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Showing posts with label JPMorgan Chase. Show all posts
Showing posts with label JPMorgan Chase. Show all posts

Saturday 25 August 2012

The Libor fuss!

The story behind the Libor scandal


Logos of 16 Banks Involved in Libor Scandal - YouTube


SINCE the outbreak of the Libor scandal, readers' reaction has ranged from the very basic: What's this Libor? to the more mundane: How does it affect me?

Some friends have raised more critical questions: Barclays appears to have manipulated Libor to lower it; isn't that good? The problem first arose in early 2008; why isn't it resolved by now? By popular demand to demystify this very everydayness at which banks fix this far-reaching key rate, today's column will be devoted to going behind the scandal starting from the very basics about the mechanics of fixing the rate, to what really happened (why Barclays paid the huge fines in settlement), to its impact and how to fix the problem.

What's Libor

The London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (Libor) was first conceived in the 1980s as a trusty yardstick to measure the cost (interest rate) of short-term funds which highly-rated banks borrow from one another. Each day at 11am in London, the setting process at the British Bankers' Association (BBA) gets moving, recording submissions by a select group of global banks (including three large US banks) estimates of the perceived rates they would pay to borrow unsecured in “reasonable market size” for various currencies and for different maturities.

Libor is then calculated using a “trimmed” average, excluding the highest and lowest 25% of the submissions. Within minutes, the benchmark rates flash on to thousands and thousands of traders' screens around the world, and ripple onto the prices of loans, derivatives contracts and other financial instruments worth many, many times the global GDP. Indeed, it has been estimated that the Libor-based financial market is worth US$800 trillion, affecting the prices that you and me and corporations around the world pay for loans or receive for their savings.

A file photo showing a pedestrian passing a Barclays bank branch in London. Barclays has been fined £290mil (US$450mil) by UK and US regulators for manipulating Libor. — EPA

Indeed, anyone with a credit card, mortgage or car loan, or fixed deposit should care about their rate being manipulated by the banks that set them. In the end, it is used as a benchmark to determine payments on the global flow of financial instruments. Unfortunately, it turns out to have been flawed, bearing in mind Libor is not an interest rate controlled or even regulated directly by the central bank. It is an average set by BBA, a private trade body.

In practice, for working purposes, Libor rates are set essentially for 10 currencies and for 15 maturities. The most important of these relates to the 3-month US dollar, i.e. what a bank would pay to borrow US dollar for 3 months from other banks. It is set by a panel of 18 banks with the top 4 and bottom 4 estimates being discarded. Libor is the simple average (arithmetic mean) of what is left. All submissions are disclosed, along with the day's Libor fix. Its European counterpart, Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor), is similarly fixed in Brussels. However, Euribor banks are not asked (as in Libor) to provide estimates of what they think they could have to pay to borrow; merely estimates of what the borrowing rate between two “prime” banks should be. In practice, “prime” now refers to German banks. This simply means there is in the market a disconnect between the actual borrowing costs by banks across Europe and the benchmark. Today, Euribor is less than 1%, but Italian banks (say) have to pay 350-40 basis points above it. Around the world, there would similarly be Tibor (Tokyo Inter-Bank Offered Rate); Sibor and its related SOR (Swap-Offered Rate) in Singapore; Klibor in Kuala Lumpur; etc.

What's wrong with Libor?

Theoretically, if banks played by the rules, Libor will reflect what it's supposed to a reliable yardstick to measure what it cost banks to borrow from one another. The flaw is that, in practice, the system can be rigged. First, it is based on estimates, not actual prices at which banks have lent to or borrowed from one another. They are not transactions based, an omission that widens the scope for manipulation. Second, the bank's estimate is supposed to be ring-fenced from other parts of the bank. But unfortunately walls have “holes” often incentivised by vested-interest in profit making by the interest-rate derivatives trading arm of the business. The total market in such derivatives has been estimated at US$554 trillion in 2011. So, even small changes can imply big profits. Indeed, it has been reported that each basis point (0.01%) movement in Libor could reap a net profit of “a couple of million US dollar.”

The lack of transparency in the Libor setting mechanism has tended to exacerbate this urge to cheat. Since the scandal, damning evidence has emerged from probes by regulators in the UK and US, including whistle blowing by employees in a number of banks covering a past period of at least five years. More are likely to emerge from investigations in other nations, including Canada, Japan, EU and Switzerland. The probes cover some of the largest banks, including reportedly Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, UBS, HSBC and Deutsche Bank.

Why Barclays?

Based on what was since disclosed, the Libor scandal has set the stage for lawsuits and demands for more effective regulation the world over. It has led to renewed banker bashing and dented the reputation of the city of London. Barclays, a 300-year old British bank, is in the spotlight simply because it is the first bank to co-operate fully with regulators. It's just the beginning a matter of time before others will be put on the dock. The disclosures and evidence appear damaging. They reveal unacceptable behaviour at Barclays. Two sorts of motivation are discernible.

First, there is manipulation of Libor to trap higher profits in trading. Its traders very brazenly pushed its own money market dealers to manipulate their submissions for fixing Libor, including colluding with counter-parties at other banks. Evidence point to cartel-like association with others to fiddle Libor, with the view to profiteering (or reduce losses) on their derivative exposures. The upshot is that the bank profited from this bad behaviour. Even Bob Diamond, the outgoing Barclays CEO, admitted this doctoring of Libor in favour of the bank's trading positions was “reprehensible.”

