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Showing posts with label Gross domestic product. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gross domestic product. Show all posts

Friday 9 September 2011

The BRICS are coming

The BRICS - Brazil, Russia, India, China and S...Image via Wikipedia



WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN

THE term BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) was first used in 2001 by economist Jim O'Neill (Goldman Sachs) to call attention to four rapidly rising large emerging economies considered able to play a significant role in global affairs, championing the interests of developing nations. Very much like what G-7 does for the developed world.

For years since, it was treated by investors and journalists as a shorthand for the big emerging markets. Adding South Africa to the group widens its focus to include more from outside fast-growing China and India.

The BRICs held its first summit in 2009 in Russia, discussing issues on international monetary reform, including the possibilities of a new dominant reserve regime to replace the US dollar-based system. This year, China played host and invited South Africa to join, formally naming the group BRICS. Together they exceeded three billion people, nearly 45% of the world, and about 25% of the world's 2011 gross domestic product (GDP) based on purchasing power parity.

China's total output is bigger than the other four put together. The economic clout of the BRICS is now growing as the developed world struggles to expand and pare debt. Indeed, they are starting to operate as a common bloc in the G-20, providing a counterpoint to the United States and Europe.

Building BRICS

But the group is vastly different. India, Brazil and South Africa are vibrant democracies in contrast to the more authoritarian Russia and China. They need to balance the interests of its members: three large commodity exporters and two huge commodity importers. For sure, they have to get used to obeying rules they played little part in shaping. China's economy, the world's second largest, is nearly three times the size of Brazil's, close on four times that of Russia and India, and 16 times that of South Africa.



They also differ on exchange rate policies. Brazil is vocal against China's tight management of the yuan's value, keeping its exports relatively cheap. China is becoming prominent in BRICS' trade already it is Brazil and South Africa's largest source of imports. Be that as it may, the group shares strong macroeconomic fundamentals going into 2012.

China and India will grow 8.5%-9% this year; Russia and Brazil, 4%-4.5%; and South Africa, 3.5%. Their structural budget deficits are well contained, with low debt/GDP ratios, highest being in India (68%) and South Africa (65%).

China continues to have a current balance of payments surplus (5.7% of GDP), while all the others' deficits are each less than 5%. But they share a common problem inflation: 6.5% in China, 9% in India, 9% in Russia, 7% in Brazil and 6% in South Africa. Containing inflation remains a top priority of public policy. Still, they continue to struggle to deal with this threat.

The 2nd BRICS Summit held in April 2011 reaffirmed the group's determination to transit from global pax americana to a new order in the “development of humanity.” The BRICS' emphasis on co-operation in their call for reform of the US-dollar dominated international monetary system and for tighter supervision of commodity derivatives and markets, and capital flows show the group is seeking to refrain from too much assertiveness. Still the desire to shake off the old hegemony is there; it calls for a larger role in international fora.

It condemns “the inadequacies and deficiencies” of global finance and the “excessive volatility in commodity prices.” The Sanya declaration underscored their concerns about underlying factors that fuel inflation and currency volatility in many emerging economies, as well as their strong desire to shift away from reliance on the US dollar.

“We call for more attention to the risks of massive cross-border capital flows now faced by the emerging economiesExcessive volatility in commodity prices, particularly for food and energy.”

The BRICS took a new step towards cementing their global influence by: (i) calling for a broad-based reserve currency system “providing stability and certainty”, one that is more reliable and stable; (ii) welcoming discussion about the global role of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), the International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s in-house accounting unit but a global reserve asset, and on the SDR's basket of currencies (now comprising the US dollar, the euro, yen and pound sterling); (iii) establishing mutual credit lines denominated in their home currencies among the state development banks of the group. To start the ball rolling, China Development Bank will issue loans worth 10 billion denominated in yuan this year to other BRICS nations, mostly to fund oil and gas projects; and (iv) forging a common emerging market negotiating stance on issues from climate change to world trade, and to act as a credible counterweight to the West in settings like the G-20.

BRICS & Asia

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) expects Asia to grow 7.5% this year (against 9.2% in 2010) and 7% in 2012. “If anything distinguished the region from the rest of the world, it is its strong macro fundamentals.”

However, a dark cloud in the horizon is the slowdown in exports to its traditional markets in the United States, Europe and Japan. Against this is the region's potential for rapid expansion in intra-regional trade, amid signs of rising domestic demand in Asia.

True, manufacturing and services-related activities stalled across much of the world in August, raising fears of another global downturn. True also, factory and services output throughout Asia, including China and India, slackened in August, pointing to growing evidence that weaker demand in the United States and Europe is weighing on Asia's export-driven economies.

Moreover, investor confidence dropped to the lowest in two years in September in the eurozone and the United States, and consumer confidence, already fragile, weakened further. Unfortunately, the United States' anaemic growth and Europe's worsening debt crisis have prompted governments to deepen budget cuts, undermining consumer demand and clouded growth prospects with uncertainty.

Barring a full-blown double-dip in the United States and Europe, Asia will still suffer significant bruising from deepened dashed expectations, with most of the pain centred on highly exposed nations Taiwan and South Korea. No doubt, the BRICS economies are bound to face clear challenges in responding to the angst over weakened global conditions.

Missing BRICS

O'Neill has since suggested his original four BRICs be expanded to include Turkey, Indonesia, Mexico and South Korea, to form the new “growth markets”. A fresh look is taken to measure exposure to equity markets beyond market capitalisation (GDP, corporate revenue growth and volatility of asset returns); any emerging market accounting for 1% or more of world GDP should be taken seriously. Mexico and South Korea each represented 1.6% of world GDP, Turkey, 1.2% and Indonesia, 1.1%.

Among them, I particularly favour Indonesia. Like Brazil, Indonesia's success is based on the commodities boom: gas and coal to China and India, and palm oil to the world. Investments are flowing in. With a population of 237 million (the world's largest Muslim nation), the country is in the midst of a consumer boom.

Indeed, it has the potential to become one of the world's biggest economies. But it has to get its act together. It will grow 6.2% this year (6.1% 2010) and hopefully 6.5% in 2012. South-East Asia's largest and fastest growing economy is firing on all cylinders. It is today rated a notch below investment grade and should be upgraded soon. It will become a credible 6th member of the BRICS.

What impresses is its growing middle class. World Bank puts private consumer spending at close to one-half of GDP. The middle class (disposable household income exceeding US$3,000 a year) numbered 1.6 million in 2004. Today, Japanese investment bank Nomura estimates it to be about 50 million, more than in India and larger than in any of its nine other Asean neighbours. By 2014-2015, Nomura thinks it could reach 150 million.

The country is growing so fast, especially in the urban areas, that inflation is a major political issue at 7.2% for 2011. But it's stable, bearing in mind the rupiah appreciated 5% this year. Affluent middle-class Indonesians are spending, mainly on motor cycles (eight million sold in 2010, dwarfing sales in the rest of South-East Asia), cars (750,000 in 2010) and smart phones.

Indonesia is reputed to be the world's No. 2 in Facebook members and world's No. 3 in Twitter users. But, Indonesia, to be frank, remains a difficult place to do business because of poor infrastructure (adding to production and distribution costs), and corruption (“non-transparent random regulations”). But there are signs things are changing for the better. It is still attractive to foreign investors: nowadays “if you are not here, you have to have a good reason.” Most new consumer desirables are still imported.

Wall of BRICS 

As a group, the BRICS are growing fast. China has surpassed Japan as the world's No. 2. India and Brazil are following fast behind. Catching-up is always much easier because the leader has already set the path and the pace. At some point, reliance on emerging nations as engines of growth begins to disappoint, as it becomes harder to sustain the pace. Growth will slow down (as did Europe, and Asian Tigers and Japan before them) or may even falter (as did Latin America in the 1990s).

