Why Greece Will Default?

CAMBRIDGE – Greece will default on its national debt. That default will be due in large part to its membership in the European Monetary Union. If it were not part of the euro system, Greece might not have gotten into its current predicament and, even if it had gotten into its current predicament, it could have avoided the need to default.

Greece’s default on its national debt need not mean an explicit refusal to make principal and interest payments when they come due. More likely would be an IMF-organized restructuring of the existing debt, swapping new bonds with lower principal and interest for existing bonds.

Or it could be a “soft default” in which Greece unilaterally services its existing debt with new debt rather than paying in cash. But, whatever form the default takes, the current owners of Greek debt will get less than the full amount that they are now owed.

The only way that Greece could avoid a default would be by cutting its future annual budget deficits to a level that foreign and domestic investors would be willing to finance on a voluntary basis. At a minimum, that would mean reducing the deficit to a level that stops the rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio.

To achieve that, the current deficit of 14% of GDP would have to fall to 5% of GDP or less. But to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio to the 60% level prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty would require reducing the annual budget deficit to just 3% of GDP – the goal that the eurozone’s finance ministers have said that Greece must achieve by 2012.

Reducing the budget deficit by 10% of GDP would mean an enormous cut in government spending or a dramatic rise in tax revenue – or, more likely, both. Quite apart from the political difficulty of achieving this would be the very serious adverse effect on aggregate domestic demand, and therefore on production and employment. Greece’s unemployment rate already is 10%, and its GDP is already expected to fall at an annual rate of more than 4%, pushing joblessness even higher.

Depressing economic activity further through higher taxes and reduced government spending would cause offsetting reductions in tax revenue and offsetting increases in transfer payments to the unemployed. So every planned euro of deficit reduction delivers less than a euro of actual deficit reduction. That means that planned tax increases and cuts in basic government spending would have to be even larger than 10% of GDP in order to achieve a 3%-of-GDP budget deficit.

There simply is no way around the arithmetic implied by the scale of deficit reduction and the accompanying economic decline: Greece’s default on its debt is inevitable.

Greece might have been able to avoid that outcome if it were not in the eurozone. If Greece still had its own currency, the authorities could devalue it while tightening fiscal policy. A devalued currency would increase exports and would cause Greek households and firms to substitute domestic products for imported goods. The increased demand for Greek goods and services would raise Greece’s GDP, increasing tax revenue and reducing transfer payments. In short, fiscal consolidation would be both easier and less painful if Greece had its own monetary policy.

Greece’s membership in the eurozone was also a principal cause of its current large budget deficit. Because Greece has not had its own currency for more than a decade, there has been no market signal to warn Greece that its debt was growing unacceptably large.

If Greece had remained outside the eurozone and retained the drachma, the large increased supply of Greek bonds would cause the drachma to decline and the interest rate on the bonds to rise. But, because Greek euro bonds were regarded as a close substitute for other countries’ euro bonds, the interest rate on Greek bonds did not rise as Greece increased its borrowing – until the market began to fear a possible default.

The substantial surge in the interest rate on Greek bonds relative to German bonds in the past few weeks shows that the market now regards such a default as increasingly likely. The combination of credits from the other eurozone countries and lending by the IMF may provide enough liquidity to stave off default for a while. In exchange for this liquidity support, Greece will be forced to accept painful fiscal tightening and falling GDP.

In the end, Greece, the eurozone’s other members, and Greece’s creditors will have to accept that the country is insolvent and cannot service its existing debt. At that point, Greece will default.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2010.
www.project-syndicate.org , Martin Feldstein Copyright: Project Syndicate

The Greatest Show on Earth

Open Hearings in US reveal the degree of greed and fraud on Wall Street
Investment banks such as Goldman Sachs were self-interested promoters of risky and complicated financial schemes that helped trigger the crisis, said senator Carl Levin

Ladies and gentlemen,

Allow me to present the Greatest Show on Earth or How Wall Street brought the Financial Crisis on Itself. There is a cast of thousands, from the most famous to the most guilty. Never have so few made so much money from so many.

See how god’s bankers say: “Of course we didn’t dodge the mortgage mess. We lost money, then made more than we lost because of shorts.” Of course they are god’s bankers – they make money on the way up and make money on the way down.