Second, there is the rigging of Libor by submitting “lowered” rates at the onset of the credit crunch in 2007 when the authorities were perceived to be keen to bolster confidence in banks (to avoid bailouts) and keep credit flowing; while “higher” (but more realistic) rates submission would be regarded as a sign of its own financial weakness. It would appear in this context as some have argued that a “public good” of sorts was involved. In times of systemic banking crisis, regulators do have a clear motive for wanting a lower Libor. The rationale behind this approach was categorically invalidated by the Bank of England. Like it or not, Barclays has since been fined £290mil (US$450mil) by UK and US regulators for manipulating Libor (£60mil fine by the UK Financial Services Authority is the highest ever imposed even after a 30% discount because it co-operated).

Efforts at reform

Be that as it may, Libor is something of an anachronism, a throwback to a time long past when trust was more important than contract. Concern over Libor goes way back to the early 2008 when reform of the way it is determined was first mooted. BBA's system is akin to an auction. After all, auctions are commonly used to find prices where none exist. It has many variants: from the “English” auction used to sell rare paintings to the on-line auction (as in e-Bay). In the end, every action aims to elicit committed price data from bidders.

As I see it, a more credible Libor fixing system would need four key changes: (i) use of actual lending rates; (ii) outlaw (penalise) false bidding bidders need to be committed to their price; (iii) encourage non-banks also to join in the process to avoid collusion and cartelisation; and (iv) intrusively monitor the process by an outside regulator to ensure tougher oversight.

However, there are many practical challenges to the realisation of a new and improved Libor. Millions of contracts that are Libor-linked may have to be rewritten. This will be difficult and a herculean exercise in the face of lawsuits and ongoing investigations. Critical to well-intentioned reform is the will to change. But with lawsuits and prosecutions gathering pace, the BBA and banking fraternity have little choice but to rework Libor now. As I understand it, because gathering real data can often pose real problems especially at times of financial stress, the most likely solution could be a hybrid. Here, banks would continue to submit estimated cost, but would be required to back them with as many actuals as feasible. To be transparent, they might need to be audited ex-post. Such blending could offer a practical way out.

Like it or not, the global banking industry possibly faces what the Economist has since dubbed as its “tobacco moment,” referring to litigation and settlement that cost the US tobacco industry more than US$200bil in 1988. Sure, actions representing a wide-range of plaintiffs have been launched. But, the legal machinery will grind slowly. Among the claimants are savers in bonds and other instruments linked to Libor (or its equivalent), especially those dealing directly with banks involved in setting the rate. The legal process will prove complicated, where proof of “harm” can get very involved. For the banks face asymmetric risk because they act most of the time as intermediaries those who have “lost” will sue, but banks will be unable to claim from others who “gained.” Much also depends on whether the regulator “press” them to pay compensation; or in the event legal settlements get so large as to require new bailouts (for those too big to fail), to protect them. What a mess.

What, then, are we to do?

Eighty years ago banker JP Morgan jr was reported to have remarked in the midst of the Great Depression: “Since we have not more power of knowing the future than any other men, we have made many mistakes (who has not during the past five years?), but our mistakes have been errors of judgement and not of principle.” Indeed, bankers have since gone overboard and made some serious mistakes, from crimes against time honoured principles to downright fraud. Manipulating Libor is unacceptable. So much so bankers have since lost the public trust. It's about time to rebuild a robust but gentlemanly culture, based on the very best time-tested traditions of banking. They need to start right now.

WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN

Former banker, Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British Chartered Scientist who speaks, writes and consults on economic and financial issues. Feedback is most welcome; email: starbizweek@thestar.com.my.

Monday 20 August 2012

Asian banks review US ties

Cost will rise when tough new rules on derivatives come into force

SINGAPORE: Asian banks are reviewing relationships with their US counterparts to avoid being caught by tough new American rules on derivatives trading that are about to come into force.

From the start of next year, non-US banks that annually deal in at least US$8bil worth of products such as interest rate swaps with American counterparties are expected to be subject to new derivatives rules in the Dodd-Frank Act.

In practice that means they will need to register as swap dealers with US regulators and abide by their rules on capital requirements and risk management, all of which adds to costs.

“If I have the choice, I just don't want to deal with a US person',” said a treasury manager at a regional Asian bank.

“We're still looking at our compliance situation, but it may mean that in future I need to ask all my US counterparties if there's a way they can change where they book their trades with us.”

A “US person” as defined by the regulation is a relatively broad term, intended by regulators to apply to any person or entity that will have an effect on American commerce.

The Dodd-Frank Act was spurred by the 2008 financial crisis and aims to impose tighter supervision of cross-border derivatives trade following incidents such as the loss-making trades by the socalled “London Whale” at JPMorgan's UK office.

But some lawyers say even entities that deal in a relatively small amount of derivatives could be forced to execute trades on an electronic platform and put them through a central clearing house acceptable to American regulators.

That has prompted a knee-jerk reaction from some Asian institutions to consider cutting all their derivative trading relationships with US counterparties, anxious to avoid higher trading costs and the spotlight of American regulators.

In reality, few banks were likely in the long term to cut all trading with US banks given that they provided a lot of liquidity to the market, and it would be hard to remain active in the global markets without them, he added.

In Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan combined, around US$143.1bil of interest rate derivatives were traded every day in April 2010, according to the most recent figures from the Bank of International Settlements.

While still small compared with the US$1.2 trillion traded in the UK and the US$642bil in the United States, the turnover has almost tripled from the US$50.8bil recorded in 2004.

American banks are big players in global over-the-counter derivatives markets, with JPMorgan Chase & Co, Citigroup Inc, Goldman Sachs Group Inc, Morgan Stanley and Bank of America Corp accounting for about 37% of all outstanding contracts, according to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association.