There is a lesson from history. A recent study by three scholars Barry Eichengreen (University of California, Berkeley), Doughyun Park (ADB) and Kwanho Shin (Korea University) called the EPS study* attempted to draw potential warning signs by examining economies since 1957 whose GDP per capita (on a purchasing power parity or PPP basis) rose more than 3.5% a year for seven years, and then suffered a sharp slowdown when growth dipped precentage points or more.

The focus was on economies enjoying sustained catch-up growth. The common sense behind PPP is the same amount of money should purchase the same product in any two countries (hence, the term purchasing power parity). That is, the purchasing power of money, expressed in one currency, should change pari passu in different countries. If US$5 buys a cup of Starbucks coffee in New York and the actual cost of the same Starbucks coffee in KL is RM12, then the exchange rate should be US$1=RM2.40 according to PPP. But the actual exchange rate is close to RM3, or 20% cheaper. So, the use of PPP serves to neutralise any currency distortions.

What emerged was as follows: (i) growth slowdowns occurred when GDP per capita reached about US$16,740 per capita; and (ii) the average growth rate then falls from 5.6% per year to 2.3%. In the 1970s, growth rates in Western Europe and Japan cooled off at about the US$16,740 threshold, as did Singapore in early 1980s and South Korea and Taiwan in the late 1990s.

Thereafter, growth often continues and may even accelerate. Japan's boom lost momentum in early 1970s, then accelerated until it blew up in the 1990s. But, no one-size-fits-all depends on circumstances. When the United States passed its threshold, it kept on growing rapidly, consistent with its innovative prowess. Other risk factors matter, including openness to trade; lifting of consumption to beyond 60% of GDP; low and stable inflation; high ratio of workers to dependents. On the other hand, an under-valued exchange rate raises the risks of a slowdown.

* “When Fast Growing Economies Slow Down: International Evidence and Implications for China.” NBER, March 2011.

The EPS study does draw interesting parallels. China is destined to reach the US$16,740 GDP per capita threshold by 2015, well ahead of India and Brazil. Will it then slacken? The risk factors for China include: an ageing population, low consumption and an under-valued currency. On these alone, the study suggests high odds (over 70%) of a definite slowdown by then! But China is unique. These risks can be managed by shifting development inland, leaving the maturing urban centres room to innovate.

China is already reforming to become a more consumption-based economy, while its currency is being managed to reflect market considerations. Prompt structural reforms help cushion the effects of any slowdown. Even so, a percentage point drop in growth to 6%-7% does not sound so scary. For China, it should not really be such a big deal.

Former banker, Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British Chartered Scientist who now spends time writing, teaching & promoting the public interest. Feedback is most welcome; email: starbizweek@thestar.com.my 

Friday 2 September 2011

Putting finance to work





 The financial sector must be transformed and serve the real economy

THINK ASIAN By ANDREW SHENG

FINANCE is a service industry, but in the past three decades it seems to have gone its own way.

The functions of the finance sector are to protect property rights for the real sector, improve resource allocation, reduce transaction costs, help manage risks and help discipline borrowers. Financial intermediaries are agents of the real sector. Bankers were traditionally among the most trusted members of the community because they looked after other peoples' money.

The divide between bankers and their customers (the real sector) is epitomised by a recent report which said that the mantra of a large British bank is about “increasing share of wallet of existing customers”. It recalls Woody Allen's joke that the job of his stockbroker was to manage his money until it was all gone. And despite what bankers say, a lot more would have gone between 2007 and 2009 without massive bailouts from the public purse.

The heart of the problem is the principal-agent relationship, where trust is everything. The real sector (the principal) trusts the finance sector to manage its savings, and the banks, as agents, have a fiduciary duty to their customers. Agency business is a big public utility because the intermediary does not take risks, which are those of his customers. All this changed when the drive for short-term profits pushed banks more and more into proprietary trading for their own profits. All this was in the name of capital efficiency, a misnomer for increasing leverage.

In the past 30 years, with growth in technology and financial innovation, finance morphed from a service agent to a self-serving principal that is larger than the real sector itself. The total size of financial assets (stock market capitalisation, debt market outstanding and bank assets, excluding derivatives) has grown dramatically from 108% of global GDP in 1980 to over 400% by 2009 . If the notional value of all derivative contracts were included, finance would be roughly 16 times the size of the global real sector, as measured by GDP. The agent now dwarfs the real sector in economic and, some say, political power.

Can finance be a perpetual profit machine that makes more money than the real sector? In the US, finance's share of total corporate profits grew from 10% in the early 1980s to 40% in 2006. Since wages and bonuses make up between 30% to 70% of financial sector costs, there are tremendous incentives to generate short-term profits at higher risks, particularly through leverage.



The key thrusts of the post-crisis reforms in the financial sector are - caps on leverage, strengthened capital and liquidity, more transparency in linking remuneration with risks, and a macro-prudential and counter-cyclical approach to systemic risks. What the current reforms have not addressed is the increasing concentration of the finance industry at the global level and increasing political power that may sow the seeds for another Too Big to Fail (TBTF) failure in the next crisis.

In 2008, the 25 largest banks in the world accounted for US$44.7 trillion in assets equivalent to 73% of global GDP and 42.7% of total global banking assets . In 1990, none of the top 25 banks had total assets larger than their “home” GDP. By 2008, there were seven , with more than half of the 25 banks having assets larger than 50% of their “home” GDP.

Post-crisis, the concentration level has increased as there were mergers with failed institutions. With this rate of growth and concentration, the largest global financial institutions simply outgrew the ability of their host nations and the global regulatory structure to underwrite and supervise them. Such concentration of wealth and power is a political issue, not a regulatory one.

Finance is not independent of the real sector, but interdependent upon the real sector. It is a pivotal amplifier of the underlying weaknesses in the real sector that led to the financial crisis over-consumption, over-leverage and bad governance. In the past 30 years, the finance sector has helped print money, encouraging its customers and itself (particularly through shadow banking) to take on more leverage in the search for yield. Instead of exercising discipline over borrowers and investors, it did not exercise discipline over its own leverage and risks.

Unfortunately, there was also supervisory failure. To bail out the financial sector from its own mistakes, advanced countries, already burdened by rising welfare expenses, have doubled their fiscal deficits to over 100% of GDP.

In spite of these trends, we should not demonise finance or blame the regulators, but examine the real structural and systemic issues facing the world and how finance should respond. The greatest opportunity for finance is the rise of the emerging markets.

An additional one billion in the working population and middle class over the next two to three decades will have more to spend and more to invest. At the same time, the world needs to address the massive stress on natural resources arising from new consumption, which is likely to be three times current levels. Ecologically, financially and politically, the present model of over-consumption funded by over-concentrated leverage is unsustainable.

Indeed, to replicate the existing unsustainable financial model in the emerging markets may invite a bigger global crisis.

Sustainable finance hinges on sustainable business and on a more inclusive, greener, sustainable environment.

Financial leaders need to address a world where consumption and investment will fundamentally change.

To arrive at a greener and more inclusive, sustainable world, there will be profound changes in lifestyles, with greener products, supply chains and distribution channels.

Social networking is changing consumer and investor feedback so that industry, including finance, will become more networked and more attuned to demographic and demand changes.

As community leaders, finance should lead that drive for a more inclusive, sustainable future.

The greatest transformation of the financial sector is less likely to be driven by regulation than by the enlightened self-interest of the financial community.

Only when trust is restored, when finance cannot thrive independently of the real sector, will we have sustainable finance.