See how the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) and the US Senate Subcommittee Investigating Financial Crisis summon almost every week the stars from Wall Street to show how they did it.

The Senate subcommittee chairman, Democratic Senator Carl Levin, said: “Investment banks such as Goldman Sachs were not simply market-makers, they were self-interested promoters of risky and complicated financial schemes that helped trigger the crisis.

“They bundled toxic mortgages into complex financial instruments, got the credit rating agencies to label them as AAA securities, and sold them to investors, magnifying and spreading risk throughout the financial system, and all too often betting against the instruments they sold and profiting at the expense of their clients.”

 

Senator Carl Levin holds up paperwork while questioning a Goldman Sachs official. — Reuters

 

Goldman Sachs’ 2009 annual report stated that the firm “did not generate enormous net revenues by betting against residential-related products.” Levin said: “These emails show that, in fact, Goldman made a lot of money by betting against the mortgage market.”

We must admire the United States for its high level of transparency and its willingness to go after the big guns. What these open hearings reveal is the degree of greed and fraud that Wall Street has perpetrated against the whole world in its pursuit of ever-growing profits.

Investors used to listen to these gods pontificate on the trend of the market and now realise that with proprietary trading, these gods are talking one book and trading also the other way. So if you believed them and bought the market up, they were probably selling the market down. This is known as “risk hedging”, but guess who pays when the market crashes?

The taxpayer bails the investment banks out and they are still laughing all the way to their golden bonuses.
April is the cruelest month, especially for Wall Street.

On April 7, the FCIC looked into the securitisation mess, beginning with the testimony of former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan. On April 13, the Senate subcommittee started the first of four major enquiries, which “examined how US financial institutions turned to high-risk lending strategies to earn quick profits, dumping hundreds of billions of dollars in toxic mortgages into the financial system, like polluters dumping poison upstream in a river.”

Coincidentally, on the same day, the Securities and Exchange Commission charged Goldman Sachs of fraud.

In the second hearing on April 16 on the role of the regulators, the subcommittee “showed how regulators saw what was going on, understood the risk, but sat on their hands or fought each other rather than stand up to the banks profiting from the pollution. Those toxic mortgages were scooped up by Wall Street firms that bottled them in complex financial instruments, and turned to the credit rating agencies to get a label declaring them to be safe, low-risk, investment grade securities.”

The third hearing on April 23 looked at the role of the credit rating agencies and the fourth hearing on April 27 considered the role of the investment bankers.

On hindsight, it was remarkable that the Wall Street bankers, who always had a good grip on what was happening in Washington, had clearly underestimated the public anger against them and their vulnerability.

The session on the credit rating agencies was most illuminating. There are three major rating agencies in the world that do most of the global credit rating business – Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch. Most investors rely on the credit rating agencies to assess the quality of their investments, particularly bonds.

With the arrival of Basel bank supervision rules in the 1980s, bank regulators also use credit ratings to assess whether the capital-risk weights are appropriate. Thus, if a bank were to hold junk bonds, then the capital requirements would be higher. Of course, pension and money market funds use the credit ratings to distinguish between safe and risky investments.

The result is that having a AAA credit rating was very helpful to borrowing at cheap rates, whereas a downgrade would not only increase the cost of funds, but also cut off liquidity as investors dump the securities and refuse to hold such downgraded debt.

In the last 10 years, the three biggest credit rating agencies gave AAA ratings to the residential mortgage backed securities, or RMBS, and collateralised debt obligations, or CDOs that fuelled the derivative market bubble. Between 2002 and 2007, these agencies doubled their revenues, from less than US$3bil to over US$6bil per year. Between 2000 and 2006, investment banks underwrote nearly US$2 trillion in mortgage-backed securities, US$435bil or 36% of which were backed by subprime mortgages.

At the heart of the problem is the inherent conflict of interest of the credit rating agencies, because they charged fees for a “public good service”. The Senate subcommittee called this “like one of the parties in court paying the judge’s salary, or one of the teams in a competition paying the salary of the referee.”

The investors thought that they were buying super-safe securities rated AAA. But in reality, 91% of the AAA subprime RMBS issued in 2007, and 93% of those issued in 2006, have since been downgraded to junk status. It was the collapse of confidence in the ratings, which led to the withdrawal of liquidity in the market that triggered the meltdown in 2008.