Asian players have a smaller share, although Singapore banks DBS Group Holdings, Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp and United Overseas Bank Ltd account for a large part of the S$282bil of interest rate swaps cleared at the Singapore Exchange since it launched its clearing service in November 2010, analysts estimate.

Lawyers say US banks operating in Asia are now rethinking how they structure themselves and handle their trades.

“US groups that want to remain competitive in the non-US market will need to develop a structure that enables them to trade in a way that does not scare their counterparties away,” said Theodore Paradise, a partner at law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell in Tokyo. - Reuters

Friday 20 July 2012

Anarchy in the financial markets!

 If regulators don't fix the lawlessness in international financial markets, future losses might us all in

THE lawlessness that pervades the international banking industry and especially the large Western banks must raise serious questions as to what perpetuates such barbarous behaviour among the custodians of people's money.

A big part of it is that the banking industry operates on greed rewarding its key employees via commissions for businesses brought in, deals made, and products sold even if they were dubious in the first place.

This encourages among the industry a bunch of highly dishonest salesman who shield themselves behind a veil of professionalism to dupe and seduce customers into believing their products are good and their processes are strong, secure and fair.

And they are aided by ineffectual regulators who parrot the trite phrase that free markets should not be overly regulated but turn a blind eye when the biggest financial institutions amass massive positions to fix markets and deceive customers, making a mockery of market freedom.

The Angel of Independence monument stands in front of HSBC’s headquarters in Mexico City. Europe’s biggest bank has been found laundering billion of dollars for drug cartels, terrorists and socalled pariah states, in a scandal which almost overshadows the Barclays’ one. — Reuters

The integrity of free markets was compromised because big players could affect the direction of markets, making the markets way less than perfect. Free markets basically became unfettered freedom to make money even at the expense of the market and the potential collapse of the world's financial system.

They did it yet again or to be more accurate they did it earlier but their misdeeds surfaced once more recently. UK's Barclay's bank made a US$453mil settlement with regulatory authorities in the United Kingdom and the United States for fixing the London interbank offered rate (Libor).

Now, it turns out that Barclay's may not be the only one. According to a Reuter's report, other major banks are likely to be involved and may try and go for a group settlement with regulators, the US' Commodities Futures Trading Commission and the UK's Financial Services Authority.

The banks being investigated include top names such as Citigroup, HSBC, Deutsche Bank and JPMorgan Chase. They all declined to comment to Reuters.

And one of these banks, Europe's biggest HSBC, has been found laundering billion of dollars for drug cartels, terrorists and so-called pariah states, in a scandal which almost overshadows the Barclays' one. That leads to the question of whether other banks were involved as well.

If they jointly fixed the Libor, the world's most used reference rate for borrowings and derivatives with an estimated US$550 trillion, yes trillion, of assets and derivatives tied to the rate, it will be a scandal of epic proportions and may result in settlements of an estimated US$20bil-US$40bil.

That settlement will only scratch the surface. Just 0.1% of US$550 trillion is US$550bil. That implies that if banks had been able to fraudulently fix Libor so that it was just 0.1 percentage points higher, customers throughout the world would have had to pay US$550bil more in interest charges in a year.

In March this year, five US banks, including Bank of America, Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase, made a landmark US$25bil settlement with the US government for foreclosure abuses.

Even so, only a small fraction of affected house buyers are expected to benefit from this. Many other banks, however, are relatively unaffected and have not been fully called to account for their role in the US subprime crisis, which could have caused a collapse of the world's financial system.

Banks which bundled together risky housing loans into credit derivative products and passed them off as those with higher credit rating than their individual ratings, aided by ratings agencies, got off scot free. No one was called to account.

That the financial system is still vulnerable and that all gaps have still not been closed is JP Morgan's recent loss of up to US$4bil from rogue trading by a London trader going by the name of The Whale.

There needs to be a new set of rules, regulations and behaviour one based on ethics, honesty, competency and checks and balances. Custodians of public money should be required to be above all else honest first and foremost.

They should be consummate professionals whose first duty should be to protect the deposits of customers and the bank's capital. They should not do anything which puts the bank at undue risk.

The insidious habit of rewarding those who bring in revenue with hefty commissions have to be stopped so that bankers do not take risks which put their banks at undue risk which will eventually require trillion of dollars in rescue from governments.

Regulators should again make clear demarcations between those financial institutions who are custodians of public money and those who are not and hold the former to much higher standards of accountability and integrity.

Shareholders of financial institutions who are custodians of public money should be led to expect a lower rate of return on their investments but they should also be led to expect a lower corresponding rate of risk befitting that of major institutions which are so vital for the proper functioning of the economy.

Enforcers should focus on bringing individuals responsible for these losses to book and throwing criminal charges at them which will put them behind bars for long periods of time, befitting their severity. Society at large tends to treat white-collar criminals with kid gloves.

When derivatives trading and deception brought major Wall Street firms such as Enron and WorldCom to their knees and eventual collapse in the early 2000s, enforcers brought to book key executives who are spending time behind bars.

But despite the near collapse of the world's financial system, despite fraudulent behaviour, despite misrepresentation and deception, despite selling structured products of dubious value and then promptly taking positions against them, despite fixing of reference interest rates, despite money laundering and despite many other crimes still to be unearthed, no one has been brought to account.

Fining institutions leaves those individuals responsible free. In fact, settlements made come with the agreement that there will be no prosecution of individual bank staff and gives major incentive for others to do the same.

