An implausible series of happenings at Kenmark requires that the authorities take note and do the needful
ANYONE following the strange sequence unfolding at furniture manufacturer Kenmark Industrial Co (M) Bhd can be forgiven for thinking that there is more – much more – than meets the eye.
A disappearing managing director and senior management saw its share price collapsing and in its aftermath, a new controlling shareholder emerged, along with the re-emergence of the MD made known via a press release.
First indications of trouble came when the share price collapsed on the eve of Wesak day, on Thursday May 27 and again on Monday, May 31, there being no trading on Friday because of the public holiday. From nearly 80 sen a share, it had collapsed to about 10 sen, in just over a day, wiping out nearly nine tenths of its value.
On Monday morning – 10.10am – after one hour and 10 minutes of trading, Bursa Malaysia suspended the shares and shot a query to the company on the unusual market activity.
Back came the shocking reply on the same day: Kenmark said its independent directors, Zainabon @ Zainab Abu Bakar and Yeunh Wee Tiong, were the only ones present at an audit committee meeting that was to be held at 10.30am on May 27, incidentally, the day the share prices collapsed.
Neither managing director James Hwang nor another executive and non-executive director, all from Taiwan, could be contacted. The deputy general manager and the finance and administration manager had resigned. There was no management representation at the meeting and therefore the meeting could not proceed.
The independent directors visited the company’s premises in Port Klang on May 29 and found it sealed and the premises secured by a guard. In a further announcement the same day, the independent directors revealed that there were letters of demand for borrowings which totalled over RM60mil and that they were unable to ascertain the financial position of the company or offer any other opinion.
And the independent directors said the company would enter PN17 status requiring its operations to be regularised. They also said that the company would be unable to release its quarterly report in time and that the shares would be suspended five trading days later on June 8. This was confirmed by Bursa Malaysia. All these announcements were made on May 31.
In short, it was utter chaos and no one knew what was happening with key board members and senior management having resigned or disappeared or otherwise unable to be located. That must have been a sort of record even for the Kuala Lumpur stock exchange where strange things have sometimes been known to happen and set the stage for a sell-off.
Incredibly, with such a state of uncertainty surrounding the company, the suspension of the shares was lifted the following day, June 1. Prudence should have dictated that the suspension be maintained until more information was forthcoming so that all shareholders could act from a position of equal information.
That would have discouraged needless speculation and ensured that insiders did not have a trading advantage. If syndicates were in the market, they could have been flushed out as more information about the company came into the public domain.
On May 31 when trading was shortened by the suspension, turnover of the company’s shares had already ballooned to an incredible 72 million shares from 1.5 million shares the previous trading day, May 27 and just 55,000 shares on May 26. That 72 million represented nearly 40% of Kenmark’s issued shares, enough to tell anyone that activity was not just unusual but terribly, terribly unusual, considering the shares changed hands in just one hour and ten minutes of trading. .
If you thought turnover was high on May 31, wait for the next day when the suspension was lifted. It shot up to a massive 190 million plus, more than the entire paid-up capital of Kenmark, implying the same shares were changing hands several times. The following day it was still an incredible 138 million shares.
And then came the next shocking announcement on June 2, when the shares were suspended from trading at the awkward time of 4.43pm and remained suspended until yesterday, June 4
Suddenly, managing director Hwang was contactable. He even issued a press release. He had been sick and unconscious, he said, and his family had barred all calls. But he did not explain why his other directors could not be contacted as well. He apologised for the confusion caused.
“I have spoken with a friendly party who has already acquired a substantial stake in the company and there will be new appointments of directors, including two executive directors to manage the situation there,” he said.
He did not say when he spoke to the friendly party.
His letter to the independent directors said that four new directors should be immediately appointed to the board. They were Ho Soo Woon, Ahmed Azhar Abdullah, Woon Wai En and Datuk Abd Gani Yusuf. The last was appointed executive chairman. The independent directors then resigned.
It transpired that the friendly party and new major shareholder was Datuk Ishak Ismail, who managed to pick up some 32% from the market on June 1 and June 2. Ishak, at his own admission, was the bumiputra partner when Kenmark was listed in 1997.
Yesterday, trading continued to be active and the share closed at 29.5 sen, more than double the previous close of 11.5 sen, on a turnover of 100.8 million shares but still well below its recent price of around 80 sen. The series of events can only be termed incredible and highly volatile. Any reasonable person who follows the case closely will have serious questions to ask at each juncture of the transactions.