The incentive issues are very clear. If financial engineers are paid far more than green engineers, will a green economy emerge first or asset bubbles?

Andrew Sheng is president of the Fung Global Institute.

Credit Suisse cuts M’sia GDP forecast





By JEEVA ARULAMPALAM jeeva@thestar.com.my

It says Asian growth set to slow more sharply

PETALING JAYA: Credit Suisse AG has cut its real gross domestic product (GDP) 2011 growth forecast for Malaysia to 4.6% from 5.3%, as the Western world is teetering on the brink of recession and large parts of Asia remain highly susceptible to growth developments in the United States and Europe.

It also cut its 2011 GDP forecast for other Asian economies such as Thailand, Hong Kong and South Korea.

In an economics research yesterday, Credit Suisse said Asian growth was set to slow more sharply over the coming months.



 “With the fiscal support provided during the global financial crisis removed and the lagged effects of higher interest rates working their way through, we had expected the Asian economies to soften from second quarter of 2011.

“Now that the Western world is teetering on the brink of recession we believe the outlook has dimmed further,” it said.

In addition to cutting its GDP forecast for this year, Credit Suisse trimmed next year's forecast to 4.8% from 5.8% previously. The new 2011 and 2012 GDP forecasts imply annualised sequential growth rates of an average 3.5% in the second half of this year and 5.5% for next year.

“What has kept us from cutting our growth forecasts further is the likely support from domestic demand. We think more investments from the Economic Transformation Programme (ETP) should come onstream, especially in the oil and gas sector which benefited from high oil prices.

“Also, the Government has underspent its budget in the first half and we expect it to increase spending in the second half to meet its target,” it said.

It added that some factors that exacerbated the slowdown in the second quarter were likely to be temporary but Credit Suisse did not expect domestic demand to be shielded from a further weakening in external demand.

“Moreover, Malaysia's growth is vulnerable to a collapse in commodity prices if this were to happen,” it said.


In the report, Credit Suisse said it expected Bank Negara to keep the overnight policy rate unchanged at 3% until the end of next year (it previously expected one 25 basis points hike).

With the global growth outlook highly uncertain and inflation slowing, it suspects that the central bank will be in no hurry to raise the overnight policy rate further. However, a severe global recession could see rates being cut.

“In contrast, we think there is little scope for the Government to stimulate the economy through fiscal policies above and beyond the existing high deficits they projected (5.4% of GDP for 2011).

“Even as things stand now, Malaysia would probably need to undertake significant fiscal adjustments over the next decade if it wants to bring its relatively high debt to GDP ratio down.

“A prolonged weakness in growth would increase the risk that the Government would further delay its plan to cut subsidies and raise the consumption tax,” it said.

Bank Negara is maintaining its GDP forecast of 5% to 6% for the full year as it expects strong domestic demand and ETP projects to fuel economic growth in second half of the year. Malaysia's second-quarter GDP moderated to 4%, compared with 4.9% in first quarter, dampened by a slowdown in the manufacturing sector and weaker external environment.

AmResearch Sdn Bhd, in a report last week, said that while it expected a full-year 5% growth rate to be achieved given the current climate, possible trigger points for a downgrade included an adverse impact of a very large drop in crude oil prices and any further delay in the ETP projects.

“As a net exporter of oil, Malaysia still relies heavily on crude oil in terms of generating income for the country. As long as the full-year average lies between US$85 and US$90 per barrel, all is well and within budget.

“On a positive front, a sharp fall in crude oil may well mean a reduction in total subsidies spent by the Government. The net impact will, however, be detrimental to the Government's coffers and overall growth,” AmResearch director of economic research Manokaran Mottain said in his report.

For latest GDP reports from the Statistics Department click here  

Saturday 27 August 2011

Dark clouds over US and Europe !





WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN

Within the past couple of weeks, the world has changed. From a world so used to the United States playing a key leadership role in shaping global economic affairs to one going through a multi-speed recovery, with the emerging nations providing the source of growth and opportunity. This is a very rapid change indeed in historical time. What happened? First, the convergence of a series of events in Europe (contagion of the open ended debt crisis jolted France and spread to Italy and Spain, forcing the European Central Bank or ECB to buy their bonds) and in the US (last minute lifting of the debt ceiling exposed the dysfunctional US political system, and the Standard & Poor's downgrade of the US credit rating) have led to a loss of confidence by markets across the Atlantic in the effectiveness of the political leadership in resolving key problems confronting the developed world. Second, these events combined with the coming together of poor economic outcomes involving the fragilities of recovery have pushed the world into what the president of the World Bank called “a new danger zone,” with no fresh solutions in sight. Growth in leading world economies slowed for the fourth consecutive quarter, gaining just 0.2% in 2Q'11 (0.3% in 1Q'11) according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. The slowdown was marked in the euro area. Germany slackened to 0.3% in 2Q'11 (1.3% in 1Q'1) and France stalled at zero after 0.9% in 1Q'11. The US picked up to 0.3% (0.1% in 1Q'11), while Japan contracted 0.3% in 2Q'11 (-0.9% in 1Q'11).

US construction
A construction worker guides a beam into place in Philadelphia. Picture: AFP Source: AFP
IT’S not always sunny in Philadelphia. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has reported severe dark clouds over the area’s factory sector. 

The US slides

Recent data disclosures and revisions showed that the 2008 recession was deeper than first thought, and the subsequent recovery flatter. The outcome: Gross domestic product (GDP) has yet to regain its pre-recession peak. Worse, the feeble recovery appears to be petering out. Over the past year, output has grown a mere 1.6%, well below what most economists consider to be the US's underlying growth rate, a pace that has been in the past almost always followed by a recession. Over the past six-months, the US has managed to eke out an annualised growth of only 0.8%. This was completely unexpected. For months, the Federal Reserve had dismissed the economy's poor performance as a transitory reaction to Japan's natural disaster and oil price increases driven by turmoil in the Middle East. They now admit much stiffer headwinds are restraining the recovery, enough to keep growth painfully slow. Recent sentiment surveys and business activity indicators are consistent with expectations of a marked slowdown in US growth. Fiscal austerity will now prove to be a drag on growth for years. Housing isn't coming back quickly. Households are still trying to rid themselves of debt in the face of eroding wealth. Old relationships that used to drive recoveries seem unlikely to have the pull they used to have. Historically, consumers' confidence had tended to rebound after unemployment peaked. This time, it didn't happen. Unemployment peaked in Oct 2009 at 10.1% but confidence kept on sinking. The University of Michigan's index fell in early August to its lowest level since 1980. Thrown in is concern about the impact of the wild stock market on consumer spending. Indeed, equity volatility is having a negative impact on consumer psychology at a time of already weakening spending.

US growth revised down to 1pc in second quarter. Traders in the oil options pit of the New York Mercantile Exchange - the oil price slipped as US growth was revised down in the second quarter.
Traders in the oil options pit of the New York Mercantile Exchange – the oil price slipped as US growth was revised down in the second quarter. Photo: AP
Three main reasons underlie why the Fed made the recent commitment to keep short-term interest rates near zero through mid-2013: (i) cuts all round to US growth forecasts for 2H11 and 2012; (ii) drop in oil and commodity prices plus lower expectations on the pace of recovery led to growing confidence inflation will stabilise; and (iii) rise in downside risks to growth in the face of deep concern about Europe's ability to resolve its sovereign debt problems. The Fed's intention is at least to keep financial conditions easy for the next 18 months. Also, it helps to ensure the slowly growing economy would not lapse into recession, even though it's already too close to the line; any shock could knock it into negative territory.