They are safe in the belief that the institution will pay the price and they will go free in the event things turn wrong. Otherwise, they will end up millionaires and even billionaires. How convenient an arrangement!

There is anarchy in the financial markets and a state of lawlessness which encourages heists of unimaginable proportions without risk of punishment. If we don't watch it, the losses will do the world economy, and all of us, in.

A Question of Business
By P. GUNASEGARAM

> Independent consultant and writer P. Gunasegaram (t.p.guna@gmail.com) is amazed that people can get away with so much by just repeating two words: free markets.

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HSBC exposed: Drug money banking, terror dealings, money laundering!
Four British banks to pay for scandal!
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Stop the banks from gambling!
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Banks tighten lending rules amid uncertainty

Saturday 19 May 2012

Stop the banks from gambling!

The JPMorgan Chase debacle is ample reminder that banks are dangerously risking money on dubious bets with dire consequences if they are not stopped. 





US giant financial services group JPMorgan Chases trading debacle which has already lost US$2bil and which threatens to raise losses to double that, will likely put pressure for greater regulation of the banking industry, not just in the United States but around the world.

That is as it should be for despite the 2008 financial crisis which resulted from bankers structuring complex and questionable credit derivatives which few understood but many bought because they believed the rating assigned them by unknowledgeable credit rating agencies, the lessons dont appear to have been learnt.

With massive US government help, many banks which were on the brink of failure were rescued and the memories of those tempestuous times when the future of not just the banks but the worlds financial system was in jeopardy seems to have faded away from public consciousness.

Until now that is.

JPMorgans debacle is but a stark reminder that little has changed since the 2008 world financial crisis in terms of how banks operate and that the world is still held to ransom by rogue traders and others who risk shareholders funds and depositors money as easily and as nonchalantly as spinning the dice on a gambling table for a few dollars.

The sad truth is that little has been done despite all the rhetoric to ensure that the predatory chase for profits by banks does not involve gambling with shareholders equity and deposits. Players still get away with massive profits and bonuses when they succeed and little more than slap on the wrist when things go wrong.

It is an indication of a financial world that has gone awry as players such as hedge funds effectively search for new games to play in a massive, borderless casino where the uninitiated are quickly gobbled up and the others play high-stakes games in which some must become major losers.

This comment by Mark Williams, a professor of finance at Boston University, who has also served as a Federal Reserve Board examiner quoted in the New York Times aptly sums up JPMorgans mistake:

JPMorgan Chase has a big hedge fund inside a commercial bank. They should be taking in deposits and making loans, not taking large speculative bets.

The trades by JPMorgan are complex to say the least and no one really seems to understand them. The New York Times reported that the complex position built by the bank included a bullish bet on an index of investment-grade corporate debt and was later paired with a bearish bet on high-yield securities.

The report further said that the trading losses suffered by JPMorgan have accelerated in recent days and have surpassed the banks initial estimate of US$2bil by at least US$1bil. Part of the reason for this is that hedge funds already know JPMorgans position is under pressure and are piling in on the opposite trade. That means the US$4bil losses anticipated may materialise sooner rather than later.

While the US$4bil loss wont threaten JP Morgans capital base, the question that must arise is what if the losses were much bigger and they could well have been. JPMorgan would most likely be considered one of those banks that cant fail and would have been rescued by the US government.

To stop exactly such situations, the Obama administration had put up the Volcker Rule named after former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker who helped formulate it but the legislation is still being hammered out. The rule basically seeks to prohibit banks from trading for their own account.

But there are exceptions and these allow banks to aggregate their positions and offset their exposures in a single hedge. Some feel that JPMorgans so-called hedge an oxymoron in this instance as it hedged nothing falls into that category but others dont.

For most of us, the solution is quite simple and straightforward if you are a bank and you take depositors money, you got no business speculating using that money, especially since you also have access to low-cost funds from the Fed and elsewhere by virtue of being a bank.

But it is an election year in the US and the silly season of course, much like it is here.

Remember, free enterprise and the capitalist system on which the US is built. You cant restrict free enterprise, the reasoning goes, even if it is your money the bank is using.

Big business has big money and they are using that to try and put Mitt Romney into the White House. If that happens, then it may well be bye-bye to banking sector reform which would be bad for the United States and the world.

New York Times columnist and renowned economist Paul Krugman was very blunt in his analysis of the JPMorgan debacle at the end of which he basically thanked JPMorgan Chases chief executive Jamie Dimon for confirming that the banking sector needs greater regulation.

Krugman, an unashamed and unabashed Democrat, has been one of those opinion makers who has been consistently calling for greater regulation of the US financial sector in the wake of world financial crisis.
JPMorgan, relatively unscathed by the world financial crisis sparked off by the subprime crisis but now in trouble through a trade engineered by a trader in London known as The Whale, is a timely reminder that little has been done to stop the recurrence of another world financial crisis.

Let us take heed before it is too late.

A QUESTION OF BUSINESS By P. GUNASEGARAM starbiz@thestar.com.my
Independent consultant and writer P Gunasegaram sometimes thinks that the financial world is just one whole, big, casino of unimagined proportions. The trouble is no one knows who owns it.

Related posts:

How will JPMorgan's $2 billion loss affect American banking rules? Senior executives to leave! 
 May 16, 2012
Lehman Sues JPMorgan for Billions of Dollars in 'Lost ...
May 28, 2010
UK bank governor warns of eurozone crisis 'storm'; Eurozone 'very close to collapse'!
May 17, 2012

Tuesday 15 May 2012

How will JPMorgan's $2 billion loss affect American banking rules? Senior executives to leave!