It is now up to the authorities, Bursa Malaysia and the Securities Commission to investigate and establish what happened and bring those responsible to book.
At the very least, there was gross negligence in terms of corporate governance and the proper running of a company.
OVER 20 years of sweat equity by the founders and employees of Kenmark Industrial Co (M) Bhd must have seemed to have come crashing down in just a span of a week.
The only one who has the answers to the strange and unexpected developments in the company is 59-year-old Taiwanese national Hwang Ding Kuo @ James Hwang, the company’s managing director. But his sudden “disappearance” and surprising reappearance days later with an apologetic note that he was taken ill and unconscious, has in fact, added more fodder to the unusual circumstances.
Along with Hwang, two other Taiwanese directors had also gone missing.
The uncertainty had led the share price to nose dive, wiping out some RM100mil in market value over this week.
The factory in Port Klang
The business
Kenmark is a big supplier of goods to the international supermarket chain Wal-Mart and other global stores either directly or via its agents.
The predicament in a nutshell – the company failed to submit its financial records on time; two creditor banks has asked the company to pay up; several banks and stockbroking firms have force sold the shares in the open market and its suppliers, to put it mildly are worried.
The first red flag had come from Bursa Malaysia with its query to the company on the unusual market activity, points out Rita Benoy Bushon, chief executive officer of the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG). Suspicions were further heightened when it failed to issue its fourth quarter results.
Rita is calling for Bursa Malaysia and the Securities Commission to conduct a thorough investigation on the matter and if wrongdoing is ascertained, to mete out the necessary penalties.
In a written reply, Bursa Malaysia said it was investigating the matter and “will pursue enforcement action for any breaches of the listing requirements.”
“Bursa Malaysia had engaged with the company’s independent directors, external auditors and officials to ascertain the state of affairs of the company immediately when the issues came to light,” it added.
In comes Ishak
And just as market observers found themselves gobsmacked by the slew of strange developments in the company, the story took on another dimension. Datuk Ishak Ismail, who made his mark in Malaysia’s corporate stage in the early 90s but had bowed out of the limelight in early 2000 following a conviction by the securities regulator, has emerged as the single largest shareholder of Kenmark after acquiring a 32% block.
Kenmark’s new directors (from left) Ho Soo Woon, Datuk Abd Gani Yusof and Woon Wai En at the press conference on Friday.
Ishak and Hwang are old pals. In fact, Ishak was the bumiputera shareholder of Kenmark with a 20% stake when the company was listed in 1997 but had subsequently unwound his holdings.
Ishak tells the StarBizWeek that he had received a call from Hwang on Monday night to “help out”.
Based on announcements to Bursa Malaysia, BHLB Trustee Bhd, a trust for Ishak’s family, scooped up 30 million shares or 16.83% stake in Kenmark on Tuesday. A day later, he used another vehicle, Unioncity Enterprise Ltd to acquire 27 million shares or 15.53% of Kenmark, raising his stake to 32.36%, just shy of the trigger point for a mandatory general offer.
Based on Kenmark’s share price over the two days of the acquisition, it can be assumed that he had acquired the shares at not more than 8 sen apiece. When trading on Kenmark’s shares resumed on Friday, the counter shot up to 26 sen, a 126% gain from its last traded price of 11.5 sen. This means Ishak could be sitting on a paper gain of some RM10mil.
When contacted by the StarBizWeek, Ishak who was in Baghdad, explained why he had acquired the shares: “It is a good company. I checked and there was nothing wrong with the operations. There is just some misunderstanding. What I am thinking now is how we can get the business operations re-started. I have been an investor before and this company is involved in a lot of export business. Imagine the foreign earnings it brings into Malaysia.
“There is also another aspect. About 400 jobs are at stake if the plant does not restart. So, I wanted to help bring the employees back to work. So, it is not about (grabbing) an opportunity but doing a social service. What is wrong with that?’’ he asks.
How much did he acquire the shares for? “I do not know. The purchases were done by the trustees. They make independent decisions,’’ he replies.
Still, many observers expect Ishak to exit not too long from now, pocketing some handsome capital gains. Will that happen? “It all depends on the trustees, it is not about me. This is a family trust and I am not in control of the trust. But this (Kenmark) is a good company,’’ he adds.