The critical key

Productivity in the US has been weakening. In 2Q11, non-farm business labour productivity fell 0.3%, the second straight quarterly drop. It rose only 0.8% from 2Q10. Over the past year, hourly wages have risen faster than productivity. This keeps the labour market sluggish and threatens potential recovery. It also means an erosion of living standards over the long haul. But, these numbers overstate productivity growth because of four factors: (a) upward bias in the data - eg the US spends the most on health care per capita in the world, yet without superior outcomes; (b) government spending on military and domestic security have risen sharply, yet they don't deliver useful goods and services that raise living standards; (c) labour force participation has fallen for years. Taking lower-paying jobs out of the mix raises productivity but does not create higher value-added jobs; and (d) off-shoring by US companies to China for example, but they don't enhance American productivity. Overall, they just overstate productivity. So, the US, like Europe, needs to actually raise productivity at the ground level if they are to really grow and reduce debt over the long-term. The next wave of innovation will probably rely on the world's current pool of scientific leaders - most of whom is still US-based.



US deficit is too large

The US budget deficit is now 9.1% of GDP. That's high by any standard. According to the impartial US Congressional Budget Office (CBO), even after returning to full employment, the deficit will remain so large its debt to GDP will rise to 190% by 2035! What happened? This deficit was 3.2% in 2008; rose to 8.9% in 2010, pushing the debt/GDP ratio from 40% to 62% in 2010. This “5.7% of GDP” rise in the deficit came about because of (i) a fall of “2.6% of GDP” in revenue (from 17.5% to 14.9% of GDP), and (ii) a rise of “3.1% of GDP” in spending (from 20.7% to 23.8% of GDP). According to the CBO, less than one-half of the rise in deficit was caused by the downturn of 2008-2010. Because of this cyclical decline, revenue collections were lower and outlays, higher (due to higher unemployment benefits and transfers to help those adversely affected). They in turn raise total demand and thus, help to stabilise the economy. These are called “automatic stabilisers.” In addition, the budget deficit also worsened because, even at full-employment, revenues would still fall and spending rise. So, the great recession did its damage.

Looking ahead, the Obama administration's budget proposals would add (according to CBO) US$3.8 trillion to the national debt between 2010 and 2020. This would raise the debt/GDP ratio to 90% reflecting limited higher spending, weaker revenues from middle and lower income taxpayers, offset in part by higher taxes on the rich. Even so, these are based on conservative assumptions regarding military spending, no new programmes and lower discretionary spending in “real” terms. No doubt, actual fiscal consolidation would imply much more spending cuts and higher revenues. According to Harvard's Prof M. Feldstein, increased revenues can only come about, without raising marginal tax rates, through what he calls cuts in “tax expenditures,” that is, reforming tax deductions (eg cutting farm subsidies, eliminating deductions for ethanol production, etc). Such a “balanced approach” to resolve the growing fiscal deficit will be hard to come-by given the political paralysis in Washington. Worse, the poisonous politics of the past two months have created a new sort of uncertainty. The tea partiers' refusal to compromise can, at worse, kill off the recovery. The only institution with power to avert danger is the Fed. But printing money can be counter-productive. Fiscal measures are the preferred way to go at this time. Even so, the US fiscal problems will mount beyond 2020 because of the rising cost of social security and medicare benefits. No doubt, fundamental reform is still needed for the long-term health of the US economy.

Eurozone stumbles

Looming large as a risk factor is Europe's long running sovereign debt saga, which is pummelling US and European financial markets and business confidence. So far, Europe's woes and the market turmoil it stirred are worrisome. The S&P 500 fell close to 5% last week extending losses of 15.4% over the previous three weeks, its worse streak of that length in 2 years, and down 17.6% from its 2011 high. The situation in Europe has been dictating much of the global markets' recent movements. The eurozone's dominant service sector was effectively stagnant in August after two years of growth, while manufacturing activity, which drove much of the recovery in the bloc shrank for the first time since September 2009. Latest indicators add to signs the slowdown is spreading beyond the periphery and taking root in its core members, including Germany. The Flash Markit Eurozone Services Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI) fell to 51.5 in August (51.6 in July), its lowest level since September 2009. The PMI, which measures activity ranging from restaurants to banks, is still above “50”, the mark dividing growth from contraction. However, PMI for manufacturing slid to 49.7 the first sub-50 reading since September 2009. Both services and manufacturing are struggling.

Going forward, poor data show neither Germany nor France (together making- up one-half the bloc's GDP) is going to be the locomotive. Indeed, the risks of “pushing” the region over the edge are significant. Germany faces an obvious slowdown and a possible lengthy stagnation.

European financial markets just came off a turbulent two weeks, with investors fearing the debt crisis could spread further if Europe's policy makers fail to implement institutional change and new structural supports for the currency bloc's finances. In the interim, the ECB has been picking up Italian and Spanish bonds to keep borrowing costs from soaring. The action has worked so far, but the ECB is only buying time and can't support markets indefinitely. So far, the rescue bill included 365 billion euros in official loans to Greece, Portugal and Ireland; the creation of a 440 billion euros rescue fund; and 96 billion euros in bond buying by the ECB. Despite this, market volatility and uncertainty prevail. Europe is being forced into an end-game with three possible outcomes: (a) disorderly break-up - possible if the peripherals fail in their fiscal reform or can no longer withstand stagnation arising from austerity; (b) greater fiscal union in return for strict national fiscal discipline; and (c) creation of a more compact and more economically coherent eurozone against contagion; this implies some weaker members will take “sabbatical” from the euro. My own sense is that the end-game will be neither simple nor orderly. Politicians will likely opt for a weak variant of fiscal union. After more pain, a smaller and more robust euro could emerge and avoid the euro's demise. Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman gives a “50% chance Greece would leave and a 10% odds of Italy following.”

Leaderless world

The crisis we now face is one of confidence. Starting with the markets across both sides of the Atlantic and in Japan. This lack of confidence reflected an accumulation of discouraging news, including feeble economic data in the US and Europe, and signs European banks are not so stable. The global rout seems to have its roots in free-floating anxiety about US dysfunctional politics and about euroland's economic and financial stability. Confidence is indeed shaky, already spreading to businesses and consumers, raising risks any fresh shock could be enough to push the US and European economies into recession. Business optimism, at best, is “softish.” Consumers are still deleveraging. Unfortunately, this general lack of confidence in global economic prospects could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the end, it's all about politics. The French philosopher Blaise Pascal contends politics have incentives that economics cannot understand. To act, politicians need consensus, which often does not emerge until the costs of inaction become highly visible. By then, it is often too late to avoid a much worse outcome. So, the demand for global leadership has never been greater. But, none is forthcoming not for the US, not from Europe; certainly not from Germany and France, or Britain.

The world is adrift. Unfortunately, it will continue to drift in the coming months, even years. Voters on both sides of the Atlantic need to demand more from their leaders than “continued austerity on autopilot.” After all, in politics, leadership is the art of making the impossible possible.

Former banker, Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British Chartered Scientist who now spends time writing, teaching and promoting the public interest. Feedback is most welcome; email: starbizweek@thestar.com.my.

Wednesday 17 August 2011

Malaysia's GDP Growth Falters to 4% in Q2 2011





Q2 GDP moderates to 4%

By CECILIA KOK cecilia_kok@thestar.com.my

KUALA LUMPUR: Malaysia's economic growth moderated to 4% year-on-year (y-o-y) in the second quarter (Q2) of the year, after a revised growth of 4.9% y-o-y in the preceding quarter due to a weaker external environment.

The country's gross domestic product (GDP - goods and services produced within the country) growth rate for the three months to June, however, was higher than market expectations of 3.6% based on Bloomberg's poll of 16 economists.