 A JPMorgan office building is shown, Monday, May 14, 2012, in New York. JPMorgan Chase, the largest bank in the United States, said Thursday that it lost $2 billion in the past six weeks in a trading portfolio designed to hedge against risks the company takes with its own money.
A JPMorgan office building is shown, Monday, May 14, 2012, in New York. JPMorgan Chase, the largest bank in the United States, said Thursday that it lost $2 billion in the past six weeks in a trading portfolio designed to hedge against risks the company takes with its own money. (AP Photo/Mark Lennihan)

   

WASHINGTON—The $2 billion trading loss at JPMorgan Chase has renewed calls for stricter oversight of Wall Street banks. Two years after Congress passed an overhaul of financial rules, many of those changes have yet to be finalized.

JPMorgan's misstep gives advocates of stronger regulation an opening to argue that regulators should toughen their approach.

The Obama administration has argued that it went as hard on banks as possible without further upsetting global finance. Now Democratic lawmakers and administration officials say JPMorgan case proves that more change is needed.

Still, many in the industry warn against reading too much into one trading loss. They say losing money is an inevitable part of taking risk, as banks must.

Some fear that after JPMorgan's announcement, regulators will greet industry concerns with more skepticism as they flesh out key parts of the overhaul law.

Here's a look at four key parts of the financial overhaul and how they might be affected by JPMorgan's losses:

This provision restricts banks' ability to trade for their own profit, a practice known as proprietary trading. It is named for former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker.

-- Battle lines: Banks say it disrupts two of their core functions: Creating markets for customers who want to buy financial products and managing their own risk to prevent major losses.

They say proprietary trading was not a cause of the 2008 financial crisis and the rule is a means of political revenge on an unpopular industry. Advocates of stronger regulation argue that the rule would have prevented JPMorgan's loss. They say the trades were made to boost bank profits, not to protect against market-wide risk.

-- State of play: A draft of the rule satisfied neither side. It includes exceptions for hedging against risk and for market-making, but banks say they the exceptions are too narrow and difficult to enforce. It's nearly impossible to tell whether a bank bought or sold something for itself or for customers.

-- JPMorgan effect: Attitudes about the Volcker rule are likely to shift as a result of JPMorgan's disclosure, experts say. Even if JPMorgan's trades truly were a failed attempt to protect against risk, the resulting loss strengthens the argument that regulators should err on the side of scrutinizing trades.

During the 2008 financial crisis and the bailouts that followed, the government was unwilling to let the biggest banks fail, for fear of upending the financial system. As part of the overhaul, Congress created a process to shut down financial companies whose failure could threaten the system.

-- Battle lines: Most players agree that this is a good idea, despite some differences on the details.

-- State of play: The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the agency responsible for closing smaller banks that falter, has taken the lead on writing rules to shut down big firms. Most observers believe that the FDIC, under acting chairman Martin Gruenberg, is on track toward creating a system that markets would trust to close a big bank.

Banks have been working with regulators to create "living wills" detailing how they would wind themselves down without disrupting markets. This exercise has forced them to look more deeply at their operations -- a defense against the accusation that banks have grown "too big to manage."

However, U.S. regulators can't do it alone. A big problem after the failure of Lehman Brothers investment bank in 2008 was what to do with its overseas operations. It wasn't clear which regulators were in charge, or whose bankruptcy court would control the disposal of Lehman's assets.

Regulators are negotiating with their European counterparts, but it could take years before they agree on rules that would allow a global company to dismantle itself without spreading confusion through the financial markets.

-- JPMorgan effect: Like other banks, JPMorgan supports giving the government the power to dismantle a failing bank. CEO Jamie Dimon said so clearly in an appearance on "Meet the Press" on Sunday.

JPMorgan's loss probably doesn't affect the likelihood that regulators will break up a bank in the future. The loss wasn't nearly big enough to threaten JPMorgan with failure.

REGULATING DERIVATIVES

JPMorgan's bets involved complex investments known as derivatives whose value is based on the value of another investment. Before 2008, many derivatives were traded as individual contracts between banks and hedge funds, without any transparency for regulators. The financial overhaul sought to bring more derivatives onto regulated exchanges and force derivatives traders to put up more cash in case their bets turned against them.

-- Battle lines: Overhauling the rules governing this market, estimated at $650 trillion, has proved as complex as the investments themselves. Banks support many parts of the overhaul but generally argue that forcing too much transparency would make it harder and more expensive for companies to use derivatives as a hedge against risk. They say it is an unnecessary cost that would be spread across all types of companies.

The agency most responsible for implementing these rules, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, faces the threat of a much smaller budget than it says it needs to write the rules and increase its oversight of the derivatives market.

Advocates for stronger regulation argue that the new rules apply to the sorts of derivatives believed to have magnified the financial crisis -- and JPMorgan's losses -- but do not threaten investments like energy futures, for example, which airlines use to control fuel costs. They say banks are just trying to protect a lucrative business that other companies can't compete in today.

-- State of play: About half the rules are done, but many crucial questions have yet to be decided. The rules will be phased in this fall through next spring. Banks are lobbying hard to protect their hold on this profitable business. Banks support pending legislation that would limit U.S. regulators' control over derivatives trades by their overseas affiliates.

-- JPMorgan effect: Fairly or not, JPMorgan's big loss on derivatives trades is likely to revive scrutiny of that market. That could give advocates of tighter rules some juice in ongoing negotiations with regulators. It also could empower those who believe the budgets of the CFTC and Securities and Exchange Commission should be increased to reflect the need for broader oversight.