Lost confidence
Meanwhile, 133 Malaysian workers of the total workforce of 413 employed by Kenmark are seeking RM1.4mil in damages for being locked out of the factory at the Labour Court in Port Klang. The claims were for termination benefits, compensation in lieu of notice and unused leave.
Quite clearly, the four new directors on board have an uphill battle ahead to regain lost confidence. After their first board meeting on Thursday, they had proceeded to the factory in Port Klang but were barred from entering the premises. On Friday, they met up with the senior team.
CLICK to view graphic
“We just met key management staff and asked them what is required to restart the whole production again. We will take it from there,’’ said newly appointed executive chairman Datuk Abd Gani Yusof.
At the start
Kenmark was set up in Taiwan back in 1978. Kenmark Industrial Co Ltd, which had a factory in Nei Hu, Taipeh, set up its first overseas plant a decade later in 1988. The plant in Malaysia began operations in 1989 on a 10-acre site in Port Klang.
Hwang, the founder of the company, is said to be a very enterprising man; within a short span, the operations expanded to Singapore, Australia, London, Hong Kong, Vietnam, US and China.
The Malaysian operations was listed on Bursa Malaysia in 1997. There are two other Taiwanese directors in the company - Chen Wen-Ling and Chang Chin-Chuan. Chen owned 18.7% stake in the company, according to the company’s latest annual report. With Hwang, the Taiwanese collectively owned 46.4% of Kenmark.
A substantial amount of these shares, it is believed, were pledged to banks and several stockbroking firms for share margin financing. Given the counter’s free fall over the week, many of these shares were force sold, which led many to believe that this is how Ishak could have accumulated his interest in the company.
Domino effect
On Wednesday, after Hwang had “disappeared”, the factory in Malaysia was shut down.
Some suppliers, spooked by the developments, were believed to have taken back their supplies.
On May 27, the company’s two independent directors Zainab Abu Bakar and Yeunh Wee Tiong had called off the audit committee meeting because Hwang had failed to appear. They could not reach Hwang or the two other Taiwanese directors.
Much to their dismay, Zainab and Yuenh had found the factory sealed. They both had stepped down from the board on Thursday.
One of the creditors, EON Bank had caught wind of these developments and wasted little time engaging their solicitors to seal the company. The company received letters of demand from EON Bank and Export-Import Bank for some RM71mil.
In a statement to Bursa yesterday, Kenmark said “There were some trade bills due for payment at the end of May 2010 but due to the unfortunate situation last week ... the trade bills could not be paid and EON Bank in safeguarding their interest had then appointed the Receivers.”
As for its Vietnam plant, Kenmark said that it has learnt from Hwang that the local authorities were requested to take control of the operating premises to safeguard the assets when some looting occurred during the absence of senior management staff.’
Hell breaks loose
On Monday, the situation worsened. The staff who turned up for work that day were told to go home. On that same day, Kenmark’s independent directors had updated officials from Bursa Malaysia on these developments, which led the latter to slap the company with a PN17 status.
After two days of wild speculation, Hwang appeared with his apologetic note that he was “sorry for the confusion” and that he was “taken ill in China ... and was in a delirious state from lack of sleep and was in and out of consciousness.”
Naturally, most found the excuse hard to swallow.
“It shows total disregard of shareholders, suppliers and employees. Even if he was not around, how could anyone expect the company to run rudderless?,” asks an observer.
Those who are close to Hwang say that he largely handled the business on his own, preferring that to delegating the work to the rest at top management. “This could explain the chaos his absence had resulted in,” says a source.
The task ahead
Since then, four professional managers have been appointed to the board. They are Ho Soo Woon, Ahmed Azhar Bin Abdullah, Woon Wai En, Datuk Abd. Gani Bin Yusof. Woon was formerly with Vads Bhd while Ho has his own family business. Gani has several businesses of his own but not much is known about Ahmed.
Evidently, the team is determined to get things back to normalcy. One of the most urgent matters that needs to be addressed is that the company needs to submit the fourth quarter results. The directors have failed to get an extension of time to June 30 from Bursa Securities to submit its results as the application was submitted less than fifteen days prior to the due date for submission.
“The Directors do not have access to the accounting records as yet and shall endeavour to have the results released as soon as available,” it said in a note to Bursa Malaysia late Friday.