This is only the beginning of the dirt that is coming out of Wall Street. The show will continue.

THINK ASIAN
By ANDREW SHENG

 ● Datuk Seri Panglima Andrew Sheng is adjunct professor at Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, and Tsinghua University, Beijing. He has served in key positions at Bank Negara, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, and is currently a member of Malaysia’s National Economic Advisory Council. He is the author of the book From Asian to Global Financial Crisis.

The customer is no longer king

It seemed to me Goldman Sachs had forgotten the first rule of business stated by the late management guru, Peter Drucker

The Goldman Sachs fiasco should remind businesses the purpose of their existence

Whose business is it anyway - by John Zenkin

I WAS going to write about the rather dry subject of risk assessment this week until I watched the Goldman Sachs congressional testimony on Tuesday night and linked it in my mind with an article in The Economist of April 24 entitled “Shareholders vs Stakehol-ders: A New Idolatry” which deals with the old conundrum of where to focus in good governance: on shareholders, customers or employees.

The reason I changed my mind was that I was shocked to listen to three Goldman Sachs traders being unable or unwilling to answer a simple “Yes” or “No” question from Senator McCaskill of Missouri.
Her question was simple and to the point: did they have a fiduciary duty to their clients, which means looking after their clients’ interest first?

Only one of the panel of four said “Yes”.

The other three hedged their answers to the increasing anger of the senator as she repeated her question.

From the testimony it appeared that all that mattered was that Goldman Sachs made money at the expense of the clients it was supposed to serve, even going to the extent of shorting trades that they had sold to their clients as being good investments, even though internal memos described the assets involved as “shi**y”.

Whether their behaviour was illegal is the subject for the courts, though it certainly appeared that the senators believed strongly that what the traders had been doing was unethical.

As I watched, fascinated by the drama, it seemed to me Goldman Sachs had forgotten the first rule of business stated by the late Peter Drucker in 1946 in his book The Concept of the Corporation that “the purpose of business is to create and maintain satisfied customers”.

What is more, this rule of business was Goldman’s own rule as long as they were a partnership because they recognised that the long-term interests of the partners were to avoid alienating their customers in return for a short-term profit.

What seems to have happened since Goldman Sachs went public is that its employees have been able to look after their own interests at the expense of both customers and shareholders.

This is because the money they were playing with was no longer theirs, but that of other people – their investors and their shareholders.

This suggests that there are limits to how much a company can look after the interests of its employees, especially when they are paid enormous bonuses, apparently regardless of how much pain the shareholders are experiencing (as we have seen in the case of AIG or Merrill Lynch).

It is even more the case when the payout comes from the taxpayer in the form of bailouts.

It seems to me therefore that if there is an excessive focus on protecting shareholder or employee interests at the expense of the client or the customer, the company could put itself at unnecessary risk as far as its reputation and license to operate are concerned.

How soon Goldman Sachs will recover from the damage to its brand shown in the following quote from April 28’s Washington Post is anybody’s guess:

“There was a time when issuers would pay a premium to have Goldman Sachs underwrite their securities, just as there was a time when investors would pay a premium to buy into a Goldman-sponsored offering. Today, Goldman has fully monetised the value of its reputation, and anyone who pays such a premium is a fool.”

I was also struck by the fact that their style of defence bore similarities to those of Exxon in the Valdez case, Shell in the Brent Spar case and recently Toyota when it was found wanting on quality. When customers get upset or when NGOs go after companies, their argument is emotional – designed to be fought in the court of public opinion rather than in a court of law. Legal niceties, technical subtleties do not go down well with people who are looking for memorable soundbites.

What ordinary people want to see is someone who shows emotion and empathy, says he/she is sorry and that he/she will try to do better next time and then there can be closure. Lawyers, with their eye on court cases and damages, advise clients to never say sorry and to prevaricate and obfuscate. This merely increases the anger and frustration of the offended parties.

I have, however, yet to see a company suffer because it has focused too much on serving its clients or delighting its customers.

Perhaps a more correct approach in today’s world is that of the new boss of Unilever, quoted in The Economist article referred to earlier, where he says:

“I do not work for the shareholder, to be honest; I work for the consumer, the customer … I’m not driven and I don’t drive this business model by driving shareholder value.”


·The writer is CEO of Securities Industry Development Corp, the training and development arm of the Securities Commission.