BANK OVERSIGHT

The overhaul calls on the Federal Reserve to oversee the biggest and most important financial companies and apply a stricter set of standards for financial fitness. For example, the companies must hold more capital as a buffer against future losses. Before, the biggest banks were overseen by a patchwork of regulations.

-- Battle lines: Industry officials say they're working with regulators to fine-tune how big companies will be overseen. They are concerned, for example, about the extra costs imposed on the big companies to offset the extra risk they create in the financial system.

-- State of play: Industry officials say many of these changes were happening behind the scenes even before the financial overhaul was passed in 2010. They say banks already are better capitalized and meet other standards laid out by regulators.

It's still not known exactly which financial companies will fall into this category. The biggest banks are included automatically. Regulators have more discretion when it comes what are known as non-bank financial companies, such as huge insurance companies. Companies on the margin reportedly are lobbying hard to avoid this designation.

-- JPMorgan effect: As the nation's biggest bank, JPMorgan automatically will face stricter oversight. The trading loss there is unlikely to affect detailed negotiations about how exactly such companies will be overseen.

By Daniel Wagner AP Business Writer

Monday 3 October 2011

A "great haircut" for U.S. growth



A "great haircut" to kick-start U.S. growth

Construction workers are shown on a residential housing work site in Burbank, California July 27, 2011.  REUTERS/Fred Prouser/Files

By Jennifer Ablan and Matthew Goldstein NEW YORK 

(Reuters) - More than three years after the financial crisis struck, the U.S. economy remains stuck in a consumer debt trap.

It's a situation that could take years to correct itself. That's why some economists are calling for a radical step: massive debt relief. Federal policy makers, they suggest, should broker what amounts to an out-of-court settlement between institutional bond investors, banks and consumer advocates - essentially, a "great haircut" to jumpstart the economy.

What some are envisioning is a negotiated process in which cash-strapped homeowners get real mortgage relief, even if it means forcing banks to incur severe write-downs and bond investors to absorb haircuts, or losses, in some of the securities sold by those institutions.

"We've put this off for too long," said L. Randall Wray, a professor of economics at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. "We need debt relief and jobs and until we get these two things, I think recovery is impossible."

The bailout of the nation's banks, a nearly trillion dollar stimulus package and an array of programs by the Federal Reserve to keep interest rates near zero may have stopped the economy from falling into the abyss. But none of those measures have fixed the underlying problem of too much U.S. consumer debt.

At the start of the crisis, household debt as a percentage of gross domestic product was 100 percent. Today it's down to 90 percent of GDP. But by historical standards that is high. U.S. households are still more indebted than their counterparts in Austria, Germany, Spain, France and even Greece - which is on the verge of defaulting on its government debt.

Tens of millions of U.S. citizens remain burdened with mortgages they can no longer afford, in addition to soaring credit card bills and sky high student loans. Trillions of dollars in outstanding consumer debt is stifling demand for goods and services and that's one reason economists say cash-rich U.S. companies are reluctant to hire and unemployment remains stubbornly high.

Take Donald Bonner, for example, a 61-year-old from Bayonne, New Jersey, who lost his job working on a dock in June. Back in March, he attended a "loan modification" fair held by JPMorgan Chase in New York. He has lived in his home since 1970, but was on the verge of losing his job. After falling behind on his $2,800-a-month mortgage, he sought to reduce his monthly payment. Bonner says the bank denied the request on the grounds that he is ineligible because his income is higher than the minimum threshold set by the Federal government for loan modifications.

"They keep asking me for additional documentation," Bonner said on Friday. "It seems to me there is never enough documentation and it has to be renewed every month. It does make you wonder with all this bailout money these banks have received, they don't want to lend the money."



DEBT JUBILEE

The idea of substantial debt restructurings and a haircut for bondholders has been raised by financial pundits, including Barry Ritholtz and Chris Whalen, two popular analysts and bloggers.

Renowned economist Stephen Roach, currently non-executive chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, has gone a step further, calling for Wall Street to get behind what others have called a "Debt Jubilee" to forgive excess mortgage and credit card debt for some borrowers. The notion of a Debt Jubilee dates back to biblical Israel where debts were forgiven every 50 years or so. In an August appearance on CNBC, Roach said debt forgiveness would help consumers get through "the pain of deleveraging sooner rather than later." (here)

But it's not just the liberal economists and doom-and-gloom financial analysts calling for a great haircut. Even some institutional investors, who might suffer some of the impact of debt reductions on their portfolios, are seeing a need for a creative solution to the mess.

"If there is something constructive that can be done it should be," said Ash Williams, executive director of the Florida State Board of Administration, which oversees $145 billion in public investments and pension money. "You don't want to reward bad behavior and you don't want to reward people who were irresponsible. But if there is a way to do well by doing good, then let's take a look at it."

To be sure, consumer debt levels have been coming down since the crisis began. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York reported in August that outstanding consumer debt has fallen from a peak of $12.5 trillion in third quarter of 2008 to $11.4 trillion. (NY Fed report: tinyurl.com/3uuvk8d) That's a sign that consumers are getting less indebted.

But U.S. households are still carrying a staggering burden of debt.

As of June 30, roughly 1.6 million homeowners in the U.S. were either delinquent on mortgages or in some stage of the foreclosure process, according to CoreLogic. And the real estate data and analytics company reports that 10.9 million, or 22.5 percent, of U.S. homeowners are underwater on their mortgage -- meaning the value of their homes has fallen so much it is now below the value of their original loan.