Time is not a luxury it has. Bursa has given Kenmark till June 8 to submit the results, failing which the trading of shares will be suspended.
Analysts expect the group’s showing in the fourth quarter to be “less impressive” as orders from the European markets have been soft due to the economic slowdown.
In the company’s latest annual report, it had stated that it will focus on strengthening the wood-based business as margins were better than the LCD television business unit which was facing stiff competition. It also expected demand for wood-based products to remain stagnant until the economy in the European and North American markets pick up.
About 78% of Kenmarks business, said the analyst is export driven; one of its largest export markets for its furniture products is Europe. As such, he expects the weakening Euro to put a damper on the company’s latest results.
For the year ended March 2009, Kenmark made a net profit of RM3.8mil on the back of RM259mil sales compared to RM10.1mil and RM308mil a year ago.
Questions left unanswered
Without a doubt, the whole debacle has raised key corporate governance issues. The unusual market activity in the counter also needs to be prodded further by the authorities.
Was this simply a case of one thing leading to another? Or is there more to it than meets the eye? “From a corporate governance view, it is astonishing that it has reached this stage. Some processes and checks and balances had failed. If so, how and why?” asked a peeved observer.
PETALING JAYA:Just when it seemed that more clarity could emerge on what transpired at troubled furniture-maker Kenmark Industrial Co (M) Bhd, a new hurdle has emerged.
Reliable sources said that while the special audit report on the company had been completed by accounting firm UHY Malaysia, the report had yet to be released to the relevant regulatory bodies because no one had paid UHY.
When contacted, an official from UHY’s forensic accounting division confirmed that it had yet to receive payment for its professional audit fees for the special report from Kenmark.
The situation poses a dilemma for the regulators as it is only expected that any firm carrying out an audit will need secure payment for work done on such a report.
To recap, UHY was directed and endorsed by Bursa Malaysia to conduct the special audit report on Kenmark back in July to determine if there had been any accounting irregularities, potential breaches of rules and regulations that contributed to the current RM150mil recorded losses.
Moreover, the special audit report was conducted to find out if there were any more losses that the new management had to deal with and debt exposure that shareholders should know.
Bursa Malaysia had confirmed to StarBiz that it had so far not received the special audit report on Kenmark. A senior auditor of a local accounting firm said professional fees for scope of work that had been identified and endorsed by the regulators should not be disputed, especially when the work had been completed.
“If payment is not made to the accounting firm conducting the special audit report it would be difficult to know the actual financial position of Kenmark and on technical grounds and the lack of pertinent information (on the company’s past undertakings and accounts), it is likely the company would get away with any missdeeds because of the lack of evidence.”
THE New Economic Model (NEM) characterises Malaysia in 2020 as market-led, entrepreneurial and innovative. A deliberate move towards a more competitive society, dedicated to value-adding to achieve high-incomes. A year ago, I wrote in this column: “The centrepiece to promote recovery and quality growth during hard times is to drive innovation.”
The key element here being the Government’s will to make some fundamental changes, including “a stubborn resolve to change mindsets in order to instil and build (and effectively put on the ground) a creative and innovative culture, and a national entrepreneurial spirit.”
A year later, I wrote: “…we can’t be expected to grow efficiently by simply doing more of the same. To become an increasingly higher income nation, we need to shift to an economy that is innovation led.”
Innovation simply means fresh thinking and approaches that add value to consistently create wealth and social welfare. In the end, “innovation drives productivity, and productivity drives the flow of real income.” I ended with a remark on venture capital: “From Asean to North-East Asia and from India to Japan, the big risk to innovative ventures remains the lack of ready access to finance.” Policy makers have turned to creating tomorrow’s jobs rather than saving yesterday’s. The buzzwords in government are entrepreneurship, innovation and venture capital.
Asian environment is set in a culture that does not take on risk easily. Thomas Watson (founder of IBM), when asked about risk taking, said: “If you want to succeed, raise your error rate.”
I believe our Government has to become a bold enabler when it comes to nurturing the build-up of risk capital. I also believe any government that takes no risk in promoting innovative ventures is likely to make the bigger error of not trying hard enough. Accept the hard-headed Sun Tzu rule that making omelettes will require breaking egg shells.
Venture capital vs private equity
Venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) are not the same. VC provides development funding to early stage firms in high-technology and bio-technology. In contrast, PE backs established enterprises using equity and debt.
