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Tuesday 1 March 2011

Will Libya be going the way of Iraq or Afghanistan?

Midweek By BUNN NAGARA



THE situation in Libya is fast deteriorating, but not as much as the diplomatic environment abroad concerning Libya.

Over the weekend the UN Security Council (UNSC) slapped an arms embargo on the country. The US itself imposed sanctions on Libya as soon as the last American nationals left last Friday.

US officials have since pressured its allies to act similarly. Germany has suspended oil payments for 60 days to stem the funding of Tripoli’s anti-revolt actions.

The US also blocked the international flow of US$30bil (RM91.3bil) in assets belonging to oil-rich Libya. It is the largest amount ever blocked by the US, and among the swiftest actions of its kind.

The US and British governments have also prepared their military forces for action. This week warships and fighter aircraft from the US Sixth Fleet began moving closer to Libya, supported by Australia.

However, Canada, France, Germany and Russia are less keen on another invasion of yet another oil-rich Third World nation. If this looks familiar, it is something of a replay of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in early 2003.

All vested interests aside, there are some facts and realities that are irrefutable and certain issues that cannot be ignored.

Among the facts is that Libya has seen the worst violence out of all the troubled states in North Africa and West Asia. This has involved virtually every political sector: government, military, opposition groups and the general public.

A fact that follows is that Libya is now embroiled in civil war, despite the denials of Col. Muammar Gaddafi and his aides. After defections in the military, civil service and government departments, elements of a civil war were confirmed with the attacks by Gaddafi forces on rebel troop outposts.

However, the fighting consists largely of sporadic exchanges of gunfire apart from a few aerial attacks on munitions dumps by government forces. Fighter jets for example have hit military stores in Ajdabiya in the east and Rajma to the south.

Gaddafi has denied such reports, while Western sources tend to overplay them. Undeclared interests on each side are in evidence yet again.

Another fact is that Libya’s oil production has been cut by half, which amounts to just 1% of world output. A feared oil crisis resulting from Libya’s troubles has not happened and may never occur.

Pressure on Gaddaffi to expedite his own exit is being applied mostly by the US and Britain. The US-UK axis has much to gain from a Western-friendly post-Gaddafi Libya, along with their ally Israel.

Among the realities is that neither Gaddafi nor his Western opponents possess the moral high ground. The Libyan people opposing Gaddafi know too well what happened in Iraq, and hope Libya will avoid a similar fate.

Add to this the reality that the spiralling violence cannot possibly end in the favour of “M. Gaddafi and Sons,” militarily, politically or diplomatically. There can no longer be “business as usual” whatever happens in the following days and weeks.

The situation continues to worsen in heading for the inevitable showdown. Yet however serious the consequences, they are an internal matter for the country requiring domestic political solutions.

Another reality is that parts of the country continue to ebb and flow between the government and its opponents. There is no clear distinction in territorial control, adding to an already murky situation.

A basic reality that the government needs to accept is that the official institutions of state are broken. They can no longer sustain, much less protect, Gaddafi’s hold on power.

Among the issues is that there is still no basis for anyone to claim global oil shortages or to act accordingly by raising prices. With countries like Saudi Arabia pledging to raise production to offset any shortfalls, self-seeking claims of a global crisis are premature if not spurious.

Politically, there is no clear successor to Gaddafi once he quits the scene. The situation is not unlike Egypt’s, where a shapeless revolution is aimed primarily at removing an incumbent rather than installing a successor.

In the interim confusion, Gaddafi has played the al-Qaeda card and indicated that allowing his government to fall could permit the influx of Islamist extremists. His authoritarian regime brooked little opposition, but his formula of an “Islamic socialism” also kept out militants.

As Western intervention looms, the question is whether a new Libya will be like Iraq, busy with mayhem and militants, or like Afghanistan, where an ineffectual government oversees little other than the prospect of more mayhem and militants.

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