CoreLogic said the figure, which peaked at 11.3 million in the fourth quarter of 2009, has declined slightly not because home prices are appreciating but because a growing number of mortgages are entering foreclosure.

The nation's banks, meanwhile, still have more than $700 billion in home equity loans and other so-called second lien debt outstanding on those U.S. homes, according to SNL Financial.

Debts owed by American consumers account for almost half of the nearly $9 trillion in worldwide bonds backed by pools of mortgages, car loans, credit card debt and student loans, which were sold to hedge funds, insurers and pension funds and endowments.

And that doesn't include the $4.1 trillion in mortgage debt sold by government-sponsored finance firms Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Kenneth Rogoff, professor of economics and public policy at Harvard University and former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, has said the ongoing crisis should be called the "Second Great Contraction" because U.S. households remain highly leveraged. He says the high level of consumer debt is what distinguishes this from other recessionary periods.

COMPETING INTERESTS

For those in favour of a radical solution, there are a lot of headwinds.

Any debt reduction initiative must confront the issue of "moral hazard" - the appearance of giving a gift to an unworthy borrower who simply made unwise spending choices.

Institutional investors who own securities backed by pools of mortgages are reluctant to see struggling homeowners get their mortgages reduced because that means those securities are suddenly worth less. Any write-downs that banks are forced to take could imperil their capital levels.

Banks and bondholders, meanwhile, have competing interests. This is because mortgage write-downs depress the value of the securities in which mortgages are pooled and sold to investors. Big institutional investors like BlackRock have long argued that any meaningful principal reduction on a mortgage must also include a willingness by banks to take their own write-downs on any home equity loans, or second liens, taken out by the borrower on the property.

The banks continue to hold those second liens on their balance sheets and so far have been reluctant to mark down the value of those loans, even though the borrower often has fallen behind on their primary mortgage payments.

In other words, bondholders are taking the position if they must suffer losses, so must the banks.

"Institutional investors, pension funds and hedge funds all have fiduciary obligations and they can't necessarily agree to haircuts solely because it may be good social policy," Sylvie Durham, an attorney with Greenberg Traurig in New York, who practices in the structured finance and derivatives area.

Tad Rivelle, chief investment officer of fixed-income securities at TCW, which manages about $120 billion of which $65 billion is in U.S. fixed income, doesn't support a big haircut. But he says he can see why some economists and consumer advocates would favor debt reductions and debt workouts as way of dealing with the financial crisis and freeing up more money for spending.

Barry Ritholtz, director of equity research at Fusion IQ and a popular financial blogger, said the standoff between the banks and bondholders is untenable and doing a good deal of harm. An early critic of the bank bailouts, Ritholtz says bankers and bondholders are all in denial and both need to get far more pragmatic.

"They'd be bankrupt if not for the bailouts," says Ritholtz of the banks' position. "For their part, bondholders need to understand that we're not earning our way out of this mess and should eat losses now before they get nothing."

TIME FOR A MEDIATOR?

Given the standoff, there's a sense nothing will happen unless federal policymakers make the first move. The Fed reports that 71 percent of household debt in the U.S. is mortgage-related.

But so far Washington policymakers seem more content to rely on voluntary measures. The two main programs set up by the Obama administration to reduce home mortgage debt - the Home Affordable Refinance Program and the Home Affordable Modification Program - have had limited success.

To date, the U.S. Treasury Department reports that those voluntary programs have resulted in 790,000 mortgage modifications, saving those borrowers an average of $525 a month in payments. Many of those modifications, however, were for borrowers paying high interest rates, not ones underwater on their mortgages.

In fact, Bank of America, one of the nation's largest mortgage lenders, said it has offered just 40,000 principal reductions to its borrowers.

U.S. administration sources told Reuters that they support the concept of carefully targeted principal reductions for underwater borrowers. But these sources, who did not want to be identified, say the administration cannot mandate banks and bondholders to accept any principal reductions absent Congress authorizing the procedure.

The sources point out that federal authorities don't have a "magic wand" - even at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-backed home-loan titans.

These sources explain that even though Fannie and Freddie are effectively owned by the federal government, they are controlled by an independent regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency. And it's up to the FHFA, and not the administration, to approve any principal reductions on home loans involving Fannie and Freddie.

An FHFA spokeswoman declined to comment. The agency has repeatedly taken the position that its first job is protect taxpayers' return on investment in Fannie and Freddie rather than reducing mortgages for underwater borrowers.

CLOCK TICKING

The fear of some economists is that the economy may be going into a double dip recession. That means precious time is being lost if a negotiated approach to debt reduction isn't taken now.

But the banks also have their own big debt burdens to deal with. Next year alone, U.S. banks and financial institutions must find a way to either pay off or refinance $307.8 billion in maturing debt, compared to the $182 billion that is coming due this year, according to Standard & Poor's.

This maturing debt for U.S. banks comes at a time when they must start raising capital to deal with new international banking standards and are facing the possibility of a new recession that will crimp earnings. (Bank of America story: link.reuters.com/sys63s)

Beyond bank debt, hundreds of billions of dollars in junk bonds sold to finance leveraged buyouts also are maturing soon. S&P says "the biggest risk" comes in 2013 and 2014, when $502 billion in speculative-grade debt comes due.

Still, there are still plenty of economists who say the concern about consumer debt is overdone and that doing anything radical now would only make things worse. One of those is Mark Zandi, chief economist of Moody's Analytics, who says a forced write-down or haircut of debt "would only result in a much higher cost of capital going forward and result in much less credit to more risky investments."