VC helps fund innovation – to grow seed and start-ups into major break-throughs that dazzle. PE thrives at the other end of the spectrum – offering equity and leveraged finance to spin deals. PE backed enterprises are usually run by the same executives who ran them before PE moved in.
Essentially, PE teams up with entrepreneurs to create value. However, VC managers bring professional advice and managerial and organisational support to the table, help manage start-ups and “teenage” ventures.
PE executives make money from fees; capital gains are just a bonus. The standard “2 & 20” fee structure, whereby managers charge investors 2% on monies managed and 20% of profits earned, is lucrative. They also charge transaction fees and fees for monitoring portfolios.
In contrast, VC takes are more modest since their fund size pales in comparison. VC ventures do fail but occasionally they get a hit – returns of 10 to 50 times. In the end, VC is all about real big successes.
PE is never easy; funding and executing private investment is hard. Competition is fierce and much financial engineering has already been tried. Only operators who are talented – and lucky – can keep producing high returns. Similarly, VC funding is difficult in terms of staying power.
The easy-to-profit schemes of 1990s created impatient investors. But building new ventures take perseverance. Most 100 largest publicly traded US software companies took six years or more to generate enough revenue to reach IPO (initial public offering). Microsoft and Oracle, which went public in 1986, were founded in 1975 and 1977 respectively.
VC fuses innovators and entrepreneurs with intelligent capital (and business know-how) in a combination that’s capable of spectacular successes, such as Apple, Google, Intel and FedEx. This also needs enlightened government policies. That’s how wealth creation takes place.
Be that as it may, NEM needs a dynamic VC and PE industry to meet its goals. Innovation and finance go hand in hand. With economic recovery, VC and PE must get back to providing growth capital – from seed to start-ups and then, on to expansion, refinancing, buy-outs, in the drive to maturity. Indeed, recession has left them with lots of “dry powder” (uninvested committed capital) before they need to raise new money. Yet, many have fallen victims of a world-wide reshuffle. Survivors will have to get used to a diet of smaller deals and lower returns, at least until economies fully recover.
VC in Malaysia
In Malaysia, chronic risk aversion defines the financial landscape. So much so the VC industry remains grossly under-developed, unwilling to take on seed and early-stage big-bang bets. In the 1970s, Bank Negara took small steps to set up VC funds. The first real move was Bank Industri’s joint venture (JV) fund with San-Francisco based Walden International to finance nascent ICT ventures. The JV later set up two additional venture funds in the 1980s.
Since then, the Government has introduced a wide array of VC funds, soft loans and tax incentives. But according to Prof N. Takahashi of Musashi University, Malaysia today ranks very low among 54 countries with less than 0.5% of those aged 18-64 involved in start-up activities, compared with 10% in US, 6% in Britain and 4% in Japan.
Structurally, the VC industry in Malaysia is very skewed and weak. Among 114 players, 104 were 100% locally-owned, nine joint-ventures and one, 100% foreign-owned. Together they managed RM5.36bil of funds at end-2009 (less than 1% of gross national product), of which only 48% (RM2.6bil) was invested.
In 2009, only RM597mil was invested; 80%-85% of committed funding came from government and only 12.6% from banks, financial institutions and individuals. Of the funds invested in 2009, only 24% went to seed (3%), start-ups (6%) and early stage (15%). The bulk was utilised to fund expansion (53%) and bridging (17%). Not only is VC funding highly reliant on government, but the ecosystem presents difficulties in private fund raising because of risk averse institutional investors, restricted regulations on asset allocation, and VC firms lack track record.
While entrepreneurs recognise there are improvements in start-ups, changes are in small and many barriers remain. The lack of “real” venture funding is a problem and funds are highly risk averse. About 85% of VC funds is provided by the Government. Since the mandate is to lend, they just do so and quickly take them to IPO, rather than take on the risk to nurture them, as in the US and Europe.
In the Government, the culture is to avoid taking risk. Malaysia is not unique here. VC companies in Japan have long suffered from a dearth of “risk” capital with a conservative attitude. According to Prof S. Kagani of Tokyo University, Japanese VC firms do not take risk even though they offer “risk” capital. Typically, they invest with other VC, scatter their funds widely and keep them small to minimise risk.