Bank Negara governor Tan Sri Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz said Malaysia's overall economy continued to be sustained by healthy domestic demand and strong exports of commodity and resource-based products amid slower global growth.

Domestic demand in Malaysia during the second quarter grew 5.2% y-o-y due to sustained growth in private spending.

Private consumption remained healthy amid robust labour market conditions, while private capital spending was sustained by expansion in production capacity and investment in new growth areas.

“Based on the growth we have achieved so far, it is likely that Malaysia's GDP for the full year would expand by at least 5%,” Zeti told a press conference here yesterday. She said it was still too early to revise the country's GDP growth forecast.

Malaysia's GDP for the first half of the year grew 4.4% y-o-y, compared with 9.5% y-o-y in the corresponding period last year. The official GDP growth target for the year was between 5% and 6%.

If there was a need for revision, it would be done during the Budget period in October, Zeti said, while emphasising that the central bank remained watchful and was closely monitoring the global economic developments.

“If we have a situation where the United States and Europe slipped into a recession or any other trigger factors that could result in the disruption in international financial markets, we will have to make a reassessment,” Zeti said.



Bank Negara highlighted the fact that global growth had moderated since the second quarter of the year due to a various factors, including fiscal issues and structural weaknesses in advanced economies and global supply chain disruptions stemming from the March 11 earthquake and tsunami in Japan.

These challenges, as the central bank revealed, were reflected in the slower growth in Malaysia's manufacturing sector at 2.1% y-o-y during the second quarter, compared with 5.5% in the preceding quarter.

Zeti conceded the downside risks to Malaysia's external demand had increased following heightened uncertainties in external demand. In the immediate term, she said, fiscal uncertainties and structural weaknesses in advanced economies would continue to challenge global growth and increase volatility in global financial markets.

“Categorically, we have to say we have a strong domestic economy... our fundamentals are strong enough to support our economy,” Zeti said, stressing that a contraction of Malaysia's economy was not to be expected despite the deepening euro debt crisis and sluggish growth in the United States.

CIMB Research, in its report yesterday, expressed optimism that Malaysia's economy would remain in the positive growth trajectory. The research house said the stepping up of government capital spending in the second half and the continued vigour of private capital spending would sustain the momentum of the country's economy.

“We maintain this year's GDP growth estimate at 5%, implying an average growth of between 5% and 5.5% in the second half, compared with 4.5% in 1H11,” CIMB Research said in its report.

Bank Negara also highlighted that the country's inflation, as measured by the consumer price index (CPI), had eased marginally last month. CPI for July gained 3.4% y-o-y, compared with 3.5% y-o-y.
Zeti said Malaysia's full-year CPI would remain within target of 2.5% to 3.5%.

Thursday 11 August 2011

How did the world get so fixated on GDP?





GDP growth remains central to economic policy, yet life in flatlining Japan remains rather better than it does elsewhere

By James Meadway guardian.co.uk,
Pacific island of Nauru
Mining on the Pacific island of Nauru shows how 'a few years of apparent prosperity can be bought at immense future cost'. Photograph: Torsten Blackwood/AFP/Getty Images

The economic news grows daily more grim. Across the developed world, once-optimistic forecasts for growth are being revised downwards. Financial markets, sensing trouble ahead, are in a tailspin. Debates over the future centre on a single metric – that of GDP.

Gross domestic product was not always with us. Created in the 1930s, and despite the warnings of its pioneer, it rapidly assumed centre stage in economic policymaking.

Growth could now be measured targeted through policy. For the right, it would be a simple gauge of national economic virility. For the left, it offered the more subtle appeal of an end to disputes over the distribution of wealth.

By focusing not on the size of the slices, but on the size of the pie, an interminable conflict between capital and labour could seemingly be resolved. The case was put most forcefully in the Labour politician Anthony Crosland's influential book The Future of Socialism. Growth would deliver the public goods – secure employment and a functioning welfare state.

That consensus has now held for 50 years or more. Yet mounting evidence suggests that GDP growth does not register many of the things people actually care about. It is a record of some aspects of economic life, but it fails to capture wider social needs and demands. Health, quality of life and inequality play no part in its measurement.



Rising, falling GDP

There is a growing consensus that rising GDP since the mid-1970s in the US and the UK has become disconnected from reported measures of wellbeing. We know that falling GDP produces misery, as unemployment rises and incomes collapse. But the reverse does not apply. Higher output does not necessarily mean happier people.

Even growth's blunt promise of material prosperity is failing. GDP in the UK increased by 11% from 2003 to 2008. Over the same period, median real incomes stagnated. The economy boomed, but few shared in its rewards. Living standards were maintained through unsustainable debt. As we crawl back into recession, the majority will find those rewards still harder to come by – even if a minority continue to grow fat.

And environmental damage has no impact on GDP's progress. A few years of apparent prosperity can be bought at immense future cost. The tiny Pacific island of Nauru once enjoyed the highest per capita living standards of anywhere in the world. Its plentiful supplies of phosphate rock, in demand for fertiliser, had been strip-mined since the 1900s. But as the phosphate dwindled, so did incomes. Nauru has been reduced to providing a detention centre in return for Australian aid money.

Environmental limits can and will bite. From declining fish stocks to the overwhelming threat of climate change, there are physical limits to our economic activities. GDP registers none of this.

 Lessons from Japan

We need to change how we think about the economy. Japan has now laboured through nearly two decades of flatlining GDP. A miracle of growth transformed it from defeated power in 1945 to the world's second-largest economy. Then, in the 1990s, the growth stopped, never to convincingly return. Yet living standards in Japan are among the highest in the world. Unemployment is half that of the US; life expectancy five years longer. Average real incomes are the same as Germany's, and inequality lower. Japan's environmental impact, particularly through the import of raw materials, remains high. But it is not simply the economic basket case it is often presented as.

The old consensus needs breaking. We need to fixate less on growth alone.

The government recognises this much, aiming to create a national measure of wellbeing. But this accounting exercise is completely disconnected from economic practice. The coalition has a near-mystical belief in the power of the free market to deliver growth. It believes the national debt should be run down, clearing the way for a return to prosperity as the economy "rebalances". Purposeful government intervention is not needed.

The coalition's lack of success is a tribute to its lack of strategy. Rebalancing the economy away from debt-fuelled consumption and bloated financial services is a fine aim. It needs policies to match. Austerity does not just blight individual lives – Ireland has shown how it cripples whole economies as demand drains out of the system. So public spending, the bedrock of an economy in recession, must be held steady.

A genuine rebalancing, however, cannot come from maintaining status quo. The thinktank New Economics Foundation has begun an ambitious modelling exercise that seeks to show how a low-carbon economy can also deliver social justice.

Action, though, is needed now. Economic policy must be broadened towards meaningful goals – creating secure, well-paid jobs; minimising environmental damage. Where private investment is failing, with business expenditure sliding again last quarter, government should be prepared to step in.

A new industrial strategy could match social objectives with credible interventions, supporting the industries of the future. Or we will be left to chase a statistical chimera.

Tuesday 2 August 2011

What's left to trust in the world of money? Stop fooling around Govermnt Debts!



Jeremy Warner

What's left to trust in the world of money?

America's inability to address its fiscal challenges – Sunday night's "bipartisan debt deal" offers only a temporary, sticking plaster solution – has raised afresh an old conundrum.

America's inability to address its fiscal challenges – Sunday night's
Relative to GDP, US sovereign debt has been far higher than it is today, but in the past America has been able to rely on fast growth and demilitarisation to return borrowing to tolerable levels. Neither of these things seem likely to come to the rescue this time around. Photo: REUTERS

If even US Treasuries are now regarded as a credit risk, is there anything left at all in the world of money that can be trusted?