He said significant progress has been made in reducing private sector debt, and draconian debt forgiveness measures would be a mistake. "Early in the financial crisis I was sympathetic to passing legislation to allow for first mortgage write-downs in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, but the time for this idea has passed," says Zandi.

Still, the notion of a debt write-down and bondholder haircuts will probably be around as long as the unemployment rate stays high and the housing market remains depressed.

Indeed, it has been two years since the notion of a "Debt Jubilee" made it into the popular culture when Trey Parker and Matt Stone used it for an episode of the politically incorrect cartoon "South Park." In the episode aired in March 2009, (here), one of the characters used an unlimited credit card to pay off all the debts of the residents of South Park to spur the economy.

At the time, the idea seemed like just a funny satire on the nation's economic mess. But now it seems like no joke at all.

(Reporting by Jennifer Ablan and Matthew Goldstein; Additional reporting by David Henry and Joseph Rauch; Editing by Michael Williams and Claudia Parsons)

Wednesday 27 July 2011

U.S. May Lose AAA Rating Even With a Debt Deal !





U.S. May Lose AAA Rating Even With a Debt Deal, BlackRock, Templeton Say



BlackRock Inc., Franklin Templeton Investments, Loomis Sayles & Co., Pacific Investment Management Co. and Western Asset Management said the U.S. faces losing its top-level debt rating as officials struggle to raise the $14.3 trillion borrowing limit and reduce spending.

Investors are warning a cut is likely as President Barack Obama and House Speaker John Boehner argue over how to increase the debt ceiling, while also trying to curb borrowing. The government needs to boost the cap by Aug. 2 so it can keep paying its bills, according to the Treasury Department.

The comments suggest that the world’s biggest bond managers are resigned to the fact that the U.S. rating will be cut. Standard & Poor’s, which has rated the U.S. AAA since 1941, said July 14 that the chance of a downgrade is 50 percent in the next three months and it may cut the nation as soon as August if there isn’t a “credible” plan to reduce the nation’s deficit.

“Addressing the debt ceiling is of course very important, but addressing it alone doesn’t avert a downgrade,” Barbara Novick, a co-founder and vice chairman at BlackRock, the world’s biggest money manager with $3.66 trillion in assets, said in an interview. “Without a credible plan to cut the deficit, that’s a real issue.”

Obama has said the nation’s record borrowings may “do serious damage” to the U.S. economy by diverting tax dollars to interest payments. Yields indicate investors are favoring bank or company debt over Treasuries, raising concern the credibility of government debt is waning.


‘Massive Consequences’

Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings have also said they may cut the nation’s top-level sovereign ranking if officials fail to resolve the stalemate.

“If the U.S. defaults, there would be massive consequences,” Pacific Investment Management Co.’s Mohamed El- Erian, chief executive and co-chief investment officer at the world’s biggest manager of bond funds, said in a radio interview on “Bloomberg Surveillance” with Tom Keene. “People are concerned, but they sort of think it’s a very, very low probability, and we would agree.”

The ratings may be reduced because politicians probably won’t agree on a plan to trim spending, said Kathleen Gaffney, co-manager of the $21 billion Loomis Sayles Bond Fund.


U.S. Credit Rating Downgrade Prospects
http://bloom.bg/pCfVUu

‘Certain’ Downgrade

“I’m pretty certain that at least by one agency we’re going to see a downgrade,” Gaffney, who is based in Boston, said yesterday in an interview on Bloomberg Television’s “Street Smart.” Treasuries will “continue to be a large, liquid market whether it’s AAA or AA,” she said.

Gaffney’s fund returned 14 percent in the past year, beating 98 percent of its competitors, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

The TED spread, the difference between what lenders and the U.S. government pay to borrow for three months, narrowed to 18.7 basis points yesterday, the least since March.

Debentures from Wal-Mart Stores Inc. (WMT), the largest retailer, and Paris-based utility EDF SA (EDF), both rated in the second-highest AA level, are the best-performing investment-grade corporate securities globally this month through July 25, Bank of America Merrill Lynch indexes show.

An index of corporate debt with the same AAA rating that the U.S. is at risk of losing is outperforming Treasuries by 0.13 percent, the most since March.

Yield Rise

“The longer-term implications are that a downgrade could be bad for our currency and this could raise our borrowing Costs,” Stephen Walsh, the chief investment officer of Western Asset Management, the Pasadena, California-based fixed-income unit of Legg Mason Inc., said in an interview. Walsh oversees about $365 billion in bond assets.

The 10-year Treasury yield rose five basis points to 3 percent as of 1:17 p.m. in New York, according to Bloomberg Bond Trader prices. The budget stalemate hasn’t been enough to push the rate to its decade-long average of 4.05 percent.

“Our growing debt could cost us jobs and do serious damage to the economy,” Obama said in a speech July 25. “Interest rates could climb for everyone who borrows money: the homeowner with a mortgage, the student with a college loan, the corner store that wants to expand.”

A House vote on Speaker Boehner’s two-step plan to raise the debt ceiling was postponed yesterday, casting doubt on whether lawmakers and Obama can come to an agreement before Aug. 2. Boehner has said Obama is seeking a “blank check.”

Investors may question the creditworthiness of the U.S., Christopher Molumphy, chief investment officer for Franklin Templeton’s fixed-income group, wrote in a report July 25 that his company distributed today by e-mail.

“Continued doubts about a longer-term solution to the U.S.’s federal deficit may well threaten the country’s AAA credit rating and the status of U.S. Treasuries as assets previously perceived as virtually ‘risk-free,’” according to Molumphy, who is based in San Mateo, California. He helps oversee $734.2 billion at the company.