Japan invested US$2bil in 2008 (as against US$25bil in the US), of which only 10% was in start-ups (18% in the US). In Malaysia, the ratio is 6%. Like Japan, Malaysian VC still has much “dry-powder” in hand, totalling RM2.7bil (or 52% of capital committed). They still have money to spend.
Compelling challenges
US President R. Reagan used to joke that the nine most terrifying words in the English language are: “I’m from the government and I’m here to help.” To be fair, government has helped ignite entrepreneurship. It also helped develop the VC industry – warts and all. Indeed, most great entrepreneurial hubs, from Bangalore to Hangzhou, from Singapore to Seoul bear the stamp of public intervention.
In Boulevard of Broken Dreams: Why Public Efforts to Boost Entrepreneurships & Venture Capital Have Failed – and What to Do About It, Prof J. Lerner (Harvard Business School) points to two foolish tendencies among politicians.
First is temptation to spread wealth to regions and interest groups. France, for example, tried to transform Brittany (a backward region) into a hive of high-tech activity but failed miserably. Second is suspicion of foreign investors. In the 1990s, Japan lavished billions on start-up VCs but was reluctant to embrace foreign VCs or invest in non-Japanese VCs. Today, Japan has the rich world’s weakest VC market. Sound familiar?
Start-Up Nation by D. Senor and S. Singer tells the story of how Israel plugged itself into the global VC market in 1992 with a US$100mil publicly funded VC. It was designed to attract foreign VC and foreign expertise to do the job. This market-driven fund attracted foreign VC to participate. The nascent high-tech industry boomed, domestic VCs learnt from this experience and foreign expertise was passed on. Its VC industry flourished. In 2009, Israel attracted as much foreign VC as France and Germany combined; and had more companies listed on Nasdaq than China and India combined.
New approach to VC
The Malaysian VC community is too government-centric: the Government provides funding and calls the tune on what to invest, who to invest in, how to invest and whom to manage.
Funds are risk averse in practice, reflecting conflict between its developmental and commercial agenda. But, they are risk averse by necessity because VC lacks risk management skills; activities are largely insulated from global inter-connectivity, with only a limited window abroad. As a result, it has poor deal flows. Its overall performance has been dismal.
The fundamental weakness lies in a lack of focus on seed and start-up enterprises; these account for 9% of total VC funding. Including early-stage, their combined share is about 24%. But there are only a handful of professionally managed, genuine early-start VC funds – targeting pre-revenue, unproven businesses. Organised angel investing, where affluent individuals invest in seed and early start-ups, is rare.
Yet, early-stage funds play a critical role; they create jobs and new industries as well as generate high returns. Importantly, without continuing flows of early-stage funds, later-stage funds would be starved in subsequent years. So why aren’t there more early-stage funds? Two main reasons. First, there is genuine lack of expertise. Second, most VC funds effectively force them to do deals of RM2mil or more to ensure a manageable number of investments.
Indeed, a few smaller-ticket early-stage deals are done as an afterthought. While VC investing traditionally has been a “home-run” business, venture firms are backing far safer investments. What’s needed are smaller funds of RM50mil and a fresh outlook from investors willing to take calculated risks on small but good opportunities and strong teams, and patience to wait for real value creation.
To succeed VC has to dramatically change direction. Creating a more dynamic environment must be high on the agenda. Here, taking risk and managing risk have to be seen in a more positive light in the Malaysian business culture.
To begin with, VC needs to be market driven. To survive, the business must be risk-, people- and innovation-driven. The Government will be needed to act as an enabler: a funder with private investors and markets; and a provider of incentives to deepen business commitment. VC focus must be on seed and start-ups.
To better serve and service the business, VC’s structure and organisation (systems processes and skills) have to be re-vamped within a more friendly ecosystem. Also, VC must be regionalised and globalised in scope.
To complete the chain, PE must also be restructured but approached differently to complement VC growth in vital areas of re-financing, mergers and acquisitions, and buy-outs.
All these simply mean a complete mind-set and culture change. In the end, VC and PE business must be seen to be talent- and skill-oriented, with the world as its marketplace. Transformation of the VC-PE landscape (restructured to up-skill with due emphasis on generating deal flows) becomes critical. Finally, VC-PE needs to find its niche business on the Islamic finance radar screen.
Source: WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN
·Former banker Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British chartered scientist who now spends time writing, teaching and promoting the public interest. Feedback is most welcome at starbizweek@thestar.com.my.