The answer to this question is almost certainly no, but far from being a calamitous conclusion to reach, this might be viewed as a positive development which will in time restore market disciplines to a global monetary system which became based on make believe.

In fact, the idea of the sovereign as a "risk free asset" is a comparatively recent development which has no basis in historical experience. Even in a country such as Britain with no history of default (we'll ignore the case of war loans, which is arguable), government bonds have hardly proved a reliable form of investment.

True enough, coupons have been paid and maturities honoured, but the currency and inflation risks have proved extreme. On any medium to long term view, you would have done much better out of property and equities.

Among members of the eurozone, the concept of the sovereign as a safe haven asset is an even shorter lived phenomenon. The widening of spreads we've seen in the past year and a half of financial crisis is as nothing compared to the way it was before the single currency was launched.
Those countries with weak governance were punished for their lack of competitiveness with high interest rates and repeated currency crises. It was a brutal, but reasonably effective form of discipline.

But once the euro had been established, all countries, bad as well as good, came to enjoy the same low interest rates that Germany had earned from years of hair shirted fiscal rectitude. Bond yields converged not because anyone believed the single currency's fiscal rules would make all countries like Germany, but because markets expected that countries which got themselves into difficulties would be bailed out. They have so far been proved entirely correct in this assumption.

Peer group pressure

The abolition of sovereign currencies removed the pressures that markets normally exert on governments to take unpopular, austerity measures. Market disciplines were replaced by peer group pressure from European finance ministers, only a few of whom were in any position to lecture their colleagues on sound financial policies. Once even Germany started to break the rules, the game was up.

All this was brilliantly predicted by Norman Lamont, a former UK Chancellor in the chapter Why I am Against the Single Currency from his book In Office, published nearly twelve years ago.

Increasingly tortuous attempts to prevent wide scale default fail to acknowledge the underlying reality; membership of the single currency has allowed some countries to borrow far in excess of their ability ever to repay.

But it is not all the fault of the euro. Risk compression was a worldwide phenomenon during the boom. In the hunt for yield, investors became oblivious to the dangers. By the end, almost everything was regarded as entirely risk free. Credit rating agencies were corrupted into the process by giving top notch ratings to fundamentally unsafe assets. These judgements then became embedded in regulatory requirements and central bank collateral rules, making everything seem safer than it really was.

 Sovereign downgrades

Today, the rating agencies are accused of deepening the debt crisis with repeated sovereign downgrades, but if anything, their pronouncements understate the reality. Their discomfort is nowhere more apparent than with US sovereign debt. Even assuming the latest settlement – which envisages a $2.1trillion (£1.3 trillion) fiscal consolidation over ten years – is ratified, it's not enough to put public debt back on a sustainable trajectory.

It's perfectly true that relative to GDP, US sovereign debt has been far higher than it is today, but in the past America has been able to rely on fast growth and demilitarisation to return borrowing to tolerable levels. Neither of these things seem likely to come to the rescue this time around.

When Standard & Poor's placed the US on negative watch last month, it suggested that a consolidation of perhaps as much as $4 trillion would be required to safeguard the nation's triple A rating.

Heading for a downgrade

Implicitly, then, America is heading for a downgrade regardless of the fact that the immediate threat of default has been removed. Will S&P have the guts to go through with its threat? I'll believe it when I see it. Already S&P has appeared to backtrack in evidence to Congress.

The major rating agencies enjoy an unhealthily cosy relationship with the major sovereigns, and can usually be persuaded to do the "right thing" in the interests of financial stability. As ever, sweeping the issue under the carpet will only make the eventual crisis even worse.

But perhaps oddly, the immediate blow to America if the big agencies do decide to downgrade is likely to be more psychological than real; it may not matter too much for bond yields.


Despite loss of its triple A rating and central government debt in excess of 200pc of GDP, Japan continues to enjoy the lowest sovereign bond yields anywhere in the world.

This apparent paradox is explained by the fact that when there is generalised risk aversion, where consumers are reluctant to spend and companies won't invest, the consequent savings surplus tends to flow into the only place it can – government debt.

Some of the same phenomenon is occurring in the US right now. Much as China threatens to withdraw its support for the US dollar in protest at policies which it thinks debase the currency, it really has no option but to continue buying US Treasuries as long as it maintains such a big trade surplus with the US. The capital surplus is merely the mirror image of the trade surplus.

Dominant reserve currency status in any case gives the US unrivalled access to international borrowing. Dollar hegemony may not last for much longer, but for the time being there are no viable alternatives. 

This is both a blessing and a curse for the US – a blessing because it allows the country to keep borrowing at reasonable rates almost regardless of underlying public debt dynamics, and a curse because it maintains the addiction to debt.

If nothing is done, the façade will eventually break; that's the point at which to run for the hills. Food, property, energy – these are the things that retain value when money dies. - Telegraph

Govt debts – it’s time to stop fooling around

Plain Speaking - By Yap Leng Kuen

INDEBTEDNESS has become an unsavoury word, especially when an important economy like the United States faces potential default if its US$14.3 trillion debt ceiling is not raised in time.

As at press time, an agreement was reached on raising the debt limit; however, the uncertainty created during the stalemate prior to the agreement had cast an element of doubt in the markets over the long term viability of US Treasuries and a possible downgrade of US' credit rating.

The debt ceiling has been raised before; however, the severity of the problems faced by Greece and other countries with high debt levels has caused the US situation to be viewed with concern.

In fact, post-2008 financial crisis, government debt has become a major issue. In a research update, McKinsey Global Institute said while global debt and equity hit new highs, more than a third of growth last year was government debt.

According to McKinsey, the overall amount of global debt grew by US$5 trillion last year, with global debt to gross domestic product (GDP) increasing from 218% in 2000 to 266% in 2010.

Government bonds outstanding rose by US$4 trillion in 2010 while other forms of debt had mixed growth, said McKinsey.

The move to downsize debt needs to be backed up by a concrete and consistent plan that shows not just commitment but also conviction of all parties involved.

Countries with high levels of debt must show that they are not only able to save others but also themselves.

Part of a government's credibility lies in its ability to manage its finances. Simply put, this involves lowering or containing its costs while increasing revenue.

Much effort should be spent on plugging the leakages while taking pains that taxpayers, who usually bear the brunt of others' mistakes, are not disadvantaged.

Postponing the problem by merely raising the limit for another time just makes matters worse; the issue of indebtedness becomes more serious and future governments end up inheriting the problem rather than spending productive hours on new areas of growth.

To get the cooperation of taxpayers to sacrifice for another round of austerity drive will probably not be easy. They may question why they have to pay for the excesses when they had already paid on previous bailouts for the big boys.

It is therefore time to stop “fooling around” with the finances and really get down to work on solid improvements. A transparent approach with proper timelines that can be accessed by all will certainly help.

Once people see something concrete coming up, they will be more convinced and committed towards the common goal.

Moreover, money allocated in a fair and equitable manner will result in better support from taxpayers.

Associate editor Yap Leng Kuen recognises that managing a country is far more complex than a family although the same dose of common sense is required.

Friday 29 July 2011

US growth anemic, debt row poses recession risk






A man stands outside a store advertising that it is going out of business in New York, July 19, 2011. REUTERS/Shannon Stapleton

(Reuters) - The economy stumbled badly in the first half of 2011 and came dangerously close to contracting in the January-March period, raising the risk of a recession if a standoff over the nation's debt does not end quickly.

