939-1945) were fought to keep down rising powers—Germany and later Japan.
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Russia and China suffered the most casualties in WWII, and both were allies against German Nazis and Japanese militarists.
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The United States became the real winner, but decided after WWII to contain communism in both the Soviet Union (USSR) and China.
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Fifty years ago, in 1972, US President Nixon set aside enmity against China, restored US-China relations, and in one strategic stroke, isolated the Soviet Union, leading to its collapse two decades later.
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The great achievement during the Cold War was the avoidance of nuclear conflict, with the Cuban missile crisis being a live test of brinkmanship.
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Both sides climbed down when the USSR removed missiles from Cuba, and the US quietly removed missiles from Turkey.
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President Kennedy understood that grandstanding on moral issues should be restrained, because in a nuclear war, mutually assured destruction is madness.
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After seven decades of peace, the Western media has been painting the multipolar world as a black-and-white conflict between good vs evil, democracy vs autocracy—without appreciating that the other side may have different points of view that need to be heard.
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By definition, a multipolar world means that liberal democracies will have to live with different ideologies and regimes.
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Today, YouTube and the Web provide a wealth of alternative views than mainstream media, such as CNN or BBC.
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Prof John Mearsheimer, author of the influential book "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics," offers the insight that the Western expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) was the reason why Russia felt threatened.
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The more the Nato allies try to arm Ukraine, the more insecure Russia gets.
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In essence, Russia wants a buffer zone of neutral countries like Austria, which are not members of Nato, but that does not exclude trade with all sides.
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Carnegie Moscow Center analyst Alexander Baunov described how "the two sides appear to be negotiating over different things.
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Russia is talking about its own security, while the West is focusing on Ukraine's."
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What he is describing are two sides that are each in their own social bubble or virtual reality (VR) Metaverse, deaf to the other side's views.
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The term "Metaverse" came from a 1992 dystopian sci-fi novel titled "Snow Crash," where the Metaverse is the virtual refuge from an anarchic world controlled by the Mafia.
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Today, Metaverse is an online virtual world where the user blends VR with the real, flesh-and-blood world through VR glasses and software augmented reality (AR).
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In other words, in Metaverse, your mind is colonised by whatever algorithm and virtual information that you get—real or fake news.
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Metaverse is escapism from reality, and will not help us solve real world problems, especially when we need to talk eyeball to eyeball.
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The Metaverse designer is more interested in controlling or influencing our minds, feeding us what we want to hear or see, rather than what information we need to have to make good decisions. The risk is that we think VR conflict is costless, whereas real war has real flesh-and-blood costs.
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.In short, the more we look inward at our own Metaverse, the more we neglect the collective costs to the world as it lurches from peace to war
`
Surprisingly, I found the right-wing influential Fox commentator Tucker Carlson asking better questions than CNN or BBC commentators.
`
In his show Tucker Carlson Tonight, in the segment "How will this conflict affect you?" he asked bluntly why Americans should hate Putin and what the war will cost every American.
`
Carlson asked some really serious questions, even though his views are partisan—have the Democrats, with their moral concern to hate Putin, forgotten the big picture of war costs?
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First, would Americans be willing to go into a winter war with Russia?
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Second, would they pay much higher gas prices as oil prices have already hit above USD 100 per barrel?
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Although economic sanctions are applied, even Europe will not be willing to risk cutting off gas supplies from Russia, since Russia accounts for 35 percent of European gas supplies.
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Third, is Ukraine a real democracy?
`
Carlson's 2018 book "Ship of Fools: How a Selfish Ruling Class Is Bringing America to the Brink of Revolution" is well worth reading to understand how conservative Americans think about elites who care about themselves more than society at large. 

Carlson asked some really serious questions, even though his views are partisan—have the Democrats, with their moral concern to hate Putin, forgotten the big picture of war costs?
`
First, would Americans be willing to go into a winter war with Russia?
`
Second, would they pay much higher gas prices as oil prices have already hit above USD 100 per barrel?
`
Although economic sanctions are applied, even Europe will not be willing to risk cutting off gas supplies from Russia, since Russia accounts for 35 percent of European gas supplies.
`
Third, is Ukraine a real democracy?
`
Carlson's 2018 book "Ship of Fools: How a Selfish Ruling Class Is Bringing America to the Brink of Revolution" is well worth reading to understand how conservative Americans think about elites who care about themselves more than society at large.
`
In sum, the decade of 2020s may face a tough period of escalating conflicts at local, regional and global levels, with proxy wars that disrupt each other's economies and social stability.
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If states fail, and poor and hungry people migrate at a larger scale, even more border conflicts are likely, since most will want to go to the richer countries in the North, such as Europe and America.
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There is no ideal world where everyone is good and the other side is bad.
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In a multipolar world, there will be all kinds of people that we don't like, but we have to live with them.
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A negotiated peace is better than mutual destruction.
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In Metaverse, virtual life can be beautiful, moral and perfect, but the real world is lurching towards a collective nightmare.
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We should not kid ourselves that the Metaverse VR of self-deception is the real world.
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We either sleepwalk to war, or have the courage to opt for sustainable peace.
`
The real question is: Who is willing to climb down and eat the humble pie for the sake of peace?
`
By Andrew Sheng is adjunct professor at Tsinghua University, Beijing and the University of Malaya. He was formerly the chairman of the Securities and Futures Commission, Hong Kong. 

Tan Sri Andrew Sheng (born 1946) is Hong Kong-based Malaysian Chinese banker, academic and commentator. He started his career as an accountant and is now a distinguished fellow of Fung Global Institute, a global think tank based in Hong Kong.^[1] He served as chairman of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) before his replacement by Martin Wheatley in

Andrew Sheng comments on global affairs from an Asian perspective. The views expressed here are his own.

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