Output increased at a 1.3 percent annual pace in the second quarter as consumer spending barely rose, the Commerce Department said on Friday. In the first three months of the year, the economy advanced just 0.4 percent, a sharp downward revision from the previously reported 1.9 percent gain.


"The economy essentially came to a grinding halt in the first half of this year," said Ryan Sweet, a senior economist at Moody's Analytics in West Chester, Pennsylvania. "We did get side-swiped by some temporary factors which are fading, but it raises some concerns about the sustainability the recovery."


The weaker-than-expected second-quarter reading and downward revisions extending into last year underscored the frail state of the recovery, which economists said could fall off the rails if lawmakers do not raise the nation's $14.3 trillion borrowing limit and avoid a government default.


Consumer spending, which accounts for about 70 percent of U.S. economic activity, decelerated sharply in the second quarter, advancing at only a 0.1 percent rate -- the weakest since the recession ended two years ago.


Stocks on Wall Street fell on the data and the debt impasse on Friday, to record their worst week in a year. Prices for government debt rallied, while the dollar fell broadly.




FUNDAMENTAL SLOWDOWN?


The Obama administration has said it will run out of borrowing authority on Tuesday and could soon run out of cash, but talks aimed at raising the debt ceiling remain deadlocked.


"This should wake up those in Washington who still have their thinking caps on," said Joel Naroff of Naroff Economic Advisors in Holland, Pennsylvania. "There is no margin for error and a default that lasted any length of time could push us back into recession."


But any debt agreement would include budget cuts that could also weigh on growth. High Frequency Economics said in a note on Thursday that a deal to trim the U.S. deficit would likely shave government spending by about $70 billion, or one-half of a percentage point of GDP, in its first year.


Growth in the first half of 2011 was held back by a combination of bad weather, expensive gasoline and supply chain disruptions after the earthquake disaster in Japan.


With economic activity yet to show signs of perking up, even with gasoline prices off their highs and the Japan supply constraints easing, there is concern that some of the weakness might be fundamental and linger for a while.


While economists still expect growth to accelerate to about a 3 percent pace for the remainder of this year and next year, the risks are stacked to the downside.


Annual revisions to GDP data that take into account newly available source material, including tax returns, showed the economy lost steam in late 2010, before it ran into the temporary headwinds. Fourth-quarter growth was revised to a 2.3 percent rate from 3.1 percent.


The revisions also showed the 2007-2009 recession was much more severe than prior measures had found.
The downgrades help to explain why the economy has only regained a fraction of the more than 8 million jobs lost during the downturn.


Economists said the current bout of weakness reinforced views that the Federal Reserve will maintain its accommodative monetary policy stance for a while, but few think the central bank will spring to the economy's rescue if it can avoid it.


"In the immediate environment, with so much at stake on fiscal policy, I think the Fed wants to remain quietly on the sidelines, sorting out events and how the data plays out in the second half of the year," said Robert DiClemente, chief economist at Citigroup in New York.


JOLT FROM JAPAN


The U.S. central bank has held interest rates close to zero since December 2008, and it has bought $2.3 trillion in bonds in an effort to further spur the economy. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke has opened the door to a further easing of monetary policy, but officials have said they are hesitant to act.


"It's a very high bar," Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank President Dennis Lockhart told CNBC on Friday.


The March earthquake in Japan severely disrupted U.S. auto output, which subtracted 0.12 percentage point from GDP growth in the second quarter.


The decline combined with high gasoline prices to weigh on retail sales as consumers were unable to find the vehicle models they wanted.


Future spending strength will depend on employment and confidence. So far, the immediate outlook is not promising.


The Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan's index of consumer sentiment fell to 63.7 in July from 71.5 in June, a separate report showed.


But economists are cautiously optimistic the jobs market will have started to improve somewhat in July after faltering badly in the last two months, although U.S. companies are still trying to hold the line on hiring to save costs.


Merck & Co said on Friday that it plans to slash thousands of jobs by late 2015 to wring out savings of up to $1.5 billion a year.


Nonfarm jobs likely rose 90,000 in July, according to a Reuters survey, after June's paltry 18,000 gain.
Growth in the second quarter was supported by a smaller trade deficit, a pick-up in home building and a healthy rise in business spending. Most encouraging was a lack of a big build-up in business inventories, which rose only modestly.


"Inventory building does not seem to be overdone, which sets us up for a good boost from manufacturing in the second half," said Moody's Analytics' Sweet.


Government spending was another drag on growth in the second quarter. Overall inflation slowed during the quarter, but underlying price pressures continued to build.


(Editing by Leslie Adler)


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Friday 1 July 2011

Greece is bankrupt !





WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN

A rose by any other name would smell as sweet. In the case of Greece, default by any other name just stinks! The plain truth: Greece is bankrupt. Greece's sovereign debt crisis deepens daily as the gap in reality widens between politically driven “in denial” views of European Union (EU) leadership and market-place views as reflected in 5-year Greek bonds trading at a yield close to 20%; Standard & Poor cutting Greece's rating to triple-C (the lowest credit rating ever); and highest premiums payable on CDS (credit default swaps, used as insurance to protect investors against defaults) on Greek debt. Probability of default by Greece over the next 5 years has jumped to 86%.

Today, a CDS will cost US$2mil annually to insure US$10mil debt over 5 years. Markets have indicated for some time Greece suffers from a condition of bankruptcy rather than a crisis of liquidity (i.e. cash-short).

This simply means Greece cannot survive without significant debt relief and restructuring, combined with an overhaul of the ways its government collects revenue and expends. In essence, Greece has 2 major problems: it has too much debt and it cannot grow. I am afraid more and more of EU will get contaminated.

Trouble in Greece: A Greek flag at the Akropolis in Athens. Millions of Greeks participated in a strike to oppose new heavy austerity measures. — EPA
 
The Greek illusion

Greece should not have been into the euro in the first place. It failed to join in 1999 because it did not meet fiscal criteria. When it did so in 2001, it was through phony budget numbers. As Twitter R. Cohen wrote: “Europe's bold monetary union required an Athenian imprimatur to be fully European. So everyone turned a blind eye.” But Greece has had an awful history. The 1912-13 war wrested northern Greece from Ottoman control. Then came the massive exchange of 1923 where 400,000 Muslims were forced from Greece to Turkey and 1.2 million Greek Orthodox Christians, from Turkey to Greece.

A military dictatorship followed in the 1930s; brutal German occupation in 1941-44; and a civil war in late 1940s. There was the rightist dictatorship of 1967-74, not to mention the on-going conflict with Turkey over Cyprus. In “Twice a Stranger”, B. Clark wrote of Greece as a society “where blood ties are far more important than loyalty to the state or to business partners.”

It would appear EU membership provided some balm to Greek wounds. It detoxifies history. So Greece took to the EU as a passport to live on the never-never. The bottom line: a monetary union among divergent economies without fiscal or political union support has no convincing historical precedent. For a while, the easy-money, easy-lifestyle allowed everyone to overlook peripheraleconomies like Greece from becoming uncompetitive with the euro (with no drachma to devalue) and not showing any signs of “converging” (closing the gulf between strong and weak nations within EU), but amassing unsustainable deficits and debt. Greece remains a nation suspicious of outsiders and a place where state structures command scant loyalty.

This does not abode well. We now see a Greece resentful of deep spending cuts, and of the sale of state assets meted out by technocrats from outside. They feel the poor and unemployed are paying for the errors of politicians, and a globalised system that punishes those left behind. Strikes and violence are a measure of a EU that now leaves most Greeks unmoved by the achievements of European integration.

Greece is insolvent

It is true a sovereign state, unlike a firm, has the power to tax. In theory, it can tax itself out of trouble. But there is a limit on how far it can tax before it becomes politically and socially unsustainable. Already, Greece has a debt/GDP ratio of 143% in 2010, rising to 150% this year. It is too high to convince creditors to continue lending.

In practice, the market expects Greece to reduce its debt ratio considerably before it can borrow again. This means it has to create a primary budget surplus (revenue less non-interest expenditure) in excess of 8% of GDP to be credit worthy again. Among advanced nations, none (except oil-rich Norway) has managed to attain a durable primary surplus exceeding 6% of GDP. Greece is insolvent.

This is a dire situation. Government bonds serve as a reference asset by setting the “riskless” rate of interest. So any doubts about its value can cause turmoil. Indeed, solvency of the Greek financial system is at risk. So are other European financial institutions. Equally vital is contagion with its sights set firmly on other debt-distressed nations notably Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy.

But it doesn't stop there. Top Europeans have warned contagion to EU members could spark off a crisis bigger than the Lehman Brothers collapse in Sept 2008. So, it is not difficult to understand the hard line taken by the European Central Bank (ECB) aimed primarily to protect European banks which need time to strengthen their capital base. For obvious reasons, it has rejected any sort of restructuring of debt raising the spectre of a chain reaction, and threatening to punish any restructuring (re-negotiation of the terms of maturing debt) by cutting banks' access to liquidity.

Moreover, credit rating agencies would deem any such action as a default (i.e. non-payment of due debt). With Greece insolvent, the EU has taken the narrow road of beefing up the financing for Greece (which can't refinance itself in the market), while using moral suasion to persuade private creditors to roll-over their bonds. It is buying breathing space.



More denial doesn't work just prolongs the agony. What's happening to Greece is distressful. Over the past 12 months: the number of unemployed rose by close to 40%; unemployment is above 16% among youths, it's a devastating 42%. IMF estimates showed its GDP contracted by 2% in 2009 and 4.5% in 2010 and will shrink by 3-4% this year.

Despite severe fiscal austerity, its budget deficit will improve only slowly: from -15.4% of GDP in 2009 to -9% in 2010 and -7% this year (and estimated at -6.2% in 2012). That's a long way to surplus! Greece has become so uncompetitive its current balance of payments deficit was -11% of GDP in 2009, -10% in 2010 and optimistically estimated at -8.2% this year (and at -7.2% in 2012). Truly, Greece is in “intensive-care” a solvency crisis, not just caught in a short-term cash crunch (yes, it also does not have cash to meet its next debt payment before July 15).

Even at today's low interest rates, Greece's government interest payments alone amounted to 6.7% of GDP, against 4.8% for Italy and considerably higher than all other major European nations and the United States (2.9%). Even Portugal's ratio is lower at 4.2%.

Political solution: slash and burn won't work

What Greece needs is deep economic reforms or fiscal transfers from the EU which help address deepening market concerns about sustainability of its huge debts. Without these, the crisis will simply be deferred.

The message is clear: Greece's debt load at Eureo 350 billion or 150% of its expected economic output this year, is simply too large for the EU troika's (plus ECB and IMF) strategy to succeed. Athens had accepted a package of Euro 110 billion of EU/IMF loans in May 2010. But it now needs a 2nd bailout of a similar size to meet financial obligations until end 2014 when it hopes to move seamlessly into the new ESM (European Stability Mechanism) bailout fund (which takes effect in 2013) to prop up fiscal miscreants.

Latest draw-down involves release of a vital Euro 12 billion very soon but carries a proviso that parliament passes on June 29 (which it did with a slim majority) Euro 28.6 billion in spending cuts and tax increases as well as Euro 50 billion from privatisation of state assets, in addition to continuing existing austerity policies.

That's not all. The new plan calls for private creditor's participation on a voluntary basis (meeting ECB's insistence to avoid even a hint of default) or “Vienna Plus”, a reference to the 2009 Vienna initiative where banks agreed to maintain their exposure to Eastern Europe.

For Greece, the brutal austerity plans call for enormous sacrifices; indeed, no end to their agonies. Today, the situation at Syntagma Square and in front of parliament is getting more strained, angry and confused, surrounded by riot police and clouds of teargas. The people are becoming frustrated at being always at the receiving end.

On the German side, however, voters are aghast at the prospect of a 2nd bail-out, which they regard as pouring good money after bad. Germans consider the Greek government as corrupt; its tax system operates on voluntarism; state railroad's payroll is 4 times larger than its ticket sales; many workers retire with full state pension at age 45; etc.

Be that as it may, the IMF in particular needs to learn from lessons of the Asian currency crisis, where it has since acknowledged its prescriptions at the time made matters worse in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, in the name of unleashing market forces to force adjustment and ignoring the adverse social and political impact of their policies.

I see them repeating the same mistakes again in Greece, paying too little heed to human suffering and adverse social impact to protect private sector creditors and pushing the end-game at breakneck pace. Germany's insistence to get private creditors share in the burden is a good soft step forward. Even so, the IMF seems too harsh.

Few options left

The fact remains Greece was outstandingly egregious in its fiscal profligacy and its lack of prudent economic governance. But Greece was not the only European economy that was living beyond its means and being pumped withill-conceived loans mainly from German and French banks. Greece is today insolvent. The EU's solution addresses only immediate funding needs, without offering a credible long-term resolution. It's just a stopgap. Frankly, Greece'spolicy options are limited: either a default, partial haircut (creditors taking losses on their investments), or a guarantee on Greek debt. Bear in mind Germany remains the biggest beneficiary of the euro-zone experiment. In 2010,

Germany recorded a US$185bil balance of payments surplus or 5.6% of GDP. No doubt, the EU has since pledged to stabilise the euro-zone economy, vowing to starve off a Greek default, and the ECB has categorically ruled out debt restructuring. That leaves Greece with only deflation, a lot of it.

As I see it, this will not work. First, in a democratic Greece, people are clearly not in the mood for deeper spending cuts and more austerity. Policies can be adopted but they can fail. Second, deflation had already made Greece's debt problem worse the debt is too large and the economy won't grow with continuing deflation. It can't just deflate its way to solvency.

The better option left is debt guarantee. Issuing guarantees (preferably partially backed by Greek assets) could help persuade creditors to exchange debt for new debt with longer maturities, effectively giving Athens more time to repay. As of now, only 27% of Greek debt is held by banks, 30% by ECB/EU/IMF, and 43% by other privates. Banks are already quietly resisting voluntary rolling-over unless offered incentives. EU has preferred to use moral suasion.

EU has also resisted haircuts. Mr Axel Weber, former Bundesbank governor, has since weighed in: “At some point you've got to cut your losses and restart the system,” drawing parallels between guarantee for Greek debt and steps taken by Germany and others during the financial crisis to backstop troubled banks.

The Greek problem “is a deep-rooted fiscal and structural problem that probably needs more than a 30-year time horizon to solve. The measures Europe need to adopt are much more profound than just short-term liquidity funds.” That, of course, raises the issue of “moral hazard”. EU has since pledged to stabilise the euro-zone, and starve off a Greek default in exchange for continuing Greek deflation and voluntary creditors' roll-over. Getting banks to share in the burden remains problematic. But, a narrow policy option is taken. It's another muddle-through created in response to politics. It offers no long-term way for Greece to resume growth.

I am told the political mood in Greece improves automatically in July and August as the urbans head en masse for family villages in the islands and mountains. Surely, for a little while, human woes will be eased by exposure to the beauty of the Agean.

Former banker, Dr Lin is a Harvard-educated economist and a British Chartered Scientist who now spends time writing, teaching and promoting the public interest. Feedback is most welcome at starbizweek@thestar